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The Narragansett leader Miantinomi once explained to European settlers that his people 
were as a great tree when other tribes in the region were mere twigs. But in the years, decades, 
and centuries that followed the proclamation the authority and dominion claimed by Indians was 
reduced significantly, and the Narragansetts were left searching for a new dawn in which the 
continuation and relevancy of their community might be affirmed.   
This study traces the historical persistence of the Narragansetts by exploring how the 
Indians, at times, shifted the composition of their community in a process scholars refer to as 
ethnogenesis—the repeated reforming and reshaping of Native societies. This work shows that 
how the Narragansetts conceptualized and expressed evolutions within their community 
sometimes conflicted with the definitions and expectations of their non-indigenous neighbors, 
thus, creating interpretive conflicts that, in time, inspired challenges to the authenticity of the 
Narragansetts. Finally, this work examines how the dictates of others—whether the Indians 
sought to comply or not—eventually informed how many Narragansetts understood and 
professed their distinctive yet evolving identity as indigenous persons. 
According to an interpretation that remained unchallenged for close to three centuries, on 
19 December 1676, the Narragansetts suffered a debilitating defeat when a regiment under the 
direction of the United Colonies—a military alliance comprised of soldiers from Connecticut, 
Massachusetts, and Plymouth—marched into southern Rhode Island and valiantly subdued what 
had been a belligerent and bellicose tribe. The demographic, social, political, cultural, and 
economic consequences of the loss left the Narragansetts reeling until 1880 when state officials 
finally and compassionately detribalized the Narragansetts.     
  
Although this false narrative explaining the supposed demise of southern New England’s 
principal indigenous community was specific, it was not unique. Accounts proclaiming the 
disappearance of Native peoples were used to affirm Euro-American claims to land throughout 
North America. When coupled with what Jean O’Brien has termed replacement narratives—
chronicles designed to diminish the historical significance of Indian communities—accounts 
proclaiming the seemingly natural demise of Indigenous peoples have enabled English colonists 
and later American citizens to reap the rewards of a landscape seemingly devoid of indigenous 
persons while avoiding the territorial, legal, and ethical complications their presence and 
persistence would have created.  
Despite the preponderance of evidence found in more recent scholarship which lays bare 
the fallacies associated with what Phillip Deloria has referred to as the myth of the vanishing 
Indian, the falsehoods purporting the demise and disappearance of the Narragansetts remain 
mostly intractable in local lore. This may be due to the fact that public recognition of the 
continued existence of Rhode Island’s once-vibrant indigenous population portends tremendous 
economic and territorial consequence for a state comprised entirely of land originally claimed by 
the Narragansetts. Within this context, it is not difficult to understand why some Rhode Islanders 
remain reluctant to acknowledge the persistence of the Narragansetts as a community. Instead—
as non-Indians in the region have done for hundreds of years—many contemporary Rhode 
Islanders continue to challenge the racial, cultural, and historical authenticity of those who 
purport to be descended from the great tree.   
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mostly intractable in local lore. This may be due to the fact that public recognition of the 
continued existence of Rhode Island’s once-vibrant indigenous population portends tremendous 
economic and territorial consequence for a state comprised entirely of land originally claimed by 
the Narragansetts. Within this context, it is not difficult to understand why some Rhode Islanders 
remain reluctant to acknowledge the persistence of the Narragansetts as a community. Instead—
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Preface – The Smoke-Shop 
"It's a racial discrimination that they [Native Americans] feel is both systemic and also specific . 
. . that is felt at the individual level."
 1
 
       James Anaya, United Nations investigator  
 
On a hot morning in mid-July, a haphazard gathering of Narragansett Indians formed an 
impromptu human wall to protect what they deemed to be sacred and sovereign tribal land. The 
disputed territory was located in southern Rhode Island and was part of a rural enclave 
surrendered to the Narragansetts in a previous settlement between the tribe and state authorities.
2
 
On the other side of the roadway, directly across from the assembled group of Indians, stood a 
few dozen officers from the local police department and more than twenty state troopers. The 
officers had direct orders from the governor of Rhode Island Donald L. Carcieri to enter the 
property and forcibly close a smoke shop that the state claimed the Indians were operating 
illegally. Tensions were high as the two sides remained resolute in the belief that the moral and 
legal right resided on their side of the road. Hence, the ugly and violent melee that ensued as the 
officers advanced to close the shop seemed almost inevitable and was reminiscent of an earlier 
era when federal, state, and local leaders attempted to assert their authority over indigenous 
                                                 
1
 James Anaya was appointed special investigator for the United Nations in its 2012 assessment of Native 
Americans rights. Anaya concluded that “the historical oppression that indigenous peoples have suffered, the taking 
of their lands, the undermining of their cultures, the taking of their children to boarding schools in order to wean 
them away from indigenous culture, these have had profound effects on indigenous peoples. There's yet to be a real 
reckoning of that history and reconciliation.” This study constitutes an attempt to better understand and 
communicate the conditions, decisions and events that have helped to shape the social, political, cultural, and 
economic realities faced by many indigenous peoples including members of the Narragansett Indian Tribe.        
2
 “Joint Memorandum of Understanding Concerning Settlement of the Rhode Island Indian Land Claims,” Rhode 





 But the altercation that took place on July 14
th
 was not an episode born 
out of the Indian wars of the nineteenth-century. Instead, this incident occurred in 2003, during 
an age of live video feeds and twenty-four-hour cable news. The story and images of the clash 
between the Narragansetts and the police were broadcast worldwide by the Cable News Network 
(CNN).  Among other images, audiences witnessed officers being choked, and tribal members 
(including women and children) slammed violently to the ground. The events of that day and—
perhaps more importantly—the images they generated prompted viewers to question why this 
embarrassing episode had even taken place.   
In response to the growing criticism over the state's approach to dealing with the 
Narragansetts, Governor Carcieri established a committee to “independently review the facts and 
circumstances leading up to and surrounding” the state police raid on the Narragansett Indian 
smoke shop.
4
 A few of the findings issued in the committee's final report help to illustrate the 
continued importance and relevance of the quires that inform this study. Because, to comprehend 
why the Narragansetts and state officials were primed for violence, one must first appreciate the 
history behind what were deeply-rooted and longstanding animosities.     
In its final report, the review committee established by the governor asserted that there 
was a severe discrepancy between the "risk level assessment" and the outsized number of 
officers deployed by state and local leaders. The committee found the overwhelming force 
dispatched by the state was inappropriate and only helped to inflame hostilities. But why did 
leaders decide to employ such a large and heavily armed force to shut down the smoke shop?  
                                                 
3
 Pauline Turner Strong, American Indians and the American Imaginary: Cultural Representations across the 
Centuries (Boulder: Paradigm Publishers, 2013), 27. 
4
 “Executive Summary: Report of The Independent Committee on the July 14, 2003, Narragansett Smoke Shop 
Incident,” Brown University, accessed June 13, 2017,  
http://www.brown.edu/Administration/News_Bureau/2003-04/03-037.html.  
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Answering this question reveals a broader reality which lays bare the crux of an enduring divide 
between the Narragansetts and many of their neighbors. Indeed, as the two sides aligned 
themselves and prepared for a faceoff, there was more than just a road that separated them.     
For almost 400 years the cross-cultural interactions between the Narragansetts and their 
non-Indigenous neighbors remained mostly adversarial.
5
 It was within this historical context that 
the Indians and officers clashed as centuries of hostilities worked to harden hearts, minds, and 
viewpoints. Thus, on that summer morning in mid-July, each side was willing to assert the 
veracity of their historical conceptualizations violently. For Rhode Island’s leaders, the opening 
of the smoke shop constituted a blatant and illegal power grab by the Narragansetts. In fact, 
much of the state’s citizenry saw the altercation as just the latest flashpoint in a long history of 
overreaches by a mostly inconsequential people who were defeated long ago but who refused to 
accept the consequences and realities associated with that loss.  
An editorial published in the Providence Journal—the principal periodical for the state of 
Rhode Island—the day after the raid on the smoke shop was indicative of the view many non-
Indians held about the status of the Narragansetts in relation to the authority of the state. The 
author argued that “tribal members were terribly wrong to resist the state police . . . turning a 
peaceful exercise of law enforcement into an ugly melee.”
6
 The writer continued to explain that, 
“No group—even one as historically persecuted as Native Americans—should be free to ignore 
state laws.”
7
 Governor Carcieri also immediately placed blame upon the tribe and decried the 
Indians as instigators. In a press conference held soon after the raid, the governor emphatically 
                                                 
5
 Julie A. Fisher and David J. Silverman, Ninigret, Sachem of the Niantics and Narragansetts: Diplomacy, War, and 
the Balance of Power in Seventeenth-Century New England and Indian Country (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
2014), 140.  
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condemned the Indians when he stated: "Let me be crystal clear: Today's actions were 
precipitated by the Narragansett Indians and their flagrant violation of state law…they have 
knowingly violated our law and have done so with impunity.”
8
 This interpretation of the Indians 
as unruly—perhaps even savage—outlaws informed the decisions and actions of those charged 
with upholding state law. Within this context, the affront posed by the Narragansetts was 
intolerable to many officials. Thus, the large contingent of officers dispatched to the grounds of 
the smoke shop was—at its core—a physical manifestation of the state’s authority over the tribe.   
In the days following the raid, and due in large part to the violent images of the 
confrontation broadcasted worldwide, many began to challenge the veracity of the state’s 
interpretation. “With national attention on the melee between state police and the Narragansett 
Indians,” begins an article authored by multiple staff writers for The Providence Journal, 
“Governor Carcieri yesterday backed away from wholly blaming the tribe and ordered two 
investigations into the state’s actions.”
9
  Apparently, culpability for the altercation was not as 
“crystal clear” as the governor and editors of The Providence Journal had once suggested. For 
their part, many of the Narragansetts did not interpret the opening of the smoke shop as a 
flaunting of state authority. Instead, the Indians saw the establishment of the shop as almost an 
act of desperation. For centuries the Narragansetts have remained among Rhode Island’s most 
economically disadvantaged group.
10
  And for some of the Indians, this was no accident. Paula 
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 “Carcieri: Raid was regrettable but necessary,” Providence Journal, July 16, 2003, A-9. 
9
 Mark Arsenault et al. “Governor apologizes to those injured,” The Providence Journal, July 16, 2003, A-1 
10
 “Minority health facts Native Americans in Rhode Island 2015,” Rhode Island Department of Health, accessed 
June 13, 2017, 
http://health.ri.gov/publications/factsheets/minorityhealthfacts/NativeAmericans.pdf. 
According to the Rhode Island Department of Health in 2015, the household income for Native Americans was 
about one-third that of the state's white population.         
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Dove-Jennings—a member of the Narragansett tribal council—was indignant as she recounted 
what she interpreted as some of the state's most egregious trespasses against the tribe. "The state 
has taken away our religion, our water rights, our language.  It's taken away our right to have a 
casino."
11
 In the two decades that preceded the raid, the state actively opposed many of the 
economic endeavors perused by the Narragansetts.
12
 This opposition included the passage of a 
legislative rider attached to an appropriations bill in 1996 that rendered the Narragansetts the 
only federally recognized tribe barred by Congress from establishing a casino.
13
 It was to this 
legislation that Dove-Jennings had referred.  
These historical realities and their propensity to inform the decisions of contemporaries 
was acknowledged by the committee when it explained that “The Tribe’s conclusion that a 
smoke shop was the most viable option for revenue can be understood in the context of a long 
history of conflict with the State.”
14
 Hence, some Narragansetts saw the smoke shop as perhaps 
the only available commercial opportunity with the potential to improve the tribe’s overall 
economic condition.
15
  Consequently, when the state moved to shut down the shop forcefully, 
many within the tribal community interpreted this effort as just the current manifestation of a 
long history in which non-Indians attempted to subdue, marginalize, and even erase the region's 
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 “Tribe: The smoke shop opens,” The Providence Journal, July 13, 2003, Sunday edition. 
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 In 1992 the Narragansett proposal to build a casino under the auspices of the IGRA was opposed by state leaders. 
In 1996 Senator John Chafee introduced an amendment to the IGRA that nullified the Act as it pertained to the 
Narragansetts. See Robert A. Geake, A History of the Narragansett Tribe of Rhode Island: Keepers of the Bay 
(Charlestown: History Press, 2011), 134-140.  
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 “Repeal Chafee Rider to Support Restoring IGRA Rights to the Narragansett Tribe,” National Congress of 




 “Executive Summary.” 
15
 Wanda Hopkins, Interview conducted by the author, June 10, 2017.   
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Indigenous inhabitants. “Finally,” began Narragansett Medicine Man Lloyd Wilcox as he 
addressed a large crowd the day after the raid, “the racism and bigotry in this state has been fully 
exposed.”
16
 For many of the people in attendance that day, the social conditions to which Wilcox 
referred were pervasive, longstanding, and becoming insufferable. Thus, the Medicine Man's 
statement met "tremendous applause."
17
 When the officers formed their ranks across from the 
wall of Narragansetts on the 14
th
 of July, they did so within a social and political atmosphere 
laden with historical animosities.  
Aside from the fact that the Narragansetts and state officials held conflicting 
interpretations about the intent of the smoke shop, assigning responsibility and blame for the 
physical confrontation that ensued becomes even more difficult once one considers the fact that 
the Narragansetts are a federally recognized tribe. This status meant that the Indians held—in 
theory anyway—a government to government relationship with the state of Rhode Island and not 
the subordinate role state leaders attempted to assign to the tribe.
18
 This was the political 
framework in which the Indians operated. In fact, on the day of the altercation, Matthew 
Thomas—Chief Sachem of the Narragansetts—instructed tribal members not to accept the 
authority of any warrant unless it was a federal warrant. Thomas and many others within the 
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 Mark Arsenault and Katie Mulvaney, “Narragansetts’ chief urges ‘healing’ after police raid,” The Providence 




 In Worcester v. Georgia the Court held that "The Cherokee Nation, then, is a distinct community occupying its 
own territory, with boundaries accurately described, in which the laws of Georgia can have no force, and which the 
citizens of Georgia have no right to enter but with the assent of the Cherokees themselves, or in conformity with 
treaties and with the acts of Congress. The whole intercourse between the United States and this Nation, is, by our 
Constitution and laws, vested in the Government of the United States."  With this decision, the court established that 
Indian Nations were under the jurisdiction of the federal government and not the state.  See: Felix S. Cohen, "The 
Erosion of Indian Rights" (1953). Faculty Scholarship Series. 4354. 
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers/4354  
xix 
tribe apparently believed that—according to the stipulations outlined by the Supreme Court in 
Worcester v. Georgia—as a federally recognized tribe the Narragansetts were only beholden to 
the authority of the federal government.
19
 This also meant that lands held under tribal jurisdiction 
were not subject to state law. This interpretation was communicated at a news conference held 
by an exasperated Thomas shortly following the raid. The Narragansett chief fumed that a 
"couple of things [are] very concerning to us.  First of all, to ignore the federal status about the 
tribe is unacceptable.”
20
 Thomas continued to explain that “the tribe has federal status. And 
under that federal status, our agreement is with Congress.”
21
 However, the state’s decision to 
disregard the sovereignty of the tribe’s landholdings was not as flippant as Thomas suggested. 
Although the status of the tribe was incontrovertible, the land upon which they maintained the 
smoke shop was not. As previously mentioned, the vast majority of the tribe’s landholdings were 
obtained via a settlement agreement reached with the state of Rhode Island in 1978. This 
agreement stipulated that the land relinquished by the state to the tribe would remain subject to 
Rhode Island’s laws. But Thomas and many of the Narragansetts operated from an understanding 
that the federal government’s recognition of the tribe in 1983 superseded any earlier agreements 
reached with state administrators. 
22
 Hence, the ideological and political gulf that existed 
between the state and the Narragansetts undergirded a seemingly irreconcilable divide that 
eventually erupted into violence. However, “The parking lot of the smoke shop”—admonished 








 This was not unlike the earlier refusals by the leaders of the newly formed state to recognize and abide by the 
agreements fashioned between the Narragansetts and the region’s colonial leaders. See 
xx 
the review committee charged with investigating the raid—“was not the appropriate forum to 
address longstanding issues of tribal rights.”
23
 
Hence, the issues that informed the decisions of the Narragansetts and the officers when 
they aligned themselves along the roadway were multifaceted and deeply-rooted. At the core of 
the dispute was not forgone tax revenue, but the legitimacy of a people who sought to assert their 
autonomy in a state that had for more than a century refused to recognize not only the 
sovereignty but also—at times—the very existence of the Narragansetts.
24
 As they watched their 
adversaries across the street lock arms in defiance, the officers did not recognize the Indians as 
members of the citizenry they had sworn to protect. Instead, what authorities saw when they 
looked at the Narragansetts were criminals, usurpers, and imposters. The governor made this 
interpretation “crystal clear” when he railed about how the Indians had “violated ‘our’ law.”  
Indeed, the state’s current leadership continued to see the Narragansetts in the same light as had 
their predecessors because—for centuries—the Indians were not perceived of as part of the 
general community. Having long been viewed and treated as outcasts, when the Narragansetts 
aligned themselves to oppose the officers, the Indians also failed to recognize their neighbors. 
Instead, what tribal members saw when they looked across the roadway was the latest 
incarnation of an oppressor who had for so long sought to subjugate, marginalize, and—at 
times—terminate their community. Acknowledging the unique and historical social, political, 
and economic realities that informed the decisions and actions of those who stood on both sides 
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 In 1880 the state of Rhode Island officially detribalized the Narragansett arguing primarily that the tribe no longer 
existed.  See:  “1898 Jan., Opinion of the Supreme Court Relative to Chapter 800 (Narragansett Indians),” Rhode 




of the divide, helps us to better comprehend what precipitated the violence. But even such an 
appraisal is at best superficial because to understand the complexity of the ideological chasm that 
existed between the state and the Narragansetts on July 14
th
, 2003; we must consider the genesis 
of the animosities that boiled over during the raid.   
1 
Introduction – The Black Foxes 
The Indians say they have black Foxes, which they have often seene [sic], but never 
could take any of them: they say they are Maittooes [sic], that is, Gods Spirits or Divine powers.
1
 
         Roger Williams  
Put simply, this investigation seeks to understand the Narragansetts as a community. 
However, the endeavor is not as straightforward as it sounds. The task is complicated by the fact 
that—like all people—the Narragansetts have evolved as they created and adapted to new 
realities. Hence, in many ways, understanding who the Narragasnetts were at any given moment 
is analogous to when tribal members saw the black foxes. We can catch glimpses of the 
Narragansetts but may never be able to capture all of the complexity and nuance associated with 
that community. Still, the snapshots provided throughout this work offer a vantage point from 
which to piece together the treads of Narragansett identity.      
“Indigenous nations have been composed,” writes anthropologist Pauline Turner Strong, 
“over time, of shifting and diverse set of persons conceptualized less often as individuals than as 
members of social groups.” At its core then, this is a study of how those who continued to 
proclaim their identity as Narragansett Indians shifted the composition of their community over 
time. This work also reveals how the Narragansetts conceptualized and expressed changes within 
their community as part of an Indigenous identity. Moreover, this investigation examines the 
historical realities that helped to create and perpetuate enduring social, political, and economic 
divisions between the Narragansetts and many of their non-Indigenous neighbors. It illuminates 
the specific choices made by individuals and groups within the Narragansett community as they 
contended with the dynamic and often contradictory laws, policies, demands, and expectations of 
their neighbors. Finally, this study shows how the dictates of others—whether the Indians sought 
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 Roger Williams, A Key Into the Language of America (New York: Cosimo Classics, 2009) 103. 
2 
to comply or not—informed how the Narragansetts understood and professed their distinctive yet 
evolving identity as Indians.  
This study is organized chronologically into five chapters with each chapter exploring a 
distinct but interrelated aspect of Narragansett identity. Chapter one provides an overview of 
how chroniclers have interpreted and communicated the experiences of Native Americans in 
general and the Narragansetts in particular. This chapter traces the historiography to identify how 
major historical themes have helped to shape the way Indigenous peoples and their actions were 
interpreted.   
Chapter two illuminates how evolving social, political, and cultural conditions influenced 
periods of ethnogenesis—the repeated reforming and reshaping of Native societies—in southern 
New England.  This section appraises intercultural interactions between white settlers and Indian 
peoples as the latter sought to restructure and redefine their political, cultural, and social 
boundaries during a period of increasingly frequent and consequential cross-cultural 
associations. The chapter also examines how some Indigenous peoples framed intercultural 
interactions in ways that reaffirmed traditional political, cultural, and social conceptualization.     
Chapter three shows that as Europeans gained militaristic, economic, and demographic 
ascendancy throughout the region, new conceptualizations about the parameters of Indigenous 
cultural, social, and political identities were used to redefine the Narragansetts in the eyes of the 
general public. Although the tropes characterizing Native Americans as forever ancient and 
vanishing directly contradicted how the Narragansetts had understood and expressed their 
indigeneity for centuries, these interpretations became self-affirming when Euro-Americans 
publicly lamented and worked to actively hastened the supposed disappearance of the 
Narragansetts. The narrative claiming the expiration of the tribe that took shape shortly after 
3 
King Phillip’s War in 1676, proved enduring and was used to great effect throughout the 
centuries that followed. By evaluating the realities associated with Rhode Island’s efforts to 
detribalize the Narragansetts in the nineteenth-century, chapter three explores the veracity and 
utility of the demise narrative. The chapter reveals how the determination of state officials to 
terminate the collective identity of the Indians was informed more by historical misconceptions 
than an effort to improve the plight of Rhode Island’s Indigenous population through 
assimilation and inclusion as some have supposed. This study shows how the durable narrative 
of demise coupled with the political and economic aspirations of members of the white 
citizenry—and not the actual demographic, cultural, social, or economic conditions of the tribe—
led to Rhode Island’s  official termination of the Narragansetts’ collective identity. 
Chapter four explores how the Narragansett sought to maintain and reaffirm a group 
identity in the years following detribalization. This section reveals how the athletic exploits of 
the Narragansett runner Ellison “Tarzan” Brown ultimately inspired some of Rhode Island’s 
political leaders to officially recognize the Narragansett tribe’s continued existence. The chapter 
illustrates how Brown and some of his Indigenous brethren parlayed the runner's physical 
accomplishments into meaningful, community-wide social, economic, and political 
advancements.   
Revealing how Narragansett tribal members internalized and endeavored to prove not 
only their racial authenticity but also the validity of their community, constitutes the 
interpretative focus of chapter five. The chapter reveals that when some Narragansetts 
reinterpreted and expressed their indigeneity during the 1930s, certain tribal members also 
assumed and employed a modality of identity politics that was monovalent and reinforced "the 
4 
assumption that differences exist between identities but not within an identity.”
2
  Hence, as some 
Narragansetts sought to authenticate and express their distinctiveness by claiming and 
accentuating some the identifiers of indigeneity delineated in the mainstream, they also adopted 
and reinforced the delimiting cultural assumptions and racial stereotypes espoused by the wider 
community. 
The specific actions that created, extended, and protracted the divide that existed between 
the Indians and state officials are deeply rooted in the past. Those early events continue to hold 
tremendous significance not only for the Narragansetts and the state of Rhode Island—as 
evidenced during the raid on the smoke shop—but also for the federal government and its 
broader policies concerning Indigenous peoples—as evidenced in Carcieri v. Salazar.
3
 When 
Rhode Island filed suit against the Department of the Interior in an attempt to circumscribe the 
autonomy of Narragansett landholdings, the state—once again—placed its longstanding struggle 
with the Indians in a national spotlight. And although the state eventually prevailed, the split 
decision rendered by the U.S. Supreme Court in 2009—which hinged on a narrow interpretation 
of one word—did little to mediate historic ideological incongruities. At an observance marking 
the raid’s ten year anniversary, Dove-Jennings lit a small ceremonial fire. When the flames 
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 Greta Snyder Fowler, “Multivalent Recognition: Between Fixity and Fluidity in Identity Politics,” The Journal of 
Politics, 74 (2012): 254.  
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suddenly extinguished themselves, the elder explained that the fire had “gone out because our 
voices are not being heard.”
4
 This work endeavors to illuminate the historical conditions that 
precipitated many of the region's enduring misconceptions. Such an aim can only be realized if 
the often stifled voices of the Narragansetts are allowed to speak. Hence, this work seeks to shed 
light on perspectives that remain conspicuously absent from a historical discourse that is often 
invoked, and as such, continues to inform and shape outcomes even in the present day.     
Exploring the unique perspectives of Native peoples as they confronted, fashioned, and 
navigated evolving historical realities is fraught with complications. Many chroniclers fail to 
incorporate an Indigenous point of view into their works because the voices of Native Americans 
appear to be absent in the sources most commonly used. Because Native peoples did not write 
down their interpretations and recollections, writers often rely too heavily upon the accounts of 
those who did. Therefore, the narratives they produce are incomplete and Eurocentric. However, 
some authors call attention to the absence of Indigenous viewpoints in historical interpretations 
and work in novel ways to incorporate the Native voice. For example, the historian Daniel K. 
Richter suggests that if chroniclers shift their perspectives and “try to view the past in a way that 
faces east from Indian country” history becomes “much more complicated, much more 
interesting, and much more revealing.”
5
  Richter explains that including the viewpoints of 
Indians is not contingent upon the availability of sources produced by Native Americans.  
Instead, Richter posits that a Native perspective—one that faces east—can be derived from 
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 Daniel Richter, Facing East from Indian Country: A Native History of Early America (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2001), 8.  
6 
sources produced by non-Indigenous peoples through a process of reorientation, reappraisal, and 
reinterpretation. Such an interpretative shift not only reimagines Indigenous peoples as central 
actors in North America’s long historical drama, but also encourages researchers to explore "how 
old documents might be read in fresh ways.”
6
 Similarly, in her account of Pocahontas, Camilla 
Townsend employs an east-facing approach to communicate a new perspective on an old and 
familiar topic. Instead of choosing to convert to English lifeways because of their supposed 
superiority, Townsend pieces together fragmented historical record and new archeological 
discoveries to argue that the famous heroin was kidnapped and imprisoned by the newcomers. 
But hardly an ineffectual victim, Pocahontas used her position to advance the interest of her 
people choosing to remain Powhatan in the midst of an English world. To better communicate 
the differing interpretations and perspectives of the Narragansett people—when appropriate—
this study applies the analytical approach delineated by Richter and Townsend when evaluating 
sources produced by nonnatives.   
Still, attempting to glean the viewpoints of Indigenous peoples from sources produced 
outside of—and often in opposition to—Native communities remains a harrowing endeavor. But, 
as the historians Julie A. Fisher and David J. Silverman argue, the stories of Native peoples “are 
worth telling despite the obstacles, for to give up just because the evidence is incomplete, 
uncertain, or biased is to allow history to remain a story of the victors.”
7
 The investigative 
techniques utilized by the authors to illuminate the world inhabited by Ninigret—a seventeenth-
century Niantic/Narragansett sachem—are instructive. As discussed later in chapter two, 
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Ninigret was the tribe’s only principle sachem to survive the debilitating struggle that has come 
to be known as King Phillip’s War. The leader and many of his followers endured because 
Ninigret proclaimed and sought to maintain the neutrality of his people throughout the conflict 
even—at times—assisting colonial authorities in their fight against the Indian coalition. Through 
his decisions and actions, Ninigret helped to spare a smaller group of the Indians from the 
disastrous fate that befell the greater Narraganett community. And it was this contingent that 
comprised the foundation of the tribe after 1676. However, the Ninigret depicted by Fisher and 
Silverman “is not colonized, subjugated, converted, or conquered.”
8
  Instead, the sachem “draws 
on colonialism as it suits him.”
9
 The nuanced interpretation of Ninigret propagated by the 
authors juxtaposed earlier dichotomies that portrayed the Narragansett leader as either a dutiful 
friend to the colonists or a tragic Indian leader engaged in a futile resistance to the inevitability 
of white expansion. An interpretative lens that promotes a deeper appreciation for the agency of 
Indigenous persons—like that used by Fisher and Silverman—is employed throughout this work. 
Moreover, Fisher and Silverman struggled—like all chroniclers who hope to reveal the 
experiences of earlier Native Americans—with the fact that the records they are left to 
investigate were primarily fashioned and controlled by Europeans. And as such, the documents 
these writers produced seldom sought to identify, comprehend, or explain the unique challenges 
facing Indigenous persons and groups. The authors acknowledge that this incomplete record 
necessarily leads to a lack of interpretive certainty. However, Fisher and Silverman posit that 
neglecting the perceptions of Natives because the “story is incomplete would be as misleading as 
asserting that we know all there is to know.”
10
 There are instances in this investigation when the 
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considerations and motivations of principal characters such as Miantonomi and Ellison Brown 
are not stated specifically in the documentary record. And it is at these points of conjecture that I 
utilize a similar interpretive approach as that employed by Fisher and Silverman when they 
sought to communicate the world inhabited by Ninigret. “Rather than avoid questions about 
Ninigret’s uncertain motivations,” write the authors, “our approach has been to propose his range 
of choices and suggest his thinking at moments of decision.”
11
 By making use of the analytical 
techniques delineated by Fisher and Silverman, this work illuminates conceptualizations about 
the past that heretofore remain mostly unexplored in the historical discourse. Indeed, the failure 
to acknowledge and include the interpretations and perspectives of the Narragansetts in a work 
about the Narragansetts would render this study as deficient as many previous accounts. And 
although, as Richter and Townsend attest, it is impossible for the modern historian to see the 
world through the eyes of past peoples, a shift in perspective will allow scholars to look over the 
shoulders of earlier populaces to better appreciate the world in which they lived.
12
   
Along with advocating for both a reorientation of perspective and a multilayered 
interpretation of Native peoples, historians have recently endeavored to determine the meanings 
behind and purposes of specific acts of Indigenous agency. Although traditionally viewed in a 
negative light, the presence, decisions, and actions of Native peoples permeate early accounts 
and records. Scholars such as Gary Van Valen explain how an interpretive focus on the agency of 
Indigenous peoples reveals a much more dynamic and complicated past. While discussing the decisions 
and actions of the Mojo—an Indigenous group living in the Amazon region—he posited that, 
“by looking through the prism of agency, we can see that the Mojos were not inherently victims 
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or powerless in the face of changes imposed by others, and that they would prove to be active 
participants.”
13
 Indeed, as was true with the Mojo, Indigenous peoples throughout the Americas 
actively contributed to the shaping of historical realities. Focusing on the agency of the 
Narragansetts reveals the dynamism of tribal members as they helped fashion social, political, 
and economic conditions in Rhode Island.   
But this study does not simply retell what the Indians did. It also appraises what these 
actions communicated about the individual and collective interpretations and perceptions of the 
Narragansetts. Moreover, by using agency as an analytical model, this work shows how certain 
Narragansetts conceptualized and sought to express their unique perspectives. Revealing what 
was connoted in the actions of the Natives is accomplished here in two ways. First, to better 
understand the implications of Narragansett agency, the actions of the Indians must be viewed 
through a long historical lens. For example, when the Narragansetts attempted to bodily resist 
Rhode Island’s effort to close the smoke shop, centuries of perceived injustices informed the 
actions of the Indians. Officials failed to appreciate the historical exigencies that influenced the 
agency of the Narragansetts, and thus, the heavy-handed approach pursued by the state only 
made matters worse. Similarly, too many chroniclers of the Narragansetts fail to appreciate the 
historical conditions that inform and shape many of the decisions made by the Indians. Hence, 
earlier accounts often fail to express the complexity and totality of the Natives’ experience. 
Finally, focusing on particular acts of Indigenous agency will enable extrapolation of the cultural 
milieu that helped to precipitate various decisions and informed numerous actions. Because, as 
the historian Inga Clendinnen explains, “Actions and words are conceived, expressed, recognized 
                                                 
13
 Gary Van Valen, Indigenous Agency in the Amazon: The Mojos in Liberal and Rubber-Boom Bolivia (Tucson: 
University of Arizona, 2013), 3.  
10 
and understood within a system of shared expectations and meanings,” one can infer from these 
actions the shared understanding that sustains them.
14
  For example, as the Narragansetts stood in 
defiance on the 14
th
 of July in 2003, their collective action revealed not only a shared experience, 
but it also communicated how the Indians interpreted that experience. Indeed, the human wall 
formed by the Narragansetts, was a physical manifestation of collective frustrations. And the 
"tremendous applause" tendered to Wilcox as he admonished state policies evidenced the 
exasperation felt by many of his fellow tribal members. By employing the analytical framework 
described by Clendinnen, this work not only illuminates what the actions of people and groups 
connote about how the Narragansetts perceived different events, but it also encourages a greater 
appreciation for the unique worldview of these Indigenous peoples. 
Through identifying, reappraising, and contextualizing the unique experiences of the 
Narragansetts, this work traces some of the cultural and ideological transformations within the 
tribal community. Although the Narragansetts are by no means a monolithic group, identifying 
general shifts in how the Natives conceptualized and expressed their indigeneity extends our 
understanding of the Indians. For example, in the short documentary “Sovereign 
Nation/Sovereign Neighbor” the Narragansett scholar Sylvia Spears maintains that the land 
settlement reached with Rhode Island’s leaders in 1978, “was not with the federally recognized 
tribe called the Narragansett [that is] two different things.”
15
  The “two different things” Spears 
was compartmentalizing was the political identity of the Narragansetts pre and post federal 
recognition. As mentioned earlier, the achievement of a federal status dramatically altered the 
                                                 
14
 Inga Clendinnen, Ambivalent Conquests: Maya and Spaniard in Yucatan, 1517-1570, Second Edition 
(Cambridge: University of Cambridge, 2003), 132. 
15
 Kendall Moore, “Sovereign Nation/Sovereign Neighbor,” Media that Matters, accessed June 28, 2017, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ixvhuu24zoA. 
11 
way the Indians conceptualized and expressed their relationships with local and state authorities.  
But these fluid ideas about the parameters of identity maintained and expressed by many 
Narragansetts were in juxtaposition to Rhode Island’s rigid appraisals of indigeneity which had 
less to do with a political identity than a racial one. The scholar Craig N. Cipolia observes that 
the ideological and cultural transformations that occur in Indian communities “are neither wholly 
Native nor wholly European but mixed responses to the cultural and social pluralities of 
colonialism.”
16
 Hence, identifying and appraising specific cultural and ideological changes 
within the Narragansett community helps to reveal not only how the Indians internalized their 
indigeneity in relation to the non-Indigenous others who also sought to define them, but it also 
illustrates how the Narragansetts continued to express their distinctiveness.    
To reconstruct the social, political, and economic realities associated with certain 
historical events, this study consults many of the traditional sources produced by colonial and 
state officials. However, as described earlier, these documents are appraised using an “east 
facing” orientation, and thus, are employed to illuminate not only the world inhabited by the 
authors but also the realities experienced by the Narragansetts. This work supplements the 
sources produced by non-Indigenous peoples with the oral histories and personal recollections of 
some Narragansetts. Fisher and Silverman explain that oral traditions provide “an important 
Indigenous counterpoint” to a documentary record that is “woefully incomplete.”
17
 Previous 
writers seldom consulted these alternative sources despite the fact that the oral histories of the 
Narragansetts are imbued with a distinct validity. First, the historical interpretations of the 
Narragansetts derive from an oral tradition that has remained unbroken for more than three 
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 As the Indians gathered annually during—what is now known as the August 
Meeting—to celebrate their traditions, the stories, jokes, and histories they retold were passed on 
from one generation to the next creating and reinforcing an enduring perception of the past that 
often challenged traditional narratives. For example, Dawn Dove—a Narragansett scholar—
stated that,  
When I recall the oral histories that have been passed down in my family, and I read the 
historical documents of the colonizers I can readily see why the colonizers want to keep 
the lie. The truth would make one weep. The truth is so horrific that it would make one 





The oral histories that were passed down to Dove and other Narragansetts are not only credible 
because they were continually recalled and retold, but also because these acts of recollection 
were performed in familiar places steeped in the cultural geography of the Narragansetts.
20
  The 
archeologist Patricia E. Rubertone explains that the forest, swamps, fields, and shorelines that the 
Narragansetts “traveled through settled on, and subsisted from…were places steeped in long-
term histories, enduring social relations, and sacred traditions.”
21
 Moreover, the anthropologist 
Keith H. Basso argues that some Indian peoples viewed their landscapes “as a repository for 
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distilled wisdom, a stern but benevolent keeper of tradition.”
22
 Because the Narragansetts were 
never divorced from their most important historical landscapes, the Indians’ geographic 
repositories serve as constant reminders of not only wisdom and tradition, but also history.
23
 
More than three hundred and fifty years have passed since the Narragansetts suffered 
their greatest defeat at the hands of colonial authorities in what chroniclers have called “The 
Great Swamp Fight.”  However, tribal members who—till this day—gather in commemoration at 
a landscape imbued with the cultural geography of the Indians, profess that the “fight” was no 
fight at all. Indeed, many Narragansetts refer to the event as “The Great Swamp Massacre” 
because—according to oral history—what took place in the winter of 1675 was the wholesale 
slaughter of noncombatants, elderly men, women, and children.   
In October 2016, while standing at a location that for many Narragansetts has become 
hallowed ground, the tribal elder Dove-Jennings stated “I look around, I look at the leaves, I look 
at the color of the trees, I look at the shapes of the trees, and I wonder, I wonder what these trees’ 
ancestors saw happen here.”
24
 It is clear that for Dove-Jennings and other Narragansetts this 
particular landscape serves as a repository that continues to inform perceptions about the realities 
experienced by tribal members both past and present. Devaluing the historical conceptualizations 
held by Dove, Dove-Jennings, and many other Narragansetts because they fail to conform to a 
more traditional evidentiary format, is to turn a blind eye to a rich alternative source of 
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information in a documentary record that remains woefully incomplete. And although like all 
sources, the oral histories of the Narragansetts must be employed judiciously, the continued 
failure to acknowledge and appraise these extremely viable pieces of evidence is untenable.   
Another crucial source of information consulted throughout this work are the writings 
and documents produced by the Narragansetts themselves. Beginning in 1935 tribal members 
produced a monthly newsletter called “The Narragansett Dawn.”  And although the paper’s final 
issue was produced in September of 1936, the histories, stories, recollections, and accounts it 
published during its short run depict a viewpoint that would otherwise remain mostly 
inaccessible. Heretofore, the Dawn has been used very sparingly by previous writers. By 
combining traditional documentary evidence with the alternative sources delineated above, not 
only is a Native viewpoint incorporated into the metanarrative, but a history gleaned from the 
actions, told through the voices, and written with the words of Indigenous peoples enriches our 




Chapter 1 - The Rock and the Sea 
In a seminal work revealing the acts of accommodation that helped establish the “middle 
ground” as a place between cultures where interactions among diverse peoples led to the creation 
of new and shared meanings and practices, historian Richard White observed that the stories 
detailing relations between Euro-Americans and the area’s indigenous peoples have, on the 
whole, been overly simplistic. White explained that earlier narratives tended to interpret Indian 
peoples as rocks whose culture, lifeways, and identities were rigid and unchanging. In contrast, 
Europeans were often portrayed as the sea, a dynamic, persistent force that eventually “w[ore] 
down and dissolve[d] the rock.”
25
  
White’s rock and sea metaphors for chroniclers’ conceptualizations of early relationships 
between indigenous and non-indigenous peoples give especially apt descriptions of scholars’ 
framing of cross-cultural interactions between the Narragansetts and Euro-Americans. Generally, 
writers have interpreted the Narragansetts as a people in the past, forever reduced to a pair of 
historical footnotes. First, the tribe has been remembered as the Natives who generously 
welcomed and aided Puritan outcast Roger Williams. The dissenter Williams not only founded 
the colony of Rhode Island but has also been credited with establishing greater religious freedom 
and tolerance in the region.
26
 The Narragansetts provided a haven for him in his time of need, so 
the tribe has continued to hold a special—yet historical—place in regional and national lore. A 
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small granite monument erected by the state of Rhode Island in tribute to the Narragansetts shed 
light on how non-Indians have continued to perceive the tribe. The words carved into the tablet 
explained that the stone was placed “in recognition of the kindness and hospitality of this once 
powerful nation to the founders of this State.” To those who commissioned and financed the 
memorial, it was clear that Rhode Islanders owe gratitude to the Indians, but it was also evident 
that, in the minds of many of these same citizens, the Indians to whom they owed appreciation 
were a people in the past.  
Second, the Narragansetts have been remembered as the principal power in the 
Indigenous coalition that instigated a futile uprising against colonial authorities in 1675. In the 
prevailing narrative, the Narragansetts, in the aftermath of their defeat, “were no more by the 
summer of 1676.”
27
 In this version of the past, over the span of a half-century, New England’s 
greatest rock—the Narragansetts—was utterly smashed and dissolved into the sea, making way 
for the expansion of Euro-American colonialists.   
This paradigm proclaiming both the nobility and the disappearance of the Narragansetts 
is not unique to this tribe. Instead, these themes are representative of a general narrative 
interpreting Indigenous peoples as mostly inconsequential bit players in the Nation’s history. 
Scholar Roxanne Dunbar-Ortiz explained that origin stories help define and unify a people’s 
collective identity and communicate their values. However, the author observed, the historical 
realities associated with colonialism have proven problematic for “those who seek history with 
an upbeat ending, a history of redemption and reconciliation.”
28
 Historian Susan A. Miller 
explained that “the prevailing narrative of American history originated with Columbus, and has 
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never been favorable to the American Indigenous peoples.”
29
 Moreover, the author posited, the 
“colonial posture of Europeans” engendered historical interpretations with strong anti-
Indigenous biases. Dunbar-Ortiz argued that many earlier historians “hop[ed] to have successful 
careers in academia and to author lucrative school textbooks,” so they propagated and protected 
the historical myths later bemoaned by White, Miller, and many others.  
Early scholars generally embraced and rationalized the themes associated with what has 
become known as “settler colonialism”—the replacement of Indigenous populations through 
state-based policies of genocide and land theft. The narratives that mythologized Euro-
Americans as a vibrant sea smashing the supposedly inert, intransigent rock of Native societies 
with the unrelenting waves of modernity and civilization, therefore, can be understood as 
explanations and rationalizations of a turbulent past. The assumptions and implication associated 
with these earlier narratives have proven to be enduring and—as Miller observed—“continue to 
poison the Euroamerican discourse of American Indian history.”
30
 
The first scholarly chronicles focused on Native Americans appeared in the mid-1800s. 
The writers of these accounts sought to explain and legitimize the general withdrawal of 
Indigenous peoples as the United States expanded its western boundaries. “The field from its 
earliest manifestations,” wrote Alyssa Mt. Pleasant, Caroline Wigginton, and Kelly Wisecup, 
“made its name by studying materials devoted to justifying European settlement in the 
Americas.”
31
 Many early accounts cast Native Americans as undeserving “savages” ill equipped 
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to realize the potential of the land they held. From this perspective, the dispossession and 
removal of Indian peoples was interpreted as a sign of the nation’s “manifest destiny” to—as 
explained by John O’Sullivan, who coined the term—“overspread the continent allotted by 
Providence for the free development of our yearly multiplying millions.”
32
 To realize this future 
envisioned by O’Sullivan and many others, the original inhabitants of the “continent allotted by 
Providence” had to vanish or at least retreat to the periphery, relinquishing their land for “free 
development” by the “multiplying millions.”  
The desire for the continent’s Indigenous inhabitants to cede their land was depicted in 
American Progress, an 1872 painting by John Gast many consider to be the graphic embodiment 
of O’Sullivan’s vision. In the painting, Indigenous persons, half-naked and clutching instruments 
of war, creep to the margins as Columbia, a white-clothed, white-skinned woman representing 
America, leads a procession of white faces marching west to bring progress and prosperity to a 
land previously filled with wild animals and wild people. 
  Accounts published in the mid-to-late nineteenth century on tribes east of the Mississippi 
also foreshadowed the next dominant trope in Indigenous history. Chroniclers of tribes along the 
Atlantic coast often portrayed Indigenous communities as “brave, populous, powerful, generous, 
and hospitable.”
33
 However, the Indians, according to these same writers, were also vanquished 
and on the path to extinction. As Jeffery P. Shepherd wrote, Native Americans were deemed to 
be “doomed relics of the past . . . noble savages . . . on their last vision quest.”
34
 After the 
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massacre of the Lakota at Wounded Knee in 1890, a motif depicting Indigenous persons as 
“noble savages” dominated the historical discourse, even west of the Mississippi. The belief that 
Native American culture was both laudable and ephemeral gave rise to what became known as 
“salvage anthropology.” To preserve the material authenticity of Native American culture, 
anthropologists such as Franz Boas recorded many customs and traditions of the various 
dwindling tribes.  
In Rhode Island, this renewed interest in salvaging, documenting, and preserving the 
“traditional” lifeways of Indigenous peoples most notoriously manifested in the desecration and 
plunder of Indian gravesites. The unearthing of one grave—said to be the “Tut-ank-ahmen of 
Rhode Island”—yielded a treasure-trove of “relics,” some of which ended up in collections 
maintained by the Rhode Island Historical Society and Harvard University’s Peabody Museum.
35
 
Even as Rhode Islanders grew more curious about the ways in which the Indians used to live, 
however, they continued to mostly ignore the descendants of those whose graves they raided. In 
fact, the state never prosecuted a suit filed by Narragansett tribal members Henry Hazard, John 
Noka, and Gideon Ammons accusing nine men of illegally unearthing Rhode Island’s “Tut-ank-
ahmen.”
36
 Moreover, the cultural snapshots looters pulled from the earth proved delimiting. As 
antiquarians paraded and displayed their ill-gotten treasures as authentic representations of 
Indigeneity, they hardened perceptions and misconceptions, leaving little room for contemporary 
Indians who did not live precisely as their ancestors had two hundred years earlier.  
The exploitation of Native peoples became a central focus of writers whose accounts 
appeared in the mid-twentieth century. Influenced by the societal reordering of the progressive 
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era and the social upheavals of the civil rights movement, revisionist historians turned from 
interpreting Indian peoples as “noble savages” and lamenting their supposed disappearance to 
decrying the cruelties suffered by Indigenous communities, constituting what became known as 
the “ Indian as victim” school of historiography.
37
 Historians such as Angie Debo, Alvin 
Josephy, and Donald Berthrong documented specific abuses as settlers, politicians, missionaries, 
and even officials at the Bureau of Indian Affairs exploited Natives and their land and natural 
resources.
38
 For example, Debo’s And Still the Waters Run “quickly became a classic of Indian 
history” as the author “uncovered the sordid truth of greed that Oklahomans had denied with 
myths of progress and patriotism.”
39
   
Nowhere were the myths of Euro-American benevolence and Indian disappearance more 
enduring than in New England, where the descendants and apologists of the Puritans crafted 
durable historical narratives proclaiming the magnanimity of the settlers. However, the mythos 
declaring the evenhandedness of New England’s early colonists encountered a significant 
challenge in 1976 with the publication of Francis Jennings’ The Invasion of America: Indians, 
Colonialism, and the Cant of Conquest. Jennings debunked traditional constructions of cross-
cultural relations as Puritan propaganda and depicted Euro-Americans as purposeful, conscious 
imperialists. “The conquerors of America glorified the devastation they wrought in visions of 
righteousness,” wrote Jennings, “and their descendants have been reluctant to peer through the 
aura.”
40
 Like Debo, Jennings methodically recounted certain injustices experienced by Native 
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peoples and denounced the colonists as “liars who dissembled to justify conquest.”
41
 More than 
an indictment of Euro-American settlers, though, The Invasion of America constituted a novel 
approach to the study of American history. “American society is the product not only of 
interaction between colonists and natives,” posited Jennings, “but of contributions from both.”
42
 
The author argued that Indigenous peoples were not “mere foil[s]” or curiosities but central 
figures whose decisions and actions helped shape current realities. However, The Invasion of 
America was disjointed because Jennings failed to thoroughly incorporate in the second half of 
the book the methodological changes advocated in the first half. For example, as Jennings 
delineated the abuses committed by the colonists, he limited his depiction of Indigenous persons, 
including the Narragansetts, to that of victims. Jennings, Debo, and others with similar views 
portrayed Natives as simple and ineffectual. These Indians did not participate in the creation of 
historical outcomes because history happened to them, not because of them. Simply put, they 
were victims and victims only. 
Jennings admitted that due to the scope, his book offered “more than the ordinary number 
of opportunities for error.”
43
 However, the shortcomings of its second half appear more 
egregious when one considers that The Invasion of America was published after Vine Deloria’s 
Custer Died for Your Sins: An Indian Manifesto which first appeared in 1969. Deloria (Sioux) 
railed against the simplistic, superficial depictions of Indians perpetuated by scholars who 
adhered to the popular tropes of savagery and victimization. “The American public,” observed 
                                                 
41
 Kirsten Fischer, “In Retrospect: The Career of Francis Jennings,” Reviews in American History 30, no. 4 (2002): 
519, https://muse.jhu.edu/. 
42
 Jennings, The Invasion of America, vi–vii. 
43
  Ibid., viii. 
22 
Deloria, “fe[lt] most comfortable with the mythical Indians of stereotype-land.”
44
 The author 
aimed to make the “American public” uncomfortable through his cutting prose and unabashed 
exhibition of the misuses, misunderstandings, and missteps of Euro-Americans. Custer Died for 
Your Sins initiated a paradigm shift in studies on Native American history because the author not 
only condemned the dominant society—as the writers of the victimization school had—but also 
delineated specific acts of resistance, stressing the agency of Indigenous peoples. For example, 
Deloria wrote: 
Always, it seemed, the white man chose a course of action that did not work. The 
white man preached that it was good to help the poor, yet he did nothing to assist 
the poor in his own society. Instead he put constant pressure on the Indian people 
to hoard their worldly goods, and when they failed to accumulate capital but 




This passage reveals not only the folly and viciousness exhibited by some Euro-Americans but 
also the Indigenous peoples’ refusal to completely give up their lifeways in favor of the supposed 
superiority and civility of white society. Despite Deloria’s demand for a broader interpretation of 
Native peoples, though, the master narrative continued to proclaim that the Indians who failed to 
assimilate and melt into the American collective were inauthentic—especially if they did not 
exhibit the mythical stereotypes Deloria exposed and condemned.  
Only a few years before Deloria’s scathing condemnation, historian Robert Berkhofer 
issued a challenge to academics in the article “The Political Context of a New Indian History.” 
Berkhofer explained that “assumptions about racial superiority” often informed interpretations of 
the “history of white–Indian relations.”
46
 He called on scholars to reevaluate their 
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conceptualizations of Native American history and to shift from simplistic, one-sided narratives 
dominated by the Euro-American experience to more inclusive interpretations taking into 
account the persistence of Indigenous communities. “By concentrating on this latter theme,” 
wrote Berkhofer, “the historian moves Indian actors to the center of the stage and makes Indian-
Indian relations as important as white-Indian ones have been previously.” Essentially, in this 
article, Berkhofer outlined the need for scholars to address what was an interpretive gap in not 
only studies on Native Americans but also the overall historical discourse because the 
persistence of Indigenous communities remained a central theme in American history.  
Moreover, like Deloria, Berkhofer sought to challenge the enduring fallacies of the 
incivility, savagery, and disappearance of Indigenous peoples. In The White Man’s Indian: 
Images of the American Indian from Columbus to the Present, Berkhofer observed that the idea 
and image of Indians, at their core, were a “White conception. …The Indian was a White 
invention and still remains largely a White image, if not stereotype.”
47
 The author explained that 
Euro-Americans created standardized interpretations that often misconstrued and conflated 
Indigenous cultures. Berkhofer showed that colonial and American authorities used the images 
and stereotypes attached to this homogenized version of Indigeneity to justify dispossession. 
Within this context, the Indians who inevitably failed to conform to the stereotyped imagery 
crafted by non-Indians were interpreted as inauthentic, so their claims as Indigenous persons 
were deemed to be immaterial. The White Man’s Indian has remained an important piece of the 
historiographical puzzle for not only tracing the genesis and uses of imagery and stereotypes 
derided by many subsequent scholars but also issuing Berkhofer’s challenge for academics to 
                                                 
47
 Robert F. Berkhofer, The White Man's Indian: Images of the American Indian from Columbus to the Present 
(New York: Random House, 1979), 3.   
24 
envision Native peoples as historical actors. In The White Man’s Indian, the author provided 
writers with a model of how to do so. 
By the early 1980s, many scholars, influenced by the social upheavals of the 1960s, fully 
embraced Berkhofer’s call to action and produced works reinterpreting Indigenous peoples as 
active agents central to the creation of historical change. Historians such as James Merrill, 
Richard White, Neal Salisbury, Colin Calloway, and Jean M. O’Brien, among others, generated 
accounts reimagining the historical roles played by Native Americans. For example, in Manitou 
and Providence: Indians, Europeans, and The Making of New England, 1500–1643, Neal 
Salisbury departed from many earlier simplistic, deterministic accounts and showed that Natives 
shaped colonial policies, “forced non-Indians to follow their rationales for trade, controlled the 
regional economy, and briefly fended off Anglo expansion.”
48
 Salisbury’s work has been widely 
hailed as an early example of the merits of ethnohistory—a methodology blending anthropology, 
linguistic studies, archeology, and history in an effort to go beyond the written record to 
reconstruct historical realities. Drawing on a wide variety of source material, Salisbury devoted 
equal attention to the experiences of Natives and colonists as both peoples worked to craft, 
reform, and reinterpret cross-cultural experiences. The book’s opening chapter reconstructed life 
along the eastern coast of the northern Atlantic before European settlement. In doing so, 
Salisbury illuminated many continuities between the worlds inhabited by Indigenous peoples 
before and after contact with Europeans. Manitou and Providence has remained instructive 
because it showed how to overcome the limitations of traditional documentary evidence when 
creating narratives highlighting communities that left few written records. 
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In Roots of Dependency: Subsistence, Environment, and Social Change among the 
Choctaws, Pawnees, and Navajos, Richard White employed this same methodology to describe 
the processes that wrought particular yet often shared historical outcomes among various Native 
peoples. In his investigation of the Choctaws, Pawnees, and Navajos, White drew upon the work 
of archeologists and anthropologists to delineate series of political, economic, and environmental 
changes that eroded the autonomy of these Indigenous communities, making them (and many 
others) dependent peoples. White posited that for the Choctaws—and, by extension, other Indian 
peoples—“trade and market meant not wealth but impoverishment, not well-being but 
dependency, and not progress but exile and dispossession.”
49
  
The Roots of Dependency was more nuanced than many previous accounts simply 
chronicling the victimization of Indians. In the work, White illustrated how the Choctaws, 
Pawnees, and Navajos adapted their lifeways to better meet their evolving social, cultural, and 
environmental realities. For example, he showed that throughout much of the eighteenth century, 
the Choctaws were able to pit the English and the French against each other, collecting “gifts” 
from both European powers. However, after the English victory in what is commonly referred to 
as the French and Indian War and the expulsion of France from North America in 1763, the 
Choctaws could no longer play both sides and became subject to the demands of the market 
economy. White argued that to acquire the European products upon which they had grown 
accustomed, the Choctaw decimated a significant source of their subsistence—the whitetail deer. 
In this way, White traced how Native peoples actively participated in the creation of their lived 
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experiences. The methodological approach pioneered by Salisbury and White was widely 
adopted by many of their successors.   
White’s investigative model was taken up and applied to great effect by David Rich 
Lewis in Neither Wolf nor Dog: American Indians, Environment and Agrarian Change. Lewis 
not only followed White’s interdisciplinary approach but also incorporated the same comparative 
model developed in The Roots of Dependency. Like White, Lewis used three Indigenous tribes—
the Northern Utes, Hupas, and Tohono O’odhams—as case studies to trace “Native American 
responses to directed cultural change, particularly the social and environmental consequences of 
directed subsistence change.”
50
 Lewis observed that the policies of directed subsistence pursued 
by the Euro-American majority mostly failed because they were ill conceived, and more 
importantly, Indians proved to not simply be white men of a darker shade. For example, many 
Ute men refused to adopt the majority’s agrarian practices due to the traditional view of farming 
as women’s work. Lewis argued that these Indigenous communities investigated were neither 
wolf (wholly unassimilated) nor dog (completely acculturated), so they were seen by many as 
innately deficient and consequently relegated to the social and economic margins. Neither Wolf 
nor Dog told “part of the larger story of how agrarian-based policies, environmental change, and 
native cultural responses contributed to the ultimate dependency of previously self-sufficient 
peoples.”
51
 However, instead of focusing on what Indian peoples lost while attempting to adopt 
Euro-American lifeways, Lewis illustrated the evolutions and transformations occurring within 
these Indigenous communities. Hence, Lewis interpreted the Natives not as passive victims of 
externally imposed changes but as protagonists who actively wrought their own realities.  
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This interpretive shift was indicative of what became known as “new Indian history,” 
borrowing the term from Berkhofer’s instructive, path-breaking article. Perhaps the most notable 
work produced within this new methodological and interpretive approach was White’s The 
Middle Ground. When it appeared in 1991, The Middle Ground was nothing less than an 
ideological revolution because White did not describe Indians as victims or bit players eking out 
an existence on the periphery. Instead, White argued, Native peoples were crucial to forging a 
middle ground established by accommodation and dominated by neither Euro-Americans nor 
Indians. White explained that “this accommodation took place because for long periods of time 
in large parts of the colonial world whites could neither dictate to Indians nor ignore them. 
Whites needed Indians as allies, as partners in exchange, as sexual partners, as friendly 
neighbors.”
52
 For White, this middle ground was not merely a forum for accommodation and 
compromise but an entirely new cultural creation formed in a dialectical process. He explained: 
On the middle ground diverse peoples adjust their differences through what 
amounts to a process of creative, and often expedient, misunderstandings. People 
try to persuade others who are different from themselves by appealing to what 
they perceive to be the values and the practices of those others. They often 
misinterpret and distort both the values and practices of those they deal with, but 
from these misunderstandings arise new meanings and through them new 




White’s interpretation of the interactions between Indigenous peoples and Euro-Americans in the 
context of a middle ground necessarily placed the former at the center of his investigations and 
firmly grounded his work in the model of new Indian history. However, the author did more than 
reinterpret Native peoples as agents and active protagonists because upon this middle ground, 
new yet authentic Indigenous identities were formed.  
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White inspired many historians to reappraise how they interpreted interactions between 
Natives and non-Natives, resulting in more academics discovering, defining, exploring, and 
contextualizing the middle grounds between various Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples. 
For example, in his work on the Indian slave trade, Alan Gallay posited that “neither Louisiana 
nor Florida nor Carolina could have resisted the powerful Indian confederacies,” and “at any 
time, native peoples could have destroyed the plantations and entire colonies.”
54
 Gallay 
explained that the Europeans who settled in these regions were dependent on the Indians and 
could not have survived without their assistance. The power dynamics outlined by Gallay meant 
that Euro-Americans were unable to dictate the terms of cross-cultural interaction and exchange.  
Following the examples of Salisbury, Lewis, and White, Gallay began The Indian Slave 
Trade by outlining the social, political, and demographic realities experienced before the arrival 
of Europeans by what scholars now refer to as the Mississippian Cultures—possibly the most 
complex Indigenous community in the Americas north of Mexico. In reconstructing the lifeways 
of the Mississippian people, Gallay “assessed evidence within new contexts and from different 
perspectives.”
55
 In The Indian Slave Trade, he also relied heavily on the abundance of 
archeological evidence uncovered from the earthen mounds—some reaching as high as one 
hundred feet—built and used by the Indians for more than two thousand years.
56
 Gallay showed 
that the Mississippian peoples kept slaves as labor sources and status symbols long before the 
arrival of Euro-Americans, and “Europeans did not introduce slavery or the notion of slaves as 
laborers to the American South but instead were responsible for stimulating a vast trade in 
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 This trade served as the foundation upon which Natives and Euro-
Americans negotiated a middle ground. Both cultures made social, political, and economic 
adjustments to better accommodate an exchange that proved to be “the most important factor 
affecting the South” from 1670–1715.
58
 More than a chronicle of the interactions between 
Natives and non-Natives, The Indian Slave Trade placed Indians at the center of the narrative by 
focusing on the interactions, relationships, alliances, and rivalries among various Indigenous 
communities. For example, Gallay observed that for the polities comprising the Creek, the 
“Confederation met their needs, and did so in a manner that neither eradicated nor significantly 
altered the individuals’ and groups’ traditional ways of life, social systems, and local polities.”
59
  
Ultimately, the Indigenous communities discussed by Gallay were not—as assumed by 
many earlier chroniclers—hamstrung by antiquated traditions that rendered them incapable of 
adjusting to new social, economic, and political realities. Instead—and according with the 
themes explored by the school of new Indian history—the Natives profiled in The Indian Slave 
Trade were dynamic, active arbiters of not only their own experiences but also those of the 
people with whom they interacted. For example, Gallay explained that the Yamasee War—a 
conflict that erupted in 1714 when the trade alliance between the Yamasee and Carolinian 
settlers broke down—forever changed life in South Carolina. “It took years for South Carolina to 
rebuild after the Yamasee War,” wrote Gallay, “but by 1730 it had emerged in a dramatically 
new form.”
60
 Gallay explained that only in the aftermath of the conflict with the Yamasse did 
South Carolina planters begin to import African slaves in high numbers. The turn from unfree 
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Indian labor to unfree African labor forever reshaped demographics in the region. In fact, over 
the next century, South Carolinians imported so many Africans that by 1860, black slaves 
comprised fifty-seven percent of the state’s population.
61
 These shifts in the racial makeup of 
South Carolina were spurred by Native Americans and revealed the utility and value of not only 
Gallay’s work but also the school of new Indian history. The Indian Slave Trade confirmed the 
centrality of Indigenous peoples in the creation of the social, political, and economic conditions 
that came to dominate the American South. Due to such reappraisals, the experiences and 
contributions of Native Americans were no longer deemed supplemental but were seen as 
essential to the development of larger historical realities. 
In many ways, Pekka Hamalainen’s The Comanche Empire embodied recent attempts to 
reframe historical narratives about America’s Indigenous population. Hamalainen challenged 
traditional notions of empire and power and, in doing so, found not only a middle ground but 
also a world dominated by the Comanche, which had significant ramifications for interpretations 
of broader American history. The author described a past when “Indians expand[ed], dictate[d], 
and prosper[ed], and European colonists resist[ed], retreat[ed], and struggle[d] to survive.”
62
 
Moreover, The Comanche Empire moved beyond the traditional interpretive confines of the 
colonial era and showed how these “Lords of the South Plains” were able to repel Euro-
American excursions into the Southwest throughout much of the nineteenth century. More than 
defenders of their land and lifeways, the Comanche—as profiled by Hamalainen—were 
imperialists in their own right as “they manipulated and exploited the colonial outposts in New 
Mexico, Texas, Louisiana, and northern Mexico.”
63
 The author convincingly argued for the 
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centrality of Indigenous persons when he observed that “the rise of the Comanche empire helps 
to explain why Mexico’s Far North is today the American Southwest.”
64
  
Hamalainen acknowledged that The Comanche Empire was about a past that “according 
to conventional histories, did not exist.” He revealed the contours of this world by reexamining 
how power was exerted. Instead of framing dominion solely in terms of possession and 
colonization, he also took assimilation, spatial and economic control, and influence over 
neighbors as evidence of power and authority. For example, Hamalainen described a peace treaty 
fashioned in 1752 between the Spanish governor of New Mexico and Comanche chiefs as 
“highly favorable for the latter.”
65
 The author explained that through bellicosity and vigorous 
diplomacy, the Comanche crafted a social, political, and economic reality in which Spanish 
officials adjusted their practices to better accommodate “Comanche principles.”
66
 In addition to 
telling the story of the power dynamics between Euro-Americans and Indians, Hamalainen made 
plain the significance of intertribal alliances and rivalries. For instance, he explained that at the 
same time the Comanches made peace with New Mexico, tribal leaders also secured their eastern 
and northern borders through alliances with the Taovayas and the Pawnee. According to 
Hamalainen, the détente allowed the Comanche chiefs to target their aggression at the Osage 
nation.
67
 By focusing on the diplomacy and strategic maneuverings of Native peoples, 
Hamalainen revealed a Southwest that was, in many ways, an Indigenous creation. Similarly, by 
illuminating the actions and decisions of certain Indian leaders, this study shows that—until 
1676—southern New England was primarily a world shaped and defined by Indigenous peoples.    
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Despite the broad, encompassing reappraisals of the Native experience produced by 
scholars such as Gallay and Hamalainen, the history of the American Indian remained—for some 
academics—a subfield with limited relevancy to the development of larger historical truths.
68
 
Frederick Hoxie posited that many historians continued to conceptualize the history of North 
America as an inevitable march toward the development of the American nation-state. From this 
perspective, the United States appeared to result from a general progression toward modernity.
69
 
“The Indian role in this story,” explained Hoxie, was “to resist, adapt, negotiate, endure and 
persist.”
70
 Despite Indigenous peoples’ efforts to accommodate and persevere, the deterministic 
framework of this national development model interpreted Indigenous peoples as ancillary to the 
creation of contemporary American realities. Consequently, some modern scholars continued to 
view Indian history as interesting but, in Hoxie’s words, “well ... not very important.”
71
 
Recently, Hoxie and other like-minded academics employed an interpretive framework 
focused on “settler colonialism” as a new lens through which to view historical developments in 
North America. These scholars argued that for Euro-Americans, continental expansion and self-
definition were simultaneous processes. Although settlers initially sought to surround and 
displace Indigenous populations, these diverse peoples created new, overlapping social, political, 
cultural, and economic institutions over time. Distinctions certainly remained, but Natives and 
settlers’ experiences were not as strictly isolated as suggested by the categories of nation and 
culture. Building on the work of Paul Gilroy, who proposed the concept of the “Black 
Atlantic”—an interpretive approach positing that the experiences of African peoples during the 
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colonial era were broader and more complex than allowed by the traditional frameworks of race 
and nation—Hoxie argued for a reconceptualization of what he termed the “Red Continent.” 
Instead of conceiving the history of North America in terms of national development, historians 
could interpret the region as a Red Continent to “imagine a new landscape in which the complex 
and continuously-evolving relationship between invaders, their national projects, and displaced 
indigenous peoples was played out.”
72
 Hoxie’s Red Continent placed Indigenous people at the 
forefront of national narratives as Natives and settlers mediated historical realities through 
ongoing acts of contestation, adaptation, and accommodation. Within this context, Indigenous 
peoples did not merely resist and persist—as proclaimed by traditional accounts written in the 
mode of national development—but they also crafted and created.   
Moreover, Hoxie explained, the framework of settler colonialism and the recognition of a 
Red Continent shed light on connections among aspects of Indigenous life overlooked as 
unimportant or inconsequential.
73
 For example, a family oral history collected in research for this 
study told of an event at an annual meeting of the Narragansett tribe during the mid-to-late 
1940s. Former tribal councilwoman Wanda Hopkins recalled a story her mother Evangeline 
Hankinson told. According to Hopkins, her grandfather Thomas Babcock, whom she had never 
met, explained to his young daughter Evangeline why she and the rest of her family were not 
allowed to participate in the ritual dances others performed at the annual meetings. “Look at all 
the niggers pretending to be Indian,” Babcock reproved.  
His statement might first seem immaterial when viewed through an interpretive lens of 
struggle and adjustment, but it revealed larger truths about the changes and divisions taking place 
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within the greater Narragansett community. Beginning in the 1920s, as argued later in this work, 
the annual August meeting of Narragansett families underwent dramatic changes when some 
tribal members appropriated aspects of western Indigenous cultures and made a spectacle of 
these adopted characteristics at the gatherings. The transformation had implications beyond 
aesthetic preferences because it coincided with a national shift in portrayals of Indian peoples in 
popular culture. Hence, the war bonnets and fancy flowing regalia donned by dancers declared 
their authenticity as Indigenous peoples and could be understood as part of an ongoing contest 
framed by the realities of settler colonialism. Not all tribal members, though, approved of the 
changes, as made clear in Babcock’s statement.            
However, recently some historians questioned how much agency and influence Indians 
could have exerted when the middle ground ultimately devolved into the widespread 
dispossession and marginalization of Indigenous peoples. Roxanne Dunbar-Ortiz has argued that 
narratives depicting the colonial experience as an “encounter” and “dialogue” between cultures 
were, in reality, justifications, rationalizations, and “apologies for one-sided robbery and 
murder.”
74
 In An Indigenous Peoples’ History of the United States, Dunbar-Ortiz declared that 
“the history of the United States is a history of settler colonialism,” but she interpreted the 
conditions wrought under settler colonialism differently than Hoxie. Instead of identifying areas 
of accommodation and creation, Dunbar-Ortiz defined settler colonialism as “the founding of a 
state based on the ideology of white supremacy, the widespread practice of African slavery and a 
policy of genocide and land theft.”
75
 Within this context, claims of accommodation and 
                                                 
74
 Roxanne Dunbar-Ortiz, An Indigenous Peoples’ History of the United States (Boston: Beacon Press, 2014), 5. 
75
 Ibid., 2. 
35 
collaboration became “an insidious smoke screen meant to obscure the fact that the very 
existence of the country is a result of the looting of an entire continent and its resources.”
76
  
Citing Jean O’Brien, Dunbar-Ortiz observed that the settler class sought to redefine North 
America as a blank canvas devoid of any historical significance before Euro-American acts of 
firsting. “All over the continent,” wrote Dunbar-Ortiz, “local histories, monuments, and signage 
narrate the story of first settlement ... the first school, first dwelling, first everything, as if there 
had never been occupants who thrived in those places before Euro-Americans.”
77
 The author 
explained that the national narrative, in contrast, depicted the continent’s Native inhabitants as 
“last Indians or last tribes,” thereby replacing and erasing Indigenous peoples. Dunbar-Ortiz 
contended this was the real history of settler colonialism and the United States. 
Despite Dunbar-Ortiz’s too heavy-handed dismissal of the commonalities present in 
aspects of the Euro-American and Native experiences, her point about attributing too much 
authority and agency to Indigenous persons was well made and proved insightful. As discussed 
in detail in chapter four, the Narragansetts’ efforts to publicly reassert their identity as an 
Indigenous community in the years after detribalization were generally disregarded until Ellison 
Brown’s athletic accomplishments made the Indians impossible to ignore.
78
 Given the 
universality and persistence of the challenges faced by many Indian communities—both past and 
present—it is not difficult to imagine that more than bad choices and the breakdown of the 
middle grounds influenced the development of economic, social, and political conditions 
throughout North America. But, as Bonnie Lynn-Sherow observed, “Few historians have deeply 
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considered the ways in which historical tensions between social groups, not just culture itself,” 
has helped to shape actual outcomes.
79
  
In Red Earth: Race and Agriculture in Oklahoma Territory, Lynn-Sherow examined the 
conditions that led to the ecological and social transformation of the Oklahoma Territory 
between the “public” land runs of 1889 and statehood in 1907. The advance of white settlers into 
the Oklahoma Territory has often been interpreted as an example of the promise of western 
migration—the idea that when combined with hard work and perseverance, the opportunities 
afforded those who migrated west portended economic success and independence. But, as Lynn-
Sherow explains, what is often remembered is “a ‘winner’s’ history told by the people who 
remain.”
80
 Through her appraisals of the experiences of Euro-American settlers, African 
American migrants, and Indigenous Kiowas, Lynn-Sherow debunks the myths associated with 
migration into the Oklahoma Territory and in its place offers a more complex and complete, 
albeit less cheerful, accounting of the period. Red Earth frames early attempts to partition and 
settle the Oklahoma Territory as a protracted struggle in which “one people’s relationship to the 
red earth came to dominate the landscape, banishing all others to the far edges of historical 
memory.”
81
 The author shows that the “race to see who would determine the fate of the territory” 
was never a fair contest because economic, social, cultural, political, and ecological success in 
the region was not determined primarily by opportunity, hard work, and perseverance, but by 
race. For instance, Lynn-Sherow explains that African American farmers were often forced to 
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settle on smaller and less productive plots than that of their Euro-American neighbors.
82
 
Moreover, these same neighbors often excluded African Americans and Native Americans from 
their costs-sharing collectives and prohibited black and Indian farmers from access to new 
scientific innovations emanating from the agricultural experiment station in Stillwater.
83
  
Still, the African Americans and Kiowas described by Lynn-Sherow were not simply 
hapless victims of white avarice but active agents who helped to determine their own realities. 
For example, the author contends that because they settled on smaller plots, African Americans 
overplanted their lands and depleted the soil rendering many of their farms not only unprofitable 
but also unsustainable.
84
 Conversely, some Kiowas—who had a tradition of farming their lands 
collectively—chose to sublease the plots allotted to them by way of the Dawes Act instead of 
becoming lone agriculturalists. But in doing so, the Indians not only reaped modest rents and 
none of the fruits of the harvest, but they also made way for their own dispossession as their 
former tenants employed a legal system rife with racial bias to turn the Indians’ lands into their 
own. It was in such ways that African Americans and Native Americans participated in creating 
the circumstances that would lead to both the ascendancy of Euro-Americans and their own 
marginalization in the Oklahoma Territory.
85
  
However, Lynn-Sherow is careful not to overstate the efficacy of African American and 
Native American acts of agency. The author’s central argument is that in the effort to determine 
the ecological, agricultural, and economic outcomes in the Oklahoma Territory, Euro-Americans 
used racial discrimination to create and maintain an unfair advantage. “Power regulated the 
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discourse of different peoples,” Lynn-Sherow explained, “and thus shaped inevitable 
intersections of culture and ecology.”
86
 It is this recognition and communication of the existence, 
persistence, and limitations of the agency of both Native Americans and African Americans that 
has proved most instructive to my own study. Throughout this work, discussions about the 
pervasiveness and consequences of Indigenous agency—after the period of initial contact—are 
framed within the limits of minority groups with little control over the levers of power or what 
Lynn-Sherow described as “negotiated responses.”  Indeed, if the Natives could have, they 
probably would have sought different outcomes. And although the ascendance of the settler class 
was not predetermined, Red Earth shows that the economic and political supremacy of Euro-
Americans—which has remained a historical reality throughout North America—was often 
buttressed by racism. It was not that minority groups lacked the capacity to create and adapt to 
new social, political, economic, and even ecological realities, it was that they were seldom given 
an equal opportunity in which to do so. 
The authors profiled in this brief historiography influenced the methodological, 
interpretive, and organizational approach of this work. Therefore the account that follows is an 
ethnographic history incorporating a variety of source material (written records, oral histories, 
and archeological studies and assessments) to trace the continuities and evolutions of the 
Narragansett community. Following the models established by proponents of new Indian history, 
this work not only focuses on Indigenous persons as central characters but also illuminates and 
explains how Natives actively shaped political and social realities throughout southern New 
England. Moreover, it is argued that the conditions and consequences of contemporary cross-
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cultural interactions cannot be understood without appreciation of the historical circumstances 
that helped inform modern conceptualizations. 
In the traditional narrative, one that—as we have seen—remains extremely influential, 
the Narragansetts no longer exist. According to this version of the past, this once powerful tribe 
was defeated in a regrettable but honorable conflict that paved the way for the Puritan dominance 
of New England and the ascendancy of non-Indians in North America. Hence, those persons who 
continue to purport a Narragansett identity are really imposters who hold but a smidgen—if 
any—of Narragansett blood. Within this framework, these usurpers and pretenders are viewed as 
wholly undeserving of any of the special privileges, considerations, or redresses afforded 
Indigenous persons. This enduring paradigm not only informs the perpetual opposition of Rhode 
Island state officials to assertions of Narragansett tribal authority, but it also explains the dearth 
of the historical investigation focusing on the tribe following the end of King Phillip’s War in 
1676.
87
 “Most European Americans were convinced that the Narragansetts had vanished,” writes 
Rubertone while challenging longstanding misconceptions, "Moreover, those who still called 
themselves Narragansett carried the stigma of mixed ancestry."
88
 Because many chroniclers 
believed erroneously that the Narragansetts perished in the aftermath of the war, few have 
devoted much attention to those remnants continuing to claim the tribe’s perseverance.  Alice 
Collins Gleeson’s Colonial Rhode Island was indicative of this interpretative approach.  The 
author wrote that "after this defeat [King Philip's War], the Rhode Island Indians had no 
independent life…their strength had gone, and they passed away."
89
  But, the narrative 
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championed by Gleeson and many others in the region was a fallacy undergirded by historical 
misconceptions, inaccurate or incomplete records, and—at times—nefarious agendas.                    
Greater interest in the experiences of the Narragansetts beyond the seventeenth century 
coincided with a more general national awakening towards the plights of America’s ethnic 
minorities. The rhetoric of “rights” and “entitlement” inspired by the Civil Rights Movement and 
President Lyndon Johnson’s Great Society permeated national discourse throughout the 1960s 
and 1970s and was reflected in historical scholarship. Spurred by the utility of this new language, 
individuals from traditionally marginalized groups worked not only to challenge delimiting 
stereotypes and publically redefine their ethnic and racial identities, but also to demand redress 
for the historical injustices suffered by their ancestors. “American Indians indeed were able to 
navigate the changing currents of American ethnic politics,” writes the scholar Joane Nagel, “and 
their success resulted in increased federal spending on Indian affairs.”
90
 Nagel ascribes the rise 
of Red Power—greater militancy among Native Americans—to “this atmosphere of increased 
resources, ethnic grievances, ethnic pride, and civil rights activism.”
91
 The Narragansetts were 
very much involved in the crusading associated with the Red Power movement. In fact, tribal 
members were present during the siege at Wounded Knee, South Dakota in 1973. The agency of 
Native Americans not only elevated the public profile of Indigenous peoples, but it also inspired 
reassessments of historic—and now seemingly antiquated—interpretations of the Native 
American experience.          
                                                 
90
 Joane Nage, “American Indian Ethnic Renewal: Politics and the Resurgence of Identity,” in American Nations: 
Encounters in Indian Country, 1850 to the Present, ed. Frederick E. Hoxie et al. (New York: Routledge, 2001), 340-
341. 
91
 Ibid., 341. 
41 
It was in this atmosphere of reappraisal that Ethel Boissevain’s The Narragansett People 
was published in 1975. The works produced by the anthropologist constitute the first study of 
any kind that focused on the experiences of the Narragansetts beyond the seventeenth century.  
The author undertook a novel approach in her investigation as she supplemented the limited 
documentary record maintained by the state with the registers preserved by tribal members. In 
fact, Boissevain’s use and publication of information contained in tribal documents that were 
heretofore unknown outside of the Narragansett community significantly contributed to a general 
understanding of the social, political, and economic realities experienced by the Narragansetts 
throughout the nineteenth century. Boissevain primarily focuses on the conditions leading up to 
the detribalization of the Narragansetts in 1880, and it is in this area that her work proves 
instructive. However, the techniques—namely, a more in-depth analysis of the meanings and 
perceptions connoted through agency—later applied by scholars to the investigation of 
Indigenous peoples was not yet in common practice at the time Boissevain was writing. And as 
such, the author failed to more thoroughly identify and describe the historical exigencies and 
contingencies that informed particular decisions and actions during crucial moments in tribal 
history.          
Despite Boissevain’s important revelations and the continued advocacy of tribal 
members, it would take fourteen years before another book that focused primarily on the 
collective experience of the Narragansetts was produced.  The Narragansett written by William 
S. Simmions for the Indians of North America series was published in 1989. Simmions’ greatest 
contribution is in his synthetization because the book admirably appraised differing aspects of 
the Narragansett experience. The author traces the history of the Narragansetts from before the 
first contact with Europeans to the aftermath of the tribe's recognition by the federal government 
42 
in 1983. And as a survey, The Narragansett is a commendable work. Simmions even included 
such interesting aspects of Narragansett culture as traditional recipes, images and explanations of 
beadwork and weaving techniques, and a few examples and translations of the Algonquin 
language.   
However, Simmions failed to supplement traditional documentary sources with those 
produced and maintained by the Narragansetts as Boissevain had done. As a result, Simmons 
rarely challenges the assertions made by state and local authorities nor questions their intent. For 
example, while discussing Rhode Island’s effort to detribalize the Narragansetts, a process that 
the author admitted was most likely illegal, Simmons claimed that state officials “probably, 
unknowingly” violated the provisions Non-intercourse Act.
92
 But this assertion is implausible 
because the Indians had themselves underscored the fact that the state did not have the authority 
to detribalize the Narragansetts in open public meetings recorded by state officials before Rhode 
Island terminated the tribe’s legal identity.
93
 Hence, the common practice of evaluating 
Indigenous persons from a Eurocentric or western facing perspective hampered Simmons' work.  
However, as explained earlier, this study faces east in its effort to understand the historical 
realities created and inhabited by the Narragansetts. 
Patricia E. Rubertone’s Grave Undertakings: An Archaeology of Roger Williams and the 
Narragansett Indians is the most important and consequential book produced about the 
Narragansetts to date. Although the author was more circumscribed in her interpretive scope than 
either Boissevain or Simmons, Rubertone contends directly with enduring historical 
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misconceptions that, as the author explains, continue to inform “past-present relations.” By 
arguing for a more nuanced and sophisticated interpretation of the Narragansetts, Rubertone 
challenges some of the limited conceptualizations about the Indians canonized in Roger 
Williams’ A Key Into the Language of America.  For example, the author writes that Williams’ 
book “informed the assumption that prehistoric coastal settlement in southern New England was 
seasonal” and that such “assumptions about Native mobility…helped the English lay claim to 
Native land and justify its dispossession.”
94
  Rubertone’s book  remains consequential because it 
not only traces the genesis of historical fallacies, it also delineates how this fictionalized past 
continues to play an active role in the lives of the Narragansetts “in their ongoing struggles over 
how their real story of survival, both then and now, has been told.”
95
 However, to better 
comprehend the story of the Narragansetts, a longer historical scope—one that incorporates 
multiple time periods—than the one used by Rubertone must be considered. 
More recent events like the smoke shop incident and the Carcieri decision have sparked a 
renewed interest in the history and experiences of the Narragansetts. Robert A. Geake’s A 
History of the Narragansett Tribe of Rhode Island: Keepers of the Bay brings the discussion 
about the tribe into the twenty-first century.  The value of Geake’s work is seen through both its 
revitalization and continuation of the historical discourse. Geake even includes a chapter 
highlighting the struggles of the Narragansetts in their attempt to open a casino in Rhode Island.  
More than just an update, the author brings controversial historical issues to a mainstream 
audience, and in this way, helps to further a more complete appreciation of the historical realities 
associated with certain events. For example, in his chapter about “The Ghosting of a People,” 
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Geake describes the deliberativeness with which state authorities pursued the detribalization of 
the Narragansetts. The author writes, “With this act…the ghosting of the Narragansett was 
complete, at least in the minds of those state politicians and Charlestown officials who had long 
wanted to make the tribe accept ordinary citizenship.”
96
 The author’s interpretation directly 
contradicted a centuries-old dictum that had purported just dealings with the area’s Indigenous 
peoples. And although Geake was hardly the first to question this historical fallacy, it was 
through his work that many were first exposed to such a blatant challenge to traditional 
interpretations because Rubertone’s book circulated primarily among academics, Simmions had 
failed to seriously question the general narrative, and Boissevain’s work had been out of print for 
more than thirty-five years.   
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Chapter 2 - The Great Tree 
Long before the arrival of the first Europeans, Native American societies sometimes 
collapsed and disappeared. Indigenous communities also merged and emerged anew having 
reformed and reshaped themselves in a process now referred to as ethnogenesis.
97
 However, the 
arrival of non-Indigenous explores, traders, fishermen, and colonists along the northeastern coast 
of the Atlantic not only hastened the disintegration, reconstitution, and restructuring of 
Indigenous communities, it also significantly reframed the contours of intertribal interactions.  
The consequences associated with these early cross-cultural contacts, such as roving epidemics 
and an intensified competition for resources, compelled many Native groups to reinterpret their 
own social, political, and cultural boundaries. "Most of the Native American nations that survive 
to our day," explains Daniel Richter, "were, to one degree or another, created in the melting pot 
set boiling" during the seventeenth century.
98
 But while the region’s Indigenous peoples sought 
to reform and reaffirm themselves, they contended not only with the mercurial interests of Native 
rivals but also with the expanding ambitions of the newcomers.  
In the aftermath of a violent conflict that witnessed the collapse of one of the region’s 
principal Indigenous communities, the Narragansett sachem Miantonomi explained to a 
European audience that “We are as a great tree” when other tribes were “but as a twig.”
99
 The 
statement revealed a social reality that would inform political and diplomatic decisions 
throughout southern New England for most of the seventeenth century. The Narragansetts 
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were—as the sachem proclaimed— the region’s principle Indigenous power, and much of the 
realpolitik of both Indians and non-Indians was a reaction to or a consequence of Narragansett 
hegemony. This chapter examines how the Narragansetts understood and communicated their 
tribal boundaries in relation to other Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples during a period of 
increasing intercultural contacts. It also explores the ways in which—in the midst of widespread 
social, political, and demographic realignments—the Narragansetts worked to create, maintain, 
define, expand, and perpetuate the ascendancy of their community at a time when many of their 
neighbors—old and new—sought to limit the influence and dominion of the “great tree.” 
Moreover, by assessing the motivations that influenced certain decisions, acts, and policies, this 
chapter helps to illuminate an Indigenous worldview that was often divergent from that of their 
new neighbors. 
In 1524, the Italian navigator Giovanni de Verrazano sailed into what is now known as 
Narragansett Bay and produced what historians believe to be the first written description of the 
people for which the waterway was named. Verrazano’s account—which identified various 
social, political, economic, and cultural practices—helps to illuminate an Indigenous world not 
yet transformed by sustained cross-cultural contacts and the prolonged settlement of Europeans. 
Although viewed through a distorted lens, the conditions, actions, and decisions described in the 
record provide a unique vantage point from which to examine some of the social, political, 
economic, and cultural realities crafted and experienced by the Narragansetts in the early 
seventeenth century. For instance, because the explorer did not meet or interact with any other 
Indigenous peoples while in the region, the Natives described by Verrazano must have held a 
position of power. Verrazano’s ship would have been visible to various polities as the navigator 
sailed along the coast and into Narragansett Bay. But the fact that the explorer did not mention 
47 
the presence of any other Indigenous groups suggests that the Indians he met not only held 
dominion over the area but that these Natives were powerful enough to forestall the ambitions 
and curiosities of any rivals. Moreover, news of the explorer’s visit must have traveled quickly 
throughout the region yet Verrazano did not record meeting or trading with any other tribes even 
though he and his men had remained among the Narragansetts for more than two weeks. 
The brief monopoly the Narragansetts held over this intercultural trade enabled the 
Indians to shape the terms of exchange and interaction. Verrazano explained that the Natives did 
“not value or care to have silk or gold stuffs.”
100
 Nor were the Indians impressed by the 
European’s technology. The navigator observed that the Indians were most interested in items 
they could use to adorn themselves.
101
 The Natives described by Verrazano were not awed or 
bewildered by the visitors nor were they deprived or desperate. Instead, the Narragansetts held 
the upper hand in the exchange as Verrazano admitted: "we remained among them fifteen days to 
provide ourselves with many things of which we were in want."
102
 Indeed, when the navigator 
and his men sailed into Narragansett territory, it was the Indians who determined when, where, 
and what was exchanged. Verrazano’s description of a Narragansett man who around his neck 
“wore a large chain ornamented with many stones of different colors” evidenced the ability of 
the Narragansetts to establish and communicate the contours of cross-cultural trade.
103
 The 
preference of the Natives for items they could “hang in their ears and about their necks” 
demonstrated the capacity of the Narragansetts to incorporate and repurpose European goods into 
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their existing social, political, economic, and cultural frameworks. Historian Eric Johnson argues 
that the redistribution of trade goods “within the community was one of the most important ways 
for sachems to legitimate their positions.”
104
 Moreover, archaeological evidence also indicates 
that along with more traditional pieces of material culture such as shells and stones, the 
Narragansetts entombed their dead with European trade goods throughout the seventeenth 
century. "European trade goods functioned not only as traditional status goods," writes the 
archaeologist George Hamell, "but also as substantial metaphors of traditional cultural value."
105
 
Hence, the preference of the Indians for items that could be used as adornment and to 
communicate the status of individuals whether deceased or alive—Verrazano believed the man 
with the necklace to be a chief—was consistent with the Narragansetts’ established cultural, 
social, and political constructs. Understanding how the Indians integrated and utilized European 
trade goods reveals essential truths about how the Narragansetts perceived and reacted to early 
cross-cultural exchanges because the Indians did not merely supplant their lifeways for those of 
the Europeans. Nor were the Narragansetts immoveable in adhering to previous behaviors and 
practices. Instead, the Natives were able to actively shape the contours of cross-cultural contacts 
by incorporating these exchanges into their existing worldview. 
The fact that the Indians Verrazano met prevented exchanges and encounters between 
Native women and European men further demonstrated the capacity of the Narragansetts to 
define and dictate the terms of intercultural interactions. Verrazano complained that the Natives 
“made their wives stay in the boats, nor could we ever get them on board by any entreaties or any 
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presents we could make them.”
106
 Archaeologist Patricia E. Rubertone posits that the 
“Narragansetts’ vigilant protection of their women suggest that this was not a first encounter and 
that the sailors were viewed as merely lecherous humans rather than powerful, otherworldly 
beings.”
107
 Similarly, the scholar Caper Jones argues that multiple Europeans might have visited 
the region before Verrazano's voyage.
108
  It is possible that during these previous contacts 
intimacies between Native women and European men proved problematic because the 
temporality of these relationships controverted long-standing customs and traditions. 
Anthropologist Kathleen Bragdon explains that relationships between Indigenous “people were 
structured on the basis of…obligation and loyalty.”
109
 Thus, when these first sailors departed, 
they might have also abandoned their newly acquired communal responsibilities. Verrazano 
observed that when some of his men left the ship and stayed for an extended time on an Island 
"for their various necessities, as sailors are wont to do” the Narragansetts “inquired about our 
movements, often asking us if we intended to remain there long.”
110
 In attending to their 
"necessities" away from the boat, it is likely that Verrazano's men perused interactions with some 
of the Indian women who were either forbidden or refused to board the ship. The queries of the 
Narragansetts might have been an attempt to assess the longer-term intentions of this group of 
sailors to determine if intimate relationships were appropriate given the obligations and 
responsibilities they entailed. But, regardless of how the Natives perceived the cross-cultural 
encounters between European men and Indian women, the Narragansett sought to define and 
dictate the parameters of intercultural exchange.  
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Because Verrazano’s account documented certain decisions, actions, and policies of the 
Narragansetts, elements of the Indians’ unique worldview can be extrapolated from this source 
material. The Narragansetts were not insular but outward looking, and when Verrazano entered 
the bay, the Indians paddled out to meet him. When Indians boarded the vessel, it was the 
Europeans who were in awe, “This is the finest looking tribe…the handsomest in their 
costumes…more beautiful in form and stature than can possibly be described.”
111
 Verrazano’s 
description suggests that the Narragansetts most likely enjoyed access to ample and diverse 
sources of nutrition. This abundance not only facilitated exchange as Verrazano observed, “They 
are very generous, giving away whatever they have,” but it allowed the Narragansetts to 
determine the parameters of that trade.
112
 As interactions with Europeans became more frequent 
and durable throughout the seventeenth century, the Narragansetts continued to conceptualize 
and accommodate cross-cultural transactions in ways that reflected and substantiated the Indians' 
particular worldview. A century later, the Narragansetts who met and interacted with English 
settlers also sought to establish and communicate the parameters intercultural interactions. 
However, these efforts proved less successful in the years following Verrazano’s visit. 
The first recorded interaction between the Narragansetts and English colonists was 
ominous and appeared to foreshadow the progression of intercultural relations throughout the 
region because, in the winter of 1622, the Narragansetts sent the English residing at Plymouth "a 
gift of several arrows wrapped in a snakeskin."
113
 The "gift" was surely unusual, and the Pilgrims 
surmised that it "was a gesture of hostility and returned the skin filled with powder and shot."
114
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Although it is impossible to know for sure what the Indians had intended to communicate by 
sending the snakeskin, it is likely that the gesture was meant to inform the newcomers that the 
Narragansetts were a formidable power.  
In the years following Verrazano’s departure roving epidemics decimated the area's 
Native population substantially reducing both the strength and dominion of the Narragansetts’ 
chief rivals the Massachusetts and the Wampanoags. For reasons that remain unclear, these 
epidemics—especially the plague that stalked Native populations in the region from 1616-
1619—seemed to dissipate once they reached the territorial boundaries of the Narragansetts.
115
 
Spared from the terrible fate that befell their neighbors, the Narragansetts became the area’s clear 
demographic and military hegemon.
116
 Hence, the sway the tribe held over other Indigenous 
polities increased, and by the time the Pilgrims arrived at Plymouth, the Narragansetts had 
established an extensive network of tribute-paying communities throughout the region.
117
 The 
snakeskin was probably sent as a notice to the newcomers that their recently formed alliance 
with the Wampanoags placed them at odds with the region’s primary powerbrokers. In fact, it 
was this intertribal political reality and Massasoit’s—the chief sachem of the Wampanoags—
displeasure with the Narragansetts’ newly acquired dominance that informed sachem’s decision 
to seek a compact with the Pilgrims. As Eric Schultz and Michael Tougias explain, in return for 
“ensuring the well-being of the Plymouth colonist…the Wampanoag secured a new ally against 
the Narragansett.”
118
 Similarly, Fisher and Silverman observe that although the less than two 
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hundred mostly diseased and malnourished settlers living in the colony “did not appear 
threatening. Plymouth did, however, possess exotic goods and armed soldiers that Massasoit 
could use to strengthen his authority among the Wampanoags and fend off the Narragansetts.”
119
 
Hence, it was not the supposed superiority of European technology or lifeways that enabled the 
English to gain a toehold at Plymouth. Instead, it was the demographic and political upheaval 
spurred by the deadly epidemics unwittily unleashed by the Europeans that informed Massasoit’s 
compact with the Pilgrims.  
As the tribe was practically unscathed in the outbreak, the Narragansetts were keen to 
inform the newcomers who it was that sat atop the region's power structure. Within this context, 
the snakeskin was most likely not only a message to the Pilgrims but also to local Native polities 
that an alliance with the settlers risked war with the Narragansetts, a war the Indians were willing 
to bring to Plymouth's doorstep. Thus, just as the Narragansetts had done with Verrazano a 
century earlier, the Indians again sought to define and control the parameters of cross-cultural 
contacts. However, in time, the political deftness of their Indigenous rivals and the unbridled 
ambitions of the colonists conspired to circumscribe the authority and influence of the 
Narragansetts.  
Because of the Narragansetts’ prominence, it is reasonable to assume that intercultural 
contacts with Plymouth should have either been directed or approved by the tribe. However, the 
fact that this did not happen reveals some of the critical economic, cultural, and political 
transformations that occurred within Indigenous communities on the eve of English colonization. 
As early as 1614 a regular trading post was established on an island in Narragansett Bay and 
although the location was not continually manned, the outpost at "Dutch Island" provided the 
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Indians with routine access to European trade goods.
120
 According to Schultz and Tougias, the 
Narragansetts used these periodic exchanges to establish themselves as “wealthy middlemen” in 
the transatlantic fur trade.
121
 Because the Indians already had access to European trade goods and 
because the tribe now held military, economic, and demographic supremacy in the region, there 
was little impetus for the Narragansetts to seek the establishment of cross-cultural trade or a 
military alliance with the fledgling settlement at Plymouth. In fact, when the Pilgrims sent a 
small trading party to meet with the Narragansetts in 1623, the Pilgrims were disappointed to 
find that the Dutch had supplied “the Indians with cloth and other highly desirable 
commodities,” while the English could offer “only a few beads and knives which were not there 
much esteemed.”
122
 Not only were the Narragansetts apathetic about the wares proffered by the 
Pilgrims, but the Indians were also apparently disinterested in establishing a relationship with 
Plymouth. The historian Jenny Hale Pulsipher explains that “traditional political relationships 
shaped Indian understanding of English political systems” and informed the “agreements made 
between the two peoples.”
123
 Because the Narragansetts represented a much more powerful 
community than that of the Pilgrims, according to the customs of Indigenous diplomacy, the only 
proper relationship that could have existed between the tribe and Plymouth was one in which the 
Pilgrims paid tribute to the Indians as a symbolic act of deference to the hegemony of the 
Narragansetts. But, because the English had already allied themselves with the Wampanoags and 
openly challenged the authority of the Narragansetts, it was clear that the English sought to 
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establish themselves as coequals. Trade between the Narragansetts and the Pilgrims on such 
terms would have significantly elevated the status of the English and legitimated their fledgling 
community. Therefore, the continued determination of the Indians to define and control the 
parameters of cross-cultural exchanges contributed to the lack of contact between the 
Narragansetts and Plymouth. 
Moreover, unlike Verrazano, the Pilgrims did not disembark in an area that was 
traditionally considered Narragansett territory. In fact, the colonist established their new 
community in a location where the settlers could make use of the fields abandoned by the 
Wampanoag following the most recent epidemic.
124
 It is possible that the Narragansetts refrained 
from expanding into the area because they feared to share a fate similar to that of their neighbors. 
Silverman observes that in the seventeenth century, "New England Indian religious life centered 
on influencing the effects of spiritual power, called manit” and that this “manit flowed through 
the Indians’ universe” and could inhabit certain places.
125
 It is plausible then that the 
Narragansetts believed that a malicious or at least deadly manit infected the lands formerly 
occupied by the Wampanoags and that by avoiding these areas and performing certain rituals, the 
Narragansetts might maintain "good relations with the spirits" which constituted "the Indians' 
firmest guarantee of worldly success."
126
 However, the colonist held no qualms about 
establishing their community on the forsaken site because what the Natives perceived as a curse, 
the English interpreted as a godsend. The governor of Plymouth William Bradford expressed the 
English point of view when he stated that the plague was really "the good hand of 
                                                 
124
 Charles C. Mann, 1491: New Revelations Of The Americas Before Columbus (New York: Vintage Books, 2005), 
61. 
125
 David J. Silverman, “Indians, Missionaries, And Religious Translation: Creating Wampanoag Christianity in 
Seventeenth-Century Martha’s Vineyard” in Colonial America,  42.   
126
 Sliverman, “Indians, Missionaries, And Religious Translation,” 43.  also see Fisher and Sliverman, Ninigret, 27. 
55 
God…sweeping away great multitudes of the natives…that he might make room for us."
127
 The 
epidemics that struck Indigenous New England did indeed make room for the colonists as the 
scholar Charles Mann observes, “more than fifty of the first colonial villages in New England 
were located on Indian communities emptied by disease.”
128
 But disease did more than just 
empty Native communities and make way for the colonists because it also provided sachems 
throughout the area with excess land that might be used to throw off the yoke of the 
Narragansetts. Massasoit's offer to leave the tiny enclave at Plymouth "in peace," even though 
the Pilgrims had settled in his territory, was emblematic of a diplomacy that exchanged land for 
protection, power, and influence.        
Another reality curtailing the ability of the Narragansetts to exert their authority over the 
Pilgrims was the fact that Massasoit was at best a disgruntled subject. Simmons argues that from 
the Wampanoag leader’s point of view, “the Pilgrims were potential allies against his former 
enemies and present overlords. He saw an opportunity to regain independence from the 
Narragansett sachems by allying the Wampanoag with the English.”
129
 And according to Mann, 
“Compared to the Narragansett” the colonists “were the lesser of two evils.”
130
 Hence, 
Massasoit's decided to aid the colonists as a means to insulate himself from the authority and 
demands of the Narragansetts. The Wampanoag sachem's motivation was evidenced by the 
agreement he reached with Pilgrim authorities in the spring of 1621. According to the compact, 
the two sides agreed that "If any did unjust warre against him [Massasoit], we [Plymouth] would 
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 The Wampanoag leader quickly made use of the protection, power, and influence 
he obtained via his alliance with the newcomers. Just a few months after the agreement was 
reached, Massasoit convinced the Pilgrims to raise "an armed force to intimidate two 
Wampanoag sachems, Corbitant and Nepeof, who threatened to defect to the Narragansetts.”
132
 
It is likely that, after appraising their options, Corbitant and Nepeof determined that Massasoit’s 
diplomatic maneuvering was dangerous and that it was in the best interest of the two sachems to 
remain loyal to the Narragansetts. But the fact that Plymouth did come to Massasoit’s aid at his 
moment of need proved to all who were watching that the English could provide Indigenous 
leaders throughout the region with an important counterbalance to the reign of the Narragansetts. 
For their part, the Narragansetts would not allow such a blatant challenge to their authority go 
unanswered, and it was then that the snakeskin arrived at the fort. Thus, the Indians answered 
Plymouth’s foray into the dynamics of intertribal politics in a way that the settlers understood to 
be threatening. The Pilgrims responded in kind, sending shot and powder to the Narragansetts. 
However, despite their aggressive posturing, Plymouth and the Narragansetts did not go to war 
over the incident. Hence, Massasoit's actions appeared to incur no discernable consequence. 
Instead, the sachem successfully enhanced his authority and power over the Wampanoag. 
"Massasoit had turned English colonization" write Fisher and Silverman "into a source of 
personal strength and sachems across the region…took notice."
133
 Indeed, Massasoit proved that 
an association with the English could help certain sachems to reshape the Indigenous political 
landscape in ways that ultimately enhanced their power and influence. And in a region 
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devastated by disease and convulsing with the collapses, mergers, and reconstitutions of tribal 
identities and affiliations, opportunistic and ambitious leaders certainly “took notice” of the 
possibilities entailed in the establishment of cross-cultural alliances. 
In 1631 the Podunk sachem Wagincut visited Plymouth and Boston where he offered the 
settlers land, corn, and beaver skins if they would “plant in his country.”
134
 Wagincut’s appeal 
was unusual because the territory proffered by the sachem centered along what is today the 
Connecticut River, and as such, lay far beyond the boundaries of the two English strongholds. 
Knowing that the settlers were unfamiliar with the region, Wagincut volunteered to take some of 
the settlers back with him to “see the country.”
135
 The Podunk sachem’s offer to the English to 
settle in his country illustrates the political acumen and diplomatic deftness of Native leaders. If 
the colonists were to accept Wagincut’s appeal, the English would have been implicitly obligated 
to protect the Podunk leader. This political reality was not lost on either of the Puritan governors 
because as the historian Alfred Cave explains, "Bradford suspected that the sachems hoped to 
involve the English in their quarrel with the Pequots.  Winthrop concurred, noting in his journal 
that the leader of the delegation, the Podunk sachem Wagincut, was ‘a very treacherous man.”
136
 
In fact, the Pequot had forced Wagincut from the area he offered up to the English, "and 
apparently he hoped" write Fisher and Silverman, “English protection would enable him to 
return.”
137
  The parallels between the experiences and motivations of Wagincut and Massasoit 
were stark. Both leaders were vexed by their recent subjugation to a neighbor who had been 
empowered by greater access to European trade goods. And both leaders hoped that by 
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establishing a close association with the English they could enhance their power and influence. It 
is likely that Wagincut watched as Massasoit successfully interwove the colonists into his 
disputes and that the Podunk leader hoped to do the same. However, after having lived among 
the Natives for more than a decade, English leaders were more cognizant of the dynamics of 
intertribal politics, and neither Plymouth nor Boston was willing to defend Wagincut against his 
rivals. Still, in the coming years, competition for control over the same territory offered up by 
Wagincut would lead to the first major confrontation between the Natives and the Colonists.  
The experiences of Massasoit and Wagincut illustrate that, for both Indians and non-
Indians alike, early intercultural exchanges were primarily strategic decisions. These 
relationships were informed by a system of complex and fluid associations evidenced by the 
payment and collection of tribute and embodied by the establishment of alliances. When 
Plymouth came to Massasoit’s defense, the Pilgrims were fulfilling their part of an agreement 
that also stated “if any did war against us [Plymouth], he [Massasoit] should aid us.”
138
 Although 
such alliances were initially expedient, in time, they proved problematic because these 
agreements were crafted from very distinct and often divergent worldviews. Archaeologist 
Lucianne Lavin explains that Indians in southern New England “share similar value systems. . . . 
They saw (and still do see) themselves as a part of the natural world related to all of nature, with 
a duty to always harmonize with and maintain the natural world order.”
139
 Hence, a worldview 
that stressed the general interdependence of people and nature helped to inform the way the 
Indians conceptualized cross-cultural associations. “To the natives here,” writes the historian 
Neal Salisbury, “the settlers appeared first as other human beings with whom they had to interact 
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as best they could under the circumstances in order to maintain equilibrium in the world they 
shared.”
140
 Within this context, cross-cultural interactions were, as Salisbury expounds, “defined 
in terms of reciprocity rather than domination and submission.”
141
 Indeed, when the region’s 
Indigenous peoples sought to reform and reaffirm themselves through the establishment of new 
associations and alliances, they did so with an appreciation for interconnectedness, reciprocity, 
and balance.   
Moreover, the diplomacy practiced by Natives in southern New England was highly 
symbolic, imbued with meaning, and reflective of Indigenous people’s social and cultural 
beliefs. For example, although it was not part of the agreement reached between the 
Wampanoags and the Pilgrims, the Indians continually provisioned Plymouth with corn. Of 
course, it was in Massasoit’s best interest that his allies did not starve to death, but the “gifts” of 
corn were more than just purely strategic. For the Wampanoags, the terms of their alliance with 
the newcomers were not simply written on paper but also—and more importantly—embodied in 
practice. In supplying the colony with corn, the Indians effectively reframed their alliance into a 
relationship governed by reciprocity and beholden to responsibilities not spelled out in the 
original agreement. “Gifts or presents,” explains Paul A. Robinson, “were used by Indian people 
to establish and represent symbolically social and political obligations. Acceptance of gifts 
inferred acceptance of obligations to givers.”
142
 For the Indians, provisioning the colony meant 
reinterpreting the newcomers as “fellow members of a regional social network whose members 
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cemented their ties through giving and receiving hospitality.”
143
 In fact, the relations between the 
two groups grew so familiar that the Pilgrims had to ask the Indians to stop making social trips to 
their community. Later, the Indians were surprised to learn that the social, political, and cultural 
capital that they had invested in their non-Indigenous neighbors was not to be reciprocated. Just 
before the outbreak of King Philip’s War the Wampanoags asserted that when they first came, 
the English were as little children and Massasoit was a great man. “He [Massasoit] constrained 
other Indians from wronging the English and gave them corn,” but now that the two groups 
exchanged positions, the colonists failed to reciprocate.
144
 For their part, the newcomers certainly 
recognize how their Native neighbors interpreted these intercultural relationships. But, as 
Salisbury posits, for many English “the Indians represented the complete inversion of the world 
they sought for themselves as well as the concrete obstacle to their attaining it.”
145
 Thus, what 
lay at the heart of the discontinuity observed by the Wampanoags was the fact that when 
Europeans and Native Americans met they held what historian Gary B. Nash claimed were 
“incompatible ways of looking at the world.”
146
 However, holding different outlooks did not 
mean that mortal combat was inevitable because both side made accommodations when such 
actions were expedient. But as Native peoples grew weaker so did their ability to define the 
parameters and meanings of cross-cultural exchanges. But the flames of conflict were not only 
fanned by ideological incongruities because the political maneuverings of ambitious and 
opportunistic Indian leaders also provided the accelerant. 
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As Wagincut’s appeal to Plymouth and Boston demonstrated, by the 1630s, the Pequot 
were a formidable power having incorporated or subjugated many Indigenous polities in the river 
valleys of what would become eastern and central Connecticut. But whereas Wagincut was 
unable to enlist the assistance of the colonists, Uncas—the chief sachem of the Mohegan during 
much of the seventeenth century—successfully used the English to “break out of the Pequot 
confederation.”
147
 Hence, the political, social, and economic calculations of Puritan leaders 
evolved during the six years bookended by Wagincut’s offer and what has come to be known as 
the Pequot War 1636-37.
148
 Abetting this shift in diplomacy was the fact that the Massachusetts 
Bay Colony—and the Plymouth Colony to a lesser extent—experienced a surge in population 
throughout the 1630s during a period referred to as The Great Migration. More than thirteen 
thousand English settlers arrived in Massachusetts between 1629 and 1640, transforming what 
once were fledgling Puritan outposts into colonial strongholds which “had become as powerful a 
force as any of the region’s major tribes.”
149
 The rapid growth of settler communities was 
juxtaposed by a sharp decline in the region's Indigenous population because, in 1633, an 
outbreak of smallpox ravaged Native communities throughout southern New England.
150
 It was 
in this context that Uncas sought to cultivate an alliance with the English hoping to capitalize on 
the demographic upheavals to strengthen his position. And to this end, the Mohegan leader was 
perhaps the region’s greatest political tactician. He was undoubtedly among the most successful 
because—with the help of his English patrons—Uncas worked to successfully curtail both the 
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dominion and authority of the region's two most prominent Indigenous communities placing 
himself in their stead. Hence, examining the political maneuverings of Uncas provides insight 
into the workings and consequences of intertribal politics. Moreover, tracing the Mohegan 
leader’s rise to prominence offers a glimpse of how some native peoples both conceptualized and 
sought to effect changing social, political, and economic realities. 
Before Uncas "turned to the English…to cultivate an alliance with them” the Mohegan 
leader had already failed at least five times to extend his authority among the Pequot.
151
 With 
each unsuccessful attempt, Uncas was forced to seek refuge among the Narragansetts and was 
only allowed to resettle within Pequot territory after “he humbled himself to the Pequot 
Sachem.”
152
 Hence, like Massasoit, Uncas brooded under the yoke of his Indigenous overlords. 
And like Massasoit, Uncas found in the English not only a pathway out of subordination but also 
a means by which to enhance his authority and dominion. The death of Tatobem—the grand 
sachem of the Pequot—precipitated Uncas’ attempts to extend his influence. The Mohegan 
leader was related to the Pequot principal through marriage. Hence, Uncas contended with 
Sassacus—Tatobem’s son and Uncas’ brother in law—for power after the death of the grand 
sachem. But until he allied himself with the English, Uncas was repeatedly “humbled.” Then, in 
1634, a group of Pequot warriors seeking atonement for the execution of Totobem, killed 
Captain John Stone mistaking the English sailor for the Dutch traders who decapitated the 
sachem.
153
 The Pequot apologized to the leaders of the Bay Colony explaining that “we know no 
difference between the Dutch and the English, they are both strangers to us, we took them all to 
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 It appears that the Puritans “were initially satisfied” with the apology and disinclined 
“to press the matter” according to Cave.   
However, Uncas used the incident to cultivate and inflame animosities between the 
Pequot and the English.  He told colonial authorities that Sassacus was directly involved in 
Stone's death and that the Pequot secretly plotted to attack English settlements "out of desperate 
madness."
155
 The conspiracy described by Uncas was precisely what the Puritans feared since 
they first heard of Opechacanough’s butchering of colonists in Virginia in 1622. Bay Colony 
leaders such as the Reverend Philip Vincent saw the incident as evidence that "savages" could 
never be trusted and that the Puritans must be resolved never to repeat the mistakes of their 
southern brethren.
156
 Hence, by claiming that the Pequot were desperate, mad, and ready to 
attack, Uncas appealed to settlers’ ever-present suspicion that they were surrounded by 
bloodthirsty “savages” who were “diligent to sute an opportunytye to their Natures.”
157
 Indeed, 
the “desperate madness” to which the Mohegan leader referred more aptly described the dread 
harbored by many colonists who huddled together in isolated communities forever fearful of the 
“howling wilderness” and the “savages” it concealed, a reality which Uncas was keen to exploit. 
As explained earlier, over time, divergent worldviews led Indians and non-Indians to 
interpret cross-cultural associations very differently. While many Indians framed intercultural 
relationships within an ethos that stressed interconnectedness and reciprocity, some colonists 
conceptualized their associations with Natives in accordance with a racialized dogma that cast 
the region’s Indigenous population as wicked and abhorrent. It was within this context that 
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Miantonomi reminded the newcomers of the Narragansetts’ status as a “great tree.” But, it was 
not that the English failed to recognize tribal distinctions or the political, demographic, and 
martial preeminence held by the Narragansetts when they sought to conflate the tribe with the 
area’s other Indigenous polities. Instead, this consolidation constituted a deliberate attempt to 
assert a worldview in which all Indian peoples—regardless of tribal affiliations—were perceived 
as the unholy and unworthy occupants of a landscape that rightfully belonged to the newcomers. 
By this doctrine, the Puritans fashioned themselves as “the modern descendants of the Children 
of Israel” and Native peoples as “the pagan Egyptians and Babylonians.”
158
 New England was 
interpreted as a gift bestowed on Christians by God and the manifestation of his divine 
providence. Puritan leader Reverend Increase Mather expressed a view held by many  when he 
explained that the Lord "hath given us for rightfull Possession” the lands formerly held by “the 
Heathen People” as punishment for their plotting against “English Israel.”
159
 Historian Billy J. 
Stratton explains that the “Native peoples Puritan migrants encountered were perceived early on 
as primary obstacles to the achievement of their religio-historical vision.”
160
 Therefore, while 
many Native peoples saw the newcomers as cohabiters of an interconnected world, some English 
viewed the Indians as an impediment to the realization of God’s blessings.       
The necessity of accommodation in early intercultural interactions was clearly evidenced 
by the alliance crafted between Plymouth and the Wampanoags. But as the Indians’ later 
condemnation of the Pilgrims shows, this era of mutuality was fleeting and hastened by Euro-
American preconceptions of Native peoples. For example, Stratton argues that, “Due to the 
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deeply ingrained cultural biases that were already well-established . . . English settlers were not 
inclined to view the Indigenous inhabitants of the land . . . as peoples vested with the same rights 
that been granted to them by God.”
161
 Exactly when and to what extent this predisposition 
informed cross-cultural associations has been an area of contention among historians. Karen 
Kupperman explains that the English were not as dismissive of Indigenous culture, technology, 
religion, and people as chroniclers often suggest. The author argues that “It was the ultimate 
powerlessness of the Indians, not their racial inferiority, which made it possible to see them as 
people without rights.”
162
 But prior to the outbreak of King Philip’s War, the Indigenous peoples 
of southern New England were far from powerless. “For a time in the spring of 1676,” write 
Shultz and Tougias, “it appeared to the colonists that the entire English population . . . might be 
driven back into a handful of fortified seacoast cities.”
163
 If the Indians were a formidable foe in 
1676, they were certainly equally so four decades earlier when the English sought to annihilate 
the Pequot, man, woman, and child. Hence, citing the “powerlessness” of the Native inhabitants 
is an inadequate explanation for the ruthlessness of Euro-Americans.       
Ronald Karr suggests that the overt acts of violence committed during the Pequot War 
“resulted from the failure to establish reciprocity between the military cultures of the English 
Puritan forces and the Pequot.”
164
 However, Karr also admits that it is difficult to account for 
some of the war’s atrocities “without concluding that the Puritans regarded their Indian enemies 
as less human than even their most despised English foes. European enemies would never be 
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 Moreover, Cave observes that Puritan preconceptions about the regions 
Indigenous peoples proved “particularly intractable” because they were part of a “hegemonic 
ideology” that was used to “rationalize and sustain claims of power and justify expropriation of 
resources.”
166
 Regardless of exactly when the religious and cultural biases of the Puritans 
become intractable, there was no greater obstacle to the realization of God's gift and the 
achievement of the Puritans' historical vision than the hegemony of the Narragansetts. For the 
settlers to claim dominion in the area the influence and authority of the tribe needed to be 
curtailed. Therefore, while the Narragansetts worked to reshape their community and redefine 
themselves throughout the seventeenth century, they did so against a backdrop in which the 
Indians were purposefully characterized as devious, unholy, and irredeemable as a means by 
which to justify the presence of the Puritans and the seemingly benign, inevitable, and 
providential dispossession of the Natives. Thus, the Narragansetts then contended not only with 
the mercurial interests of Indigenous rivals but also with the expanding ambitions of the 
newcomers.   
Conceptualizations of the region’s Indigenous population as obstructive, unholy, and 
undeserving were coupled with a dread that gripped settler societies in southern New England 
during the mid-1630s. The internal spiritual strife known as the “Antinomian Controversy,” 
heightened Puritan insecurities and informed the way colonists perceived the Indigenous peoples 
that surrounded them. The chronicler Karyn Valerius explains that “disagreement over the 
relationship between sanctification” or “the daily course of living a godly life, and justification, a 
Puritan term for election by God, created a rift in the colony that had widespread 
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 According to the scholar Anne Kibbey, some of these ramifications 
reverberated throughout Indigenous communities. Kibbey argues that religious insecurities 
“established the legitimacy of genocidal war against non-white peoples.”
168
 Similarly, the 
historian Gary Nash writes that “Dead Pequots were offered to God as atonement for Puritan 
fallings.”
169
 What Uncas and his tales of an Indian conspiracy offered the Puritans was an 
opportunity to prove the divinity of their endeavor and justification for pursuing the realization 
of their religio-historical vision, no matter how bloody the outcome. But the Mohegan leader also 
gained something in the exchange. "Through the careful cultivation of Anglo-Pequot 
animosities,” writes Cave, “Uncas would help precipitate a war that would enable him to achieve 
his goal and take the place of the Pequot grand sachem.”
170
 Hence, the exigencies associated 
with dogmatic uncertainties, a general fear of an impending Indian attack, and longstanding 
beliefs that Indian peoples were savage and  wicked, abetted Uncas’ diplomatic maneuvering 
transforming the Mohegan leader from a Pequot underling to an English confidant and 
compatriot, and finally to one of the region's most potent Indigenous leaders.      
As stated, prior to the Pequot War, the Narragansetts were the area’s hegemonic 
Indigenous power. Thus, when the tribe decided to ally with the English settlers, they did so as—
at the very least—coequals. In fact, the leadership in Boston found it necessary to meet with the 
Narragansetts before pursuing war with the Pequot to solicit the tribe’s support and neutrality.
171
 
Unlike the delegation from Plymouth that met with the Narragansetts in 1623, by 1636 the 
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Bostonians represented a much larger and well-established community with whom an affiliation 
might have proved advantageous, or at least, could not be interpreted as diminishing to the 
Indians. Still, crafting an agreement with the tribe would require “many travels and charges” 
according to the Puritan outcast turned Narragansett tenant, Roger Williams.
172
 Residing on land 
provided to him by the Narragansetts, Williams was in a unique position to advocate on behalf of 
the English. In fact, Williams’s assistance proved so pivotal that the Puritan leader John 
Winthrop suggested that “Williams be recalld [sic] from Banishment” because of his interceding 
with the Indians.
173
 However, securing an understanding with the Narragansetts was much too 
important of a task to be left to only one man. In the fall of 1636, the Bay Colony sent "a formal 
delegation to negotiate a military alliance" with the Narragansetts.
174
 Edward Johnson, one of the 
diplomats sent to parley with the Indians, fretted that if the two parties failed to reach an 
agreement the Bay Colony might be attacked by a large contingent of Narragansett warriors.
175
  
Johnson was relieved to find that the colonists were not rebuffed but instead “entertain’d [sic] 
royally” by the Indians.
176
 However, the envoy was unable to secure an alliance with the 
Narragansetts leaving Williams to urge the Indians into meeting once again with the leaders of 
the Bay Colony, but this time in Boston. It is likely that the English hoped to impress the 
Narragansetts by inviting the Indians into their stronghold. Indeed, before the negotiations 
commenced, the two parties dined together, and one can imagine that the Indians were 
entertained and treated in a similar manner to which they had received the colonists just a few 
months earlier. The exchanges and merrymaking were intended to ingratiate the two peoples to 
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each other and therefore establish a more solid base upon which to craft an agreement. Pulsipher 
explains that Indians throughout New England framed, characterized, and solidified alliances 
between coequals with “mutual gift giving” and mutual assistance. The fact that the English and 
the Narragansetts reached an agreement in Boston when just a few months earlier no such 
understanding could be achieved suggest that the Indians were not only pleased with their 
reception, but also with the terms of the treaty itself.    
There is no doubt that language and cultural misunderstandings contributed to differing 
interpretations of the stipulations and parameters of the agreement crafted in Boston. In fact, 
when the compact was reached the Narragansetts objected that they did not understand all of the 
treaty’s provisions.
177
 However, it is also likely that both sides sought to exploit misconceptions 
to strengthen their political position and standing after the war. For example, soon after their 
victory over the Pequot, Puritan leaders began making demands of the Narragansetts as the 
English attempted to assert their newly won authority over all of the region’s Indigenous polities.  
As Fisher and Silverman write, “The English acted as though their victory over the Pequots gave 
them automatic rights to all the spoils.”
178
 The central contention that erupted between the 
colonists and the Narragansetts after the war—which was the fate of the surviving Pequot—
reveals much about how the two peoples saw themselves in relation to their Indigenous and non-
Indigenous neighbors. Because, as explained earlier, many English interpreted Native peoples as 
irredeemable savages who performed the Devil’s work, the newcomers sought nothing less than 
the complete extermination of the Pequots.
179
 The Puritan attack on a Pequot stronghold in 
Mystic left no misconceptions about what the English endeavored to accomplish. After setting 
                                                 
177
 Ibid., 128. 
178
 Fisher and Sliverman, Ninigret, 41. 
179
 Stratton, Buried In Shades Of Night, 2.  
70 
the fort ablaze, the Puritans surrounded the encampment and shot down anyone who tried to 
escape leaving the great majority of the Indians to burn, man, woman, and child.
180
 The scene 
was so gruesome that rank and file soldiers “were distressed by the cold-blooded slaughter of 
Indians fleeing the burning village.”
181
 However, others found solace in the flames as William 
Bradford later wrote, “It was a fearful sight to see them thus frying in the fire and the streams of 
blood quenching the same…but the victory seemed a sweet sacrifice, and they gave praise to 
God.”
182
  For the Narragansetts, the massacre was too much to endure, and the vast majority 
abandoned the English effort decrying the tactics employed by the newcomers saying "mach it 
mach it,—that is’ it is naught, it is naught because it is too furious and slays too many men.”
183
 
After the “sweet sacrifice” in Mystic, the Puritans, along with their Mohegan allies, hunted down 
many of the remaining Pequots killing some and selling others into slavery. In an unabashed 
attempt to supplant the tribe, Puritan leaders even went so far as to forbid any survivors from 
uttering the name of the Pequots.       
While English settlers attempted to exterminate the Pequots, the Narragansetts hoped to 
incorporate the remnants of their vanquished foes into the tribe. “People were the scarcest 
resource,” explains Richter, “of all in the Indians’ new world.”
184
  The Narragansetts saw the 
Pequots not as irredeemable and eternal enemies but rather as a means by which to expand and 
strengthen their community.  In fact, before the attack in Mystic, Narragansett leaders sought and 
received assurances from the Puritans that women and children would not be harmed.
185
 The 
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demand was in keeping with longstanding customs which saw individuals and even whole 
communities moving from the protection and dominion of one polity to another as political 
realities and fortunes changed. The English were aware of these social migrations, and some 
settlers even suspected that the Narragansetts had only participated in the Pequot War "to 
augment their own kingdom" as they wanted to be "the only lords of the Indians."
186
 Moreover, 
the permeability of tribal affiliations was demonstrated by Uncas because the Mohegan leader 
was also a member of the Pequot aristocracy—hence his ability to challenge Sassacus for 
control—who at the same time retained close ties to the Narragansetts—hence his various 
retreats seeking protection from the tribe. The intent of the Narragansetts to integrate the 
defeated Pequot was indicative of the social and political traditions that existed throughout the 
region, because, in the seventeenth century, tribal affiliations were not as rigid as some writers 
have supposed. For example, when Puritan leaders questioned the efforts of certain Narragansetts 
to shelter and protect some of the remaining Pequots the Indians responded that “the Pequot were 
good Men, their friends, and they would Fight for them, and protect them.”
187
  What is most 
revealing about the exchange is not the fact that the Narragansetts inserted themselves between 
the English and the Pequots as the protectors of the latter, but the reality that tribal demarcations 
were more porous than many chroniclers have suggested because the Narragansetts apparently 
held no qualms about referring to their supposed long-term rivals as “good men” and “friends.”   
According to some chroniclers, the Narragansetts and the Pequots were bitter enemies 
even before the arrival of the first Europeans.
188
 And the conventional narrative contends that 
this rivalry intensified as the two tribes jockeyed for access to European trade goods and 
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domination of the fur and wampum trades.
189
 One contemporary even recalled how the Pequot 
derided the Narragansetts as “women-like men.”
190
 Within this context, then, it is surprising that 
the Narragansetts sought to protect their former enemies from their new allies. And if the 
animosities between the two tribes were as fraught as some have suggested, then the shift that 
took place after Mystic was a remarkable example of the fluid nature of Indigenous communal 
affiliations. However, because as explained earlier, the delineation of tribal social boundaries 
was not as rigid as often supposed, it is likely that the Narragansetts and the Pequots were not as 
adversarial as commonly portrayed.  In fact, many sources contend that before the war the 
Pequot sent emissaries to the Narragansetts to enlist their support against the English with the 
foreboding message that if the Narragansetts failed to join the Pequot in alliance against the 
newcomers “they did but make the way for their own overthrow.”
191
 However, the Pequot were 
rebuffed because, as one writer observed, “Intertribal disputes seemed more important then, in 
the early 17
th
 century than the European threat.”
192
 But why, if the Narragansetts were such bitter 
rivals, would the Pequots hope that their appeal to pan-Indianism would have met any other 
outcome?   
There are a few possible scenarios that help to explain why the Pequots might have 
appealed to the Narragansetts in hopes of forming an alliance. First, as described, the Pequots 
and the Narragansetts were not the hard-worn enemies some have supposed. Settlers did not 
meet the rumors of the possibility of a Pequot-Narragansett alliance with disbelief but dread.  
Williams recalled how the leaders of the Bay Colony “requested me to use my utmost and 
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Speediest Endeavors to break and hinder the league labored for by Pequts.”
193
 The fact that the 
colonists not only believed that an alliance between the Narragansetts and Pequots was possible, 
but that the settlers also actively sought to thwart the compact, reveals that the English did not 
see the differences between the two peoples as irreconcilable.   
Another—and possibly concurring—reason why the Pequots might have sought an 
alliance with the Narragansetts was that, as Uncas had claimed, the Indians were indeed in a state 
of desperation. But, the “desperation” described by Uncas seems to have applied more 
appropriately to the English. In fact, until just before the outbreak of hostilities, the Pequots 
sought to reestablish and further peaceful relations with the settlers.
194
 For example, in 1636 
when John Endecott’s expeditionary force sailed up the Pequot River, the soldiers were met by 
crowds of Pequot who shouted out "What cheer, Englishmen, what cheer, what do you come 
for?”
195
 The contemporary chronicler John Underhill explained that “They [Pequots] not 
thinking we intended war, went on cheerfully.”
196
 Moreover, the outcomes associated with 
Endecott’s ineffectual raid failed to inspire fear among the Pequot because, as an exasperated 
settler observed, “The Bay-men killed not a man.”
197
 Furthermore, while amongst the 
Narragansetts Williams learned that the Pequots did not fear the English because they “Comfort 
themselves in this that a witch amongst them will sink the pinnacles.”
198
 Thus, on the eve of war, 
the Pequots seemed to be more optimistic than desperate.   
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Finally, it is possible that the Pequots never sought to form an alliance with the 
Narragansetts. Because of language and cultural differences, the English were uniquely 
susceptible to misinformation. And, as we have seen, Uncas was a shrewd political tactician. The 
Mohegan leader played upon the fears of the English, and in the 1630s there was no greater 
threat to the settlers than a compact between the Pequots and the Narragansetts. As Cave 
observes, “A Pequot-Narragansett alliance would have placed in jeopardy not only the tiny 
Puritan settlements in Connecticut but the parent colonies as well.”
199
 European 
conceptualizations about Indigenous peoples as the unholy instruments of the Devil only 
heighten fears making the plots revealed to them by “friendly” Indian “informants” appear not 
only plausible but likely.
200
 “The documentary evidence available to us,” writes Cave, “points to 
Uncas as the main, and perhaps the only, source of these rumors.”
201
 It is conceivable that Uncas 
seized upon this opportunity to spread misinformation about a possible Pequot-Narragansett 
alliance stoking the fears of the English in hopes of turning the settlers against his traditional 
overlords. If this had indeed been Uncas’ intent, his plan worked to perfection.   
The Puritans did not only learn of the supposed plot from Indian informants though 
because Williams also warned that the Pequots sought to convince the Narragansetts “that the 
English were minded to destroy all Indians.”
202
 The Puritan outcast used his proximity to the 
Narragansetts—both physical and social—to render himself an vital liaison thus maintaining his 
connection to the Bostonians at a time when Puritan leaders sought to expand and empower their 
communities at the expense of Indigenous populations. Williams even assumed credit for 
                                                 
199
 Cave, The Pequot War, 123. 
200




 Ibid., 123.  
75 
unilaterally breaking “to pieces the Pequts’ [Pequots] negociation and Designe, and to make, 
promote, and finish, by many travells and Charges the English league with the Naheggonsike 
[Narragansetts] and Monhiggins [Mohegans] against the Pequts.”
203
 It is clear that—according to 
himself—Williams was instrumental in thwarting the pan-Indian alliance proving he was indeed, 
an indispensable ally to his once forsaken community. The account was of course only Williams' 
interpretation of his influence on Indigenous political developments, but the claim that he alone 
sundered the alliance was reiterated by chroniclers such as Simmons who wrote: "Roger 
Williams succeeded in persuading the Narragansett to side with the English.”
204
 The relationship 
formed between the Narragansetts and Williams was probably a factor in tribe’s decision to not 
ally with the Pequots, but Williams was in no position to dictate to the Indians.  Instead, the 
Narragansetts most likely saw value in the relationship they had cultivated with the outcast, and 
it is possible that the Indians interpreted Williams' pleas for support similar to the way that they 
had viewed Uncas' request for protection. However, chroniclers failed to assign a similar 
influence among the Narragansetts to the Mohegan leader that they did to Williams despite the 
fact that both men sought and received protection from the tribe. Those who argue that Williams 
alone dissuaded the Narragansetts from forming a compact with the Pequots not only assign too 
much power and influence to Williams, they also fail to grasp the complexity of Indigenous 
social, political, and economic relationships. This is, of course, assuming that the Pequots did 
indeed appeal to the Narragansetts when it is entirely possible that they did not. 
It was easy for Williams, his contemporaries, and subsequent writers to overstate the 
influence the Puritan outcast had among the Narragansetts because the Indians failed to write, 
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publish, and preserve their interpretations of this relationship. Hence, what we do know about the 
parameters of these early cross-cultural interactions derive primarily from the ethnocentric 
interpretations “of a small number of European men, each of whom pursued his own interest.”
205
 
Therefore, it is important—as Richter observes—to evaluate these old records in new ways in an 
attempt to better gleam an Indigenous perspective from the documents produced by non-
Indigenous peoples. For example, in 1637 Narragansett sachems gave what would become 
Prudence Island to Williams and the leaders of the Bay Colony. According to Williams, the 
island was a gift and "truth is, not a penny was demanded."
206
 But if the event is interpreted in 
accordance with traditional Indigenous conceptualizations about the meaning behind and utility 
of exchange, then the “gift” takes on a wholly different connotation. As we have seen, gift giving 
among native peoples was deeply meaningful because these exchanges defined relationships and 
communicated social roles and obligations. It is possible then that—as Robinson posits—the 
Narragansett hoped to “control the English by gifting them into debt.”
207
 For his part, Williams 
was already deeply indebted to the Indians because the Puritan outcast—who advocated 
compensating Native peoples for their land—had by his admission not paid a cent for the 
territory upon which he had hoped to build God’s Providence. But what the Indians offered 
Williams and his followers was more than just land because—like they had done for Uncas—the 
Narragansetts provided the outcasts with a refuge. In fact, The United Colonies of New 
England—a military pact between Massachusetts, Plymouth, Connecticut, and New Haven that 
overtly excluded the Rhode Island settlements—saw the Narragansetts as a bulwark and 
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“buttress to the independence of heterodox Rhode Island.”
208
 But like Uncas and the Mohegan, 
Williams and his followers were “but a twig” and their association with the “great tree” reflected 
this reality.     
“It is a strange truth,” observed Williams, “that a man shall generally finde more free 
entertainment and refreshing amongst these Barbarians [Narragansetts], then amongst thousands 
that call themselves Christians.”
209
 But as explained, Williams found more than just 
entertainment and refreshment because amid the Indians he discovered a sanctuary. Williams 
wrote glowingly of his Indigenous sponsors stating that “I have acknowledged amongst them an 
heart sensible of kindnesses, and have reaped kindness.”
210
 It is likely the Narragansetts believed 
the kindness, protection, and land conveyed to Williams came with certain obligations. For 
example, when Puritan and Narragansett leaders negotiated the terms of their alliance in 1636, 
the Indians insisted that Williams be sent a copy of the agreement so that he could interpret the 
document for them.
211
 The incident not only revealed that the Narragansetts believed Williams’ 
assistance was implicit, but also that the Indians expected the outcast to labor in their best 
interest. It is clear then that some Narragansetts thought differently of Williams than they did of 
the leaders in Boston. According to the region’s common political traditions, Williams’ 
acceptance of the kindnesses proffered by the Indians not only saddled the outcast with certain 
obligations but these “gifts” also worked to integrate Williams more firmly into the Narragansett 
community. For example, when Williams established a trading post at Cocumscussoc in present-
day North Kingstown, he complained that the Indians frequented his establishment too often and 
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lingered too long. But such practices were indicative of Indigenous culture as Williams observed 
when he wrote, “they [Narragansetts] are remarkably free and courteous, to invite all Strangers 
in; and if any come to them upon any occasion, they request them to come in.”
212
 Apparently, the 
Indians expected that Williams would not just live among them but also incorporate certain 
elements of their lifestyle. Hence, the sociability that Williams scorned was not only emblematic 
of his close association with the Indians, but also of the behavioral norms entailed therein.  
Indeed, Williams became so politically, socially, and economically intertwined with the 
Narragansetts that he felt obligated to reassure the Puritan leadership that “I am not yet turned 
Indian.”
213
 Although he did not turn Indian, there is little doubt that Williams’ Indigenous 
benefactors anticipated that the relationship forged between the outcast and the Indians dictated 
that Williams would pursue the tribe’s interest in many of his social, political, and economic 
dealings. For instance, in 1640, when Miantonomi was summoned to Hartford to answer charges 
about an alleged conspiracy, the sachem asked that Williams be allowed to serve as his 
interpreter instead of the “Pequot maid” proffered by the colonists.
214
 Although Miantonomi’s 
appeal was denied, the sachem’s request was indicative of not just the prevailing political and 
diplomatic conditions, but also of specific social and cultural realities. Miantonomi trusted that 
Williams would be more faithful to the concerns of the Narragansetts in the proceedings than the 
Pequots not because the outcast could better translate the sachems’ words and intents, but 
because Williams was more closely allied with the tribe and their overall interest. Hence, the 
determinative factors here were not ones of language and culture, but of association and 
obligation. 
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The refusal of colonial leaders to accommodate Miantonomi’s request that Williams be 
allowed to serve as interpreter was emblematic of a new political and diplomatic calculus.  
Whereas the Puritans had previously sought to avoid confrontation with the Narragansetts, 
colonial leaders—emboldened by their victory over the Pequots—now looked to exert their 
authority over all of the region’s Indigenous polities. Within this context, Williams' role as 
intermediary became less critical because English leaders now sought to humble Miantonomi 
and the Narragansetts instead of negotiating with and accommodate them. This shift in statecraft 
also abetted the rise of Indian leaders who—like many newcomers—hoped to see the 
Narragansetts subdued. With the Pequots defeated, only the Narragansetts prevented Uncas and 
the Mohegans from claiming supremacy among the regions Indigenous communities. But, as 
Fisher and Silverman observe, “Uncas first had to convince the English that the Narragansett 
represented a threat to them too, not just him.”
215
 To this end, the Mohegan leader began to 
undermine the English-Narragansett alliance even before the attack on the Pequot fort by telling 
Commander Mason on the eve of the raid that the “Narragansett would leave us, but as for 
himself He would never leave us.”
216
  The fact that many Narragansetts—disgusted with the 
brutal tactics employed by the English—did indeed abandon the effort only helped to bolster 
Uncas’ credibility among the colonists. Later, Uncas told colonial leaders that “This heart (laying 
his hand upon his breast) is not mine but yours; I have no men; they are all yours…I will not 
believe any Indian’s words against the English.”
217
 The Mohegan principal’s abrupt rise from 
refugee to one of the region’s most consequential Indian leaders must be understood within this 
context. Long driven by his ambitions, Uncas had at last located in the colonists the means by 
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which to usurp the authority of his Indigenous overlords. By committing his men to the English, 
Uncas was attempting to craft a cross-cultural alliance reminiscent of the pact between Massasoit 
and Plymouth. But in pledging his heart and continued loyalty to the newcomers, the Mohegan 
leader looked to forge an even closer association with the English not unlike the relationship 
crafted between Williams and the Narragansetts. The Mohegan leader likely hoped that if the 
English accepted his offer, they would not only be obligated to protect and defend their 
Indigenous patron but that they would also liken Uncas' success with that of their own. The fact 
that—in the aftermath of the Pequot war—some colonists attempted to equate the interest and 
concerns of the Mohegans with that of the Narragansetts was a testament Uncas’ skill as a 
political and diplomatic tactician. An exasperated and perplexed Miantonomi questioned the 
recent elevation of Uncas and his followers when he explained that: “These [Mohegans] are but 
as a twig, we [Narragansetts] are as a great tree.”
218
  The Narragansett leader was trying to 
communicate a political reality already understood by Indigenous peoples throughout the region, 
that the Mohegan were traditionally a subordinate tribe. But as Johnson explains, Uncas used his 
alliance with the colonist “to attack and to defend himself from his Native enemies.”
219
 The 
English were often quite happy to oblige the Mohegan sachem “especially when doing so 
coincided with their interest.”
220
  And felling the great tree seemed to be in the interest of many 
of the region’s more ambitious leaders. 
The defeat of the Pequots created a power vacuum that extended across the sound into 
what is now Long Island. There the Montauk—a tribe that had previously paid tribute to the 
Pequot—were confronted with a choice. To whom should the Indians now send their tribute, the 
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English or the Narragansetts?  Such was the dilemma that befell many of the region’s Indigenous 
polities following the war. Various Narragansett sachems paddled across the sound in hopes of 
enlisting the support, loyalty, and tribute of the Montauk.
221
 But the Montauk leader Wyandanch 
saw in the Pequot loss an opportunity to enhance his standing by opposing the attempts of the 
Narragansetts to expand their influence.
222
  “Wyandanch viewed the Narragansetts as his biggest 
threat,” explain Fisher and Silverman, “and the English as a resource to exploit.”
223
  Because 
Wyandanch was in no position to resist the Narragansetts on his own, the Montauk leader sought 
to establish a cross-cultural alliance—not unlike the ones perused by Massasoit and Uncas—with 
the leaders of the Connecticut colonies. Soon after declaring his alliance and loyalty to the 
newcomers, Wyandanch tested this relationship when he protested, "How can I pay tribute to the 
English…if they allow the Niantics or others to steal it from me at will?”
224
 The Montauk leader 
was complaining that Ninigret—a Niantic leader who was so closely related to the Narragansetts 
and who, in time, would become the chief sachem of the merged tribe—had humiliated him and 
took thirty fathoms of wampum because Wyandanch refused to submit to the authority of the 
Niantic leader. When the Montauk leader tried to explain that his tribe was now under the 
protection of the English Ninigret supposedly told him that the English would "speak much but 
doe little."
225
 Whether Wyandanch's account was true, false, or some gradient therein, the 
outcome must have been what the Montauk leader hoped for because the colonists intervened on 
his behalf securing the return of the wampum.  
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However, the next accusation that Wyandanch levied toward the Narragansetts would 
inspire the settlers to both speak and do even more. Two years after Wyandanch claimed he was 
humiliated by Ninigret, the Montauk leader brought the colonists disturbing news about 
Miantonomi’s attempts to build a grand alliance to destroy all the English settlements.
226
 The 
allegation was eerily reminiscent of the claims Uncas made about the Pequot and the English 
responded in much of the same way they had three years earlier by immediately preparing for 
war. At first, Wyandanch reported that he was unaware of the specific details of the coming 
attack because Miantonomi had spoken to Montauk leaders while the sachem was away.
227
 Later, 
the full plot was revealed only after Wyandanch deceived tribal elders into divulging the plan. 
Supposedly, having realized their mistake, the Montauk leaders quickly appealed to Miantonomi 
to call off the attack which the Narragansett sachem promptly did.
228
 The implications of the 
account are clear. Because of his dogged persistence and loyalty, Wyandanch single-handedly 
saved all of the English settlements from certain disaster. Again, whether the story was true, 
false, or somewhere in between, the events precipitated by Wyandanch’s account worked to 
strengthen the Montauk leader’s position. Regardless of its veracity, the tale exposed the fact that 
Wyandanch’s authority over the Montauk was by no means complete. Spooked by the story, and 
hoping to cut off the access and sway Miantonomi maintained among the Montauk, Puritan 
leaders “concluded that Wyandanch’s influence over his elders had to be strengthened by 
English economic and military support.”
229
 After summoning the Narragansett leader to Boston 
to face the conspiracy charges, English leaders commissioned an armed sloop to patrol the sound 
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in hopes of preventing the Narragansetts from continuing to undermine Wyandanch’s 
authority.
230
 The outcome must have been exactly what the Montauk sachem hoped for because, 
as the historian, John A. Strong writes, "Few Long Island sachems would challenge openly any 
leader who could draw upon this level of support from the English."
231
 Even before the arrival of 
the colonist, Indigenous leaders would have competed with each other to fill the void created by 
the collapse of one of the regions principle communities. But the presence of the newcomers 
heightened and intensified rivalries because now—through strategically crafted alliances—
smaller and traditionally subordinate groups could enter the fray. Leaders such as Massasoit, 
Uncas, and Wyandanch exploited these new political and diplomatic realities in hopes of 
furthering their unique agendas.   
Wagincut’s failure and the successes of Massasoit, Uncas, and Wyandanch proved the 
importance and utility of cross-cultural alliances. However, the repeated efforts of Puritan 
leaders to marginalize Williams and Rhode Island’s colonial settlements coupled with the 
attempts by other Indigenous leaders to intensify and exploit rivalries between the Narragansetts 
and colonial authorities in Massachusetts and Connecticut meant that the Narragansetts were left 
without a useful ally. Therefore, when Samuel Gorton—an English settler who had already been 
banished from Massachusetts, Plymouth, and two towns in Rhode Island—appealed to 
Miantonomi for land and protection, the sachem accommodated Gorton by granting him lands 
held by Pomham, a disgruntled sub-sachem who sought to rid himself of Miantonomi’s rule by 
submitting to the authority of Massachusetts. The Narragansett sachem must have known that 
Pomham would bring his protest directly to the Bay colony. In fact, Miantonomi probably 
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counted on it. The Narragansetts were undoubtedly aware of the jurisdictional disputes that 
invariably arose between the colonies and that Gorton and his followers had a reputation for 
“being a thorn in Massachusetts’s side.”
232
 By granting Gorton access to the lands held by 
Pomham, Miantonomi not only disciplined the disloyal sub-sachem, but he also directly 
challenged Massachusetts’ attempt to extend its influence and authority into areas traditionally 
controlled and settled by the Narragansetts. Miantonomi might have believed that his decision 
would force the leaders of the Bay colony to abandon Pomham and their claims of authority in 
Rhode Island. But when Massachusetts raised an armed force and marched into the territorial 
boundaries of what would become Rhode Island to root out Gorton, the leaders of the Bay 
colony sparked an even wider intercolonial dispute that became internationalized when the 
Gortonists sailed to England to take their protest directly to the King.
233
 In hopes of bolstering 
his claim and to decry the overreach of Massachusetts, Gorton hand-delivered a letter to Charles 
I from the Narragansett sachems Canonicus and Pessacus—Miantonomi having been recently 
murdered by Uncas. “In the letter,” writes Pulsipher, “the sachems submitted themselves, their 
land, and possessions to the king.”
234
 The move—as we have seen—was consistent with the 
political and diplomatic calculations made by Indigenous peoples throughout the region. But, 
whereas smaller polities such as the Wampanoag, Mohegan, and Montauk sought to allay with or 
submit to the authority of colonial leaders, the Narragansetts endeavored to subject themselves to 
the only entity in the region that the Indians considered to be a power greater than their own. The 
rationale for subjecting themselves to the authority of the king was made evident just one month 
after Gorton delivered the letter when Massachusetts authorities summoned Narragansett leaders 
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to Boston. Pessacus and Canonicus refused the order explaining that they had “subjected or 
selves, or lands, & possessions” to “that royal King Charles.”
235
 And that “being subjects now 
unto the same king, & state yorselves are,” the Indians would do as they pleased. It is clear from 
the exchange that the Narragansetts believed themselves to be the equals of colonial leaders and 
that they would not submit themselves to the authority of the settlers. Thus, by subjecting 
themselves to the king, the Narragansetts attempted to force colonial leaders to recognize and 
admit a political and diplomatic reality that the Indians considered obvious. The Narragansetts 
were indeed a “great tree.” For likeminded colonial and Indigenous leaders, the Narragansetts 
constituted the most significant obstacle to the expansion of their authority and influence. And 
while Uncas and Wyandanch worked to undermine the tribe’s dominion, Massachusetts, 
Connecticut, and Plymouth encouraged and sanctioned the execution of its leadership.
236
 
Colonial and Indian leaders would spend the next thirty years attempting to curtail and undercut 
the sway the Narragansetts held throughout the region.   
Since at least 1524, the Narragansetts constituted a distinct and consequential community 
in what would come to be known as southern New England. In fact, it was the reality of 
Narragansett dominance that influenced and shaped the direction and progression of many of the 
region’s cross-cultural associations. But the alliances and relationships crafted between 
Indigenous and colonial leaders were often conceptualized and understood in different ways 
shaped by two often discordant worldviews. Although specific Indigenous groups, at times, 
formed alliances and closer associations with particular individuals, these relationships were 
mostly viewed by the colonists as ephemeral. The Narragansetts, Wampanoags, Mohegans, and 
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other Native polities in the region also understood cross-cultural associations to be strategic and 
expedient. But, unencumbered by the delimiting racial dogma that beset the settlers—over 
time—the gifts, protection, and assistance proffered by the Indians worked to recast these 
associations into relationships that held—for the Natives anyway—social, political, and cultural 
significance. For example, when Uncas offered his heart to the English he was not simply being 
melodramatic. Instead, the Mohegan leader was communicating how he interpreted this cross-
cultural relationship. Because Uncas' fortunes were intimately tied to the military and political 
successes of the colonists, the sachem's statement was more than just symbolic. It is most likely 
that Uncas hoped his dramatic pledge would be recognized and reciprocated by his newly 
acquired compatriots, thereby confirming a political and social reality that the sachem knew to 
be true. The Mohegans and the colonists needed to act as one—with one heart—if they were to 
realize their ambitions. Similarly, the alliance crafted between Plymouth and the Wampanoags 
evolved—at least for the Indians—over time from a strategic compact to an enduring association 
built upon a mutual respect established by historic obligations. When it became clear that the 
Puritans failed to interpret this relationship in the same way as their former allies, it was then that 
Metacom—Wampanoag sachem and sole surviving son of Massasoit—reminded the settlers of 
the obligations they incurred when Massasoit was a great man and the English were as 
children.
237
 Metacom called to attention the social and political debt the colonists incurred when 
they accepted Massasoit’s gifts of land, protection, and corn. But because many settlers held a 
much different interpretation about the durability of the compact reached between their 
forbearers and Massasoit some fifty-five years earlier, Metacom’s appeal did little to slow the 
advance a war that would see the region's Indigenous population significantly reduced and 
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almost entirely dispossessed. Finally, like the Mohegans and the Wampanoags, the Narragansetts 
were surprised to learn that their English allies did not interpret their cross-cultural associations 
in the same way as the Indians.  And the Narragansetts, failure to recognize this fact would cost 
them dearly. On their way to attack a Narragansett fort, the regiment dispatched by the United 
Colonies traveled in the boats provided by Rhode Island settlers and camped outside the trading 
post once manned and maintained by Williams. But as the contingent sailed, slept, and marched 
along the pathways and into the swamps of southern Rhode Island, none of the people the 
Narragansetts had once offered land and protection sent word to the tribe of the impending 
attack, and the Indians were caught unprepared for the ensuing massacre. A few months later, 
Williams met with Narragansett leaders as they prepared to exact their revenge on Providence 
and pleaded with Indians to spare his settlement. But it was too late. The attack on the fort and—
principally—Rhode Island’s failure to fulfill what the Narragansetts saw as the settlers’ social, 
political, and military responsibilities—obligations incurred by the colonists when they accepted 
the land and protection of the Narragansetts—destroyed whatever influence Williams had 
maintained among the Narragansetts and the Indians burned every building in Providence to the 
ground.
238
 It is clear then that how colonial and Indigenous leaders interpreted the meaning and 
significance of cross-cultural contacts were not only divergent but often incongruent. A fact that 
held significant ramifications for the region’s Indigenous population as the Puritans sought to 
make their religio-historical vision a reality.              
In 1629 the seal of the newly chartered Massachusetts Bay Colony featured a Euro-
American interpretation of an Indian man standing mostly naked in front of an emptied 
landscape with a bow in one hand and a downward facing arrow in the other. The words above 
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the character read “come over and help us.” The sigil was the embodiment of a racialized dogma 
that cast Indigenous peoples as ahistorical, warlike, uncivilized, and undeserving of the Eden 
they inhabited. The mission of those who traveled to the colony was clear. The settlers were to 
cloth the Indian dressing him in the superiority of English cultural practices. The newcomers 
were to tame the native’s brutish and hostile nature by getting him to put down his bow and 
arrow. And finally, the colonists were to impregnate this barren land with the seeds of prosperity. 
How the newcomers interpreted and sought to realize their divine mission informed the way they 
perceived interactions with Indigenous peoples. For many of the colonists, longstanding 
prejudices and the fact that many Natives—including the Narragansetts—failed to supplant their 
lifeways for that of the English appeared to affirm the supposed retrogressive, bellicose, and 
uncivilized nature of Indigenous peoples. Thus, Indians were viewed primarily as an obstacle to 
the realization of the region's real potential and ordained purpose. But, if the seal is observed 
from a different perspective—one that places the political and diplomatic realities of the region 
into sharper focus—then the imagery of the sigil takes on a much different and perhaps more 
accurate meaning. Instead of being barely clothed the man depicted in the seal is dressed for 
combat with his instruments of war in his hands. The arrow points not just to the location where 
the battle will be fought, but it also makes clear what is at stake in the contest, the very land upon 
which the Indian stands. Lastly, the appeal made by the character is an attempt to recruit allies 
for the coming struggle. When the sigil is viewed with these subtexts in mind, the mission of the 
settlers appears to take on a wholly different connotation. No longer were the colonists the 
supposed redeemers of the Indians. Instead, the newcomers who settled in the region were 
collaborators in a struggle waged between Native peoples as they attempted to reorder their 
world in the midst of massive social, political, cultural, and economic upheaval.    
89 
 
Chapter 3 - The Summer Sun 
It was in the aftermath of what chroniclers termed “King Phillip’s War” that the 
Narragansetts seemed to vanish as colonial authorities and their Indigenous allies aggressively 
perused the remnants of this once mighty tribe. Emboldened by their success, colonists hunted 
down many of the Indians who failed to expire on the battlefield and sold others as slaves to 
traders in the Caribbean, greatly depleting the region's Native population.
239
 The shift in 
demographics was especially dramatic for the Narragansetts because the tribe was reduced to just 
a few hundred survivors from a prewar population that numbered somewhere around ten 
thousand.
240
 For the colonists, victory forever reordered the dynamics of power in southern New 
England, solidifying not only the land claims of the settlers but also the ascendancy of their 
Eurocentric worldview as the perspectives, interpretations, and historical explanations of the 
English achieved supremacy. For the Natives, defeat meant not only dispossession but also 
redefinition, as survivors were challenged with reforming and reinterpreting their communities. 
But while the Narragansett endeavored to reconstitute, reimage, and reassert their collective 
identity, their non-Indigenous neighbors also sought to redefine the parameters of indigeneity. 
This chapter traces how the Narragansetts reinterpreted and reaffirmed their community in the 
years, decades, and centuries following King Phillips War. The chapter also explores the 
discrepancies between the way Indians and non-Indians attempted to define Indigeneity.  
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Officially, the Narragansetts were bystanders in the conflict that originally erupted 
between the Wampanoags and Plymouth. As described in chapter two, the Pilgrims and their 
Indigenous host held different interpretations about the responsibilities and obligations 
associated with their compact. “It is startling to see how quickly two peoples,” write Shultz and 
Tougias, “having lived side by side for half a century, could become consumed so quickly and 
completely with an intense hatred for one another.”
241
 But the transformation was not as sudden 
as the authors suggest because—as previously stated—the aversions many non-Natives held 
toward the region’s Indigenous population were enduring. The historian Virginia DeJohn 
Anderson explains that when the Wampanoag leader realized that English settlers valued their 
economic and territorial pursuits “more than good relations with his people . . . Philip resorted to 
violence.”
242
 Undermanned and outgunned, Metacom appealed to other Indigenous polities for 
assistance. But many of the Narragansetts considered the outbreak of hostilities a localized affair. 
In fact, a group of the Indians questioned Roger Williams as to why Massachusetts and Rhode 
Island had “left not Philip and Plymouth to fight it out.”
243
 But the English could not simply 
dismiss Metacom’s turn to violence as a limited and local issue because the bellicosity of the 
Wampanoags and their Indigenous supporters only seemed to substantiate and heighten the fears 
that had long gripped colonial settlements throughout southern New England. Roger Williams 
explains, “How often I have heard both the English and Dutch say, ‘These Heathen Dogges, 
better kill a thousand of them then that we Christians should be indangered or troubled by them.’ 
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 Informed by such disquiet, immigrant communities—who had once feuded with each 
other—now coalesced into a racialized alliance informed by the longstanding dogmas that 
settlers employed to differentiate themselves from the area's Native population.
245
 Within this 
context, few colonists believed that the region’s most substantial Indigenous power would 
remain impartial in a struggle that pitted a pan-Indian force against the European settlers. Indeed, 
some early chroniclers referred to the conflict as the “Narragansett War,” even though the tribe 
had declared its neutrality and worked to assuage the fears of Puritan leaders by attempting to 
meet their wartime demands.
246
 But, to truly subdue the region's Indigenous population—thereby 
securing their existence—the colonists knew they needed to bring the Narragansetts to heel.  
When the United Colonies marched into southern Rhode Island to subdue the 
Narragansetts, they did so under the pretext that the tribe had violated the terms of neutrality. On 
July 15, 1675, English soldiers secured an agreement in which “they forced four low-ranking 
sachems to sign a treaty," acting as representatives of the entire tribe.
247
 In the pact, the minor 
chiefs supposedly promised that the Narragansetts would not provide shelter to Wampanoag 
refugees. A few months later Plymouth declared war on the Narragansetts, claiming that the tribe 
was “relieving and securing Wampanoag women and children and wounded men.”
248
 The 
accusation was most likely true considering the permeability of tribal affiliations and the fact that 
the Narragansetts had previously harbored Pequot refuges. But the English were aware of these 
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earlier precedents and familiar with the traditional practices that informed the political and 
diplomatic decisions of Native peoples. Thus, the colonists probably understood that "reliving 
and securing" women and children was neither an act of aggression nor a pledge of support to 
Metacom’s uprising.
249
 The real impetuses for the attack on the fort—which erased all 
ambiguities about the neutrality of the Narragansetts, pretended or not—were the deep-seated 
trepidations and enmities that shaped the way many colonists viewed the tribe. The 
contemporary writer William Harris argued that the Narragansett’s claims of neutrality were but 
“pretenses of peace” done “all in deceit.”
250
 But more than just fear and loathing, the defeat of 
the Narragansetts portended to open up territory long coveted by English settlers. In fact, to 
ready his men for the coming battle, the Massachusetts governor promised, "If they played the 
man, took the fort, and drove the enemy out of the Narragansett country, which is their great 
seat, they should have a gratuity of land, besides their wages."
251
 It is clear then that the soldiers 
who marched deep into Narragansett country on December 19, 1675, had more in mind than just 
the failure of the Indians to turn over Wampanoag women and children. The ensuing battle—
which took place in a marsh—is commonly referred to in the literature as the Great Swamp 
Fight. However, according to Narragansett oral tradition, the "fort" was a refugee camp in which 
women, children, and elderly men sought respite from the ravages of war.
252
 Within this context, 
some Narragansetts argue that the conflict is more aptly named the Great Swamp Massacre. 
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Whatever the designation, the clash proved decisive because the rout forever changed the 
political, cultural, social, economic, and demographic landscape of southern New England. With 
the Narragansetts left reeling and Metacom unable to secure the support of the Mohawk, the 
uprising was crushed, and many Indians throughout the region—even the noncombatants—were 
hunted down or sold into slavery.
253
 The “colonists had shattered Indian power in the region,” 
writes Silverman, “by wiping out some 70 percent of the people who had warred against 
them.”
254
 Hence, after 1676, there were no more great trees in southern New England.  
King Philip’s War marked a watershed in which the colonists dramatically asserted their 
dominion over the land and peoples of southern New England. Due to the totality of the English 
victory and the upheavals experienced by Indigenous communities after the war, chroniclers 
have often imagined the possibilities of different outcomes. “Looking back at these events of 
more than three centuries ago,” writes Simmons, “We can only ask whether there could have 
been a different ending.”
255
 Such counterfactual postulations often envision an alternative reality 
in which the region’s Indigenous peoples coalesce to thwart the settlement and advance of 
English colonists.
256
 But at the time, a pan-Indian alliance would have been just as unimaginable 
to Native peoples as a compact with the French would have been unthinkable to many English. 
Silverman explains that in the mid-seventeenth century, the Narragansetts "cannot be said to 
have thought racially at all."
257
 Hence, the racial binary that permeated the worldviews of the 
colonists and their posterity had not yet informed the diplomatic and political decisions of many 
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Native peoples. Still, it is not too hard to imagine that Massasoit might have pursued a different 
course with the Pilgrims had he known that his grandson would be sold to a Caribbean slaver and 
the head of his son would sit atop a pike in Plymouth for more than twenty years.
258
 In the 
aftermath of the war, those Indians who did escape both death and slavery were left to—once 
again—stitch themselves back together. But now, when the remnants of the region’s once 
powerful tribes attempted to reform their communities, they did so within a social reality in 
which non-Indigenous peoples also claimed the right—by virtue of their victory—to determine 
the parameters of indigeneity. And as the colonists achieved supremacy, so too did their 
conceptualizations about race and ethnicity. 
The collapse, merger, and reconstitution of Indigenous communities intensified in the 
decades following King Phillip’s War as Native peoples in southern New England faced the 
challenges and demands associated with English colonialism. With the remaking of the region’s 
demographic, social, political, and physical landscapes, Indians sought to strengthen the bonds 
within their communities and to bolster and reinterpret ties with other Indigenous groups. For 
example, Fisher and Silverman explain that before 1676, the English sometimes differentiated 
between the Niantics and the Narragansetts as two distinct and separate groups, but “after the 
war they became known solely as Narragansetts.”
259
 Similarly, Simmons writes, “In the years 
after the war, a few surviving Narragansett and other New England Indians merged with the 
Niantic,” thus forming a new group referred to as the Narragansetts.
260
 Although the 
Narragansetts and the Niantics had a long and close association, sometime shortly after 1676, the 
two tribes along with other Native peoples in the region coalesced into one—almost 
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indistinguishable—group. As described in the first chapter, the process of ethnogenesis was a 
social and political reality for Indigenous peoples throughout southern New England long before 
the arrival of Europeans. The historian Linford D. Fisher observes that: “Tribal boundaries were 
often overlapping . . . and could be amended, altered, or even obliterated by cultural processes 
such as adoption, intermarriage, alliance-building, and the ritual submission of defeated 
enemies.”
261
 The benefits accrued by those Indigenous communities that did join together were 
clearly communicated by Fisher when he asserted that: “By pooling agricultural, trade, and 
spiritual resources, communities were redefined, strengthened, and better able to respond to the 
most devastating consequences of colonialism.”
262
 Indeed, the merger of Indigenous polities 
after the war can be understood not only as the continuation of a diplomatic tradition that 
preceded colonial settlement but also as a strategic and political exercise. However they 
reconfigured themselves, Natives continued to assert and celebrate their distinctiveness as 
Indigenous peoples even after the devastation and dislocation they experienced. Over the next 
century, the Narragansetts continued to reimagine and reassert themselves, as they navigated and 
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The victory provided the newcomers with a greater sense of security as many of their 
Indigenous rivals either perished in battle, fled the area, or were forcibly removed from the 
region. Therefore, after the war, many colonists “no longer feared local Indians as bloodthirsty 
savages” with the potential and temperament to threaten English settlements.
264
 The newcomers 
instead reinterpreted the Native peoples who remained in southern New England. No longer 
viewed as a menace, some colonists now saw Indians as the fatally flawed victims of their own 
immutable nature. The assertion that Indians were “suited to degradation within colonial society” 
because “they were incapable of civility” became for many a self-fulfilling prophecy as the 
political, social, and economic influence of the Narragansetts waned in the years following King 
Philip’s War.
265
 For example, in 1707, inspired in part by the belief that non-Indians could make 
better use of the territory, the Rhode Island General Assembly commissioned a survey of all the 
“vacant lands in the Narragansett country.”
266
 The following year colonial leaders questioned the 
Narragansett sachem Ninigret II about these “vacant” lands inquiring “what may be a sufficient 
competency of land for him and for his men to live upon?”
267
 When the sachem later quitclaimed 
four-fifths of the tribe’s land to the colony in 1709 relinquishing ancestral rights to the territory, 
the move was widely interpreted as part of a natural progression in which Native peoples yielded 
to the superiority of settler society. When viewed from this perspective, the dispossession of the 
Indians appears inevitable because the Narragansetts were supposedly innately ill-equipped to 
adapt to postwar realities.
268
 However, the decision of the tribe to abandon its claim to what had 
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been ancestral lands was emblematic of emerging social, political, economic, and demographic 
conditions and not a tacit capitulation by the Indians. In reality, the Narragansetts could no 
longer enforce their territorial boundaries and non-Indians regularly encroached upon their 
land.
269
 Thus, the quitclaim can be more appropriately understood as a strategic move informed 
by traditional diplomatic practices. It is likely that the Narragansetts hoped that by gifting the 
land to the settlers the colonial government would be obligated to help the tribe maintain the 
territorial integrity of the one-fifth that remained in their possession. The intention of tribal 
members to retain and preserve some form of autonomy in the circumscribed area can be 
understood by examining the land the Indians sought to maintain. Within the boundaries of the 
area that the Narragansetts continued to claim were located natural springs, freshwater ponds, 
parcels of dense forest and swamplands, tidewater areas, and a significant stretch of the region’s 
coastline. Thus, the acreage the Indians reserved for themselves allowed access to traditional 
forms of sustenance including the waters harboring the hard shell clams the Narragansetts 
referred to as quahogs. Because of the tribe’s diminished population, it is conceivable that those 
Indians who remained in the area could have sustained a fairly traditional lifestyle within the 
sixty-four-mile expanse, and this might have been the motive of the quitclaim.
270
 
However, it appears that the Indians had learned from the failings and inconsistencies of 
previous cross-cultural agreements and instead of defining the quitclaim through acts that 
engendered familiarity and reciprocity, the Narragansetts now specified what they expected to 
gain in the arrangement. For example, when Ninigret II negotiated with colonial leaders, he 
declared: “I reserve . . . lands where I now dwell . . . all which within said bounds, I reserve to 
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myself and my heirs forever.”
271
 The implications of the sachem’s pronouncement were clear. If 
colonial leaders accepted Ninigret’s offer, they also agreed to all of the terms and obligations 
therein. When the land deed is viewed within this context, what many thought was a windfall for 
Rhode Island’s settlers was really a transaction in which the Narragansetts secured—in 
principle—the assurance and protection of colonial leaders “forever.” But the Natives were not 
the only ones who learned from previous cross-culture exchanges because it was in these earlier 
agreements that the newcomers realized the utility of their treaties. Any violation of the terms of 
an agreement—however inconsequential or ordinary—could be used as a pretext to invalidate 
the compact and release the colonists from any obligations. Therefore, the stipulation in the 
quitclaim which stated that if the Narragansetts sold any land without the consent of Rhode 
Island’s colonial authorities “all that is so disposed shall be forfeited to the Governor and 
Company,” was both a safeguard and a release clause.
272
  
In the early eighteenth-century, the lines of demarcation between colonies were fluid and 
evolving. In fact, the 1707 land survey was not only inspired by notions of Native inferiority, but 
it was also precipitated by a land dispute between Rhode Island and Connecticut.
273
 Hence, it is 
likely that Rhode Island’s colonial leadership sought the inclusion of the provision forbidding 
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any sale of land by the Indians without the colony’s consent as a means by which to maintain 
some authority over the Indians and their territory. But more than just control, the agreement 
offered Rhode Islanders justification for future claims. “It was the anticipation of Indian 
disappearance,” writes Silverman, “that made reservations palatable for land-hungry 
Englishmen.”
274
 Indeed, as early as 1713, the Narragansetts petitioned colonial leaders for 
assistance in dealing with aggressive settlers and land speculators. In 1717 Rhode Island placed 
the remaining tribal lands in trust as a means by which to better regulate and even slow the rate 
of dispossession.
275
 But the Indians who appealed to the state not only sought reprieve from 
opportunistic whites, because they also wanted to circumscribe the authority of sachems that 
seemed to be disposing of communal land for personal gain. 
Throughout most of the eighteenth-century Narragansett sachems occupied an almost 
impossible role. Not only were the tribal leaders tasked with representing and advocating for 
their community, but the sachems were expected to do so while observing and adhering to the 
traditional ideals of monocratic rule maintained by many of the newcomers. Europeans often 
framed their rulers as autocrats with great authority and dominion over those within their 
preview. In fact, it was this “absolute despotism” that so enraged the colonists in North America 
and contributed to the outbreak of the Revolutionary War in 1776.
276
 Conversely, as shown 
earlier, reciprocity and consensus informed traditional Indigenous ideals of leadership and social 
allegiance. While discussing the power held by Narragansett sachems, Roger Williams observed 
that leaders avoided making laws or wars “unto which the people are averse, and by gentle 
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perswasion [sic] cannot be brought.”
277
 Similarly, Daniel Gookin explained that leaders who 




However, settlers often expected Indigenous leaders to speak and act as sovereigns 
vesting them with tremendous power over a tribe’s economic resources. For example, throughout 
the eighteenth-century, the Rhode Island legislature recognized the sachem as the sole arbiter and 
beneficiary of “the lease, rent, and sale of tribal land to whites.”
279
 This prescribed authority 
along with an expectation that Indian leaders assume the trappings and lifestyles of English 
nobility encouraged some Narragansett sachems to use land sales to finance newly acquired 
lifeways. An account produced in 1744 by Dr. Alexander Hamilton described the estate of 
George Ninigret—youngest son of Ninigret II.  
He possesses twenty or thirty 1000 acres of very fine level land round this house, upon which 
he has many tenants and has, of his own, a good stock of horses and other cattle. This King 
lives after the English mode . . . His queen goes in a high modish dress in her silks, hoops, 
stays, and dresses like an English woman. He educates his children to the belles letters and is 
himself a very complaisant mannerly man. We pay’d [sic] him a visit and he treated us with a 




As Hamilton observed, George Ninigret aimed to have his children educated “after the English 
mode,” in fact his youngest son Thomas was later sent to England for schooling. George’s horses 
and cattle, his wife’s silks and hoops, and Thomas’ education were all financed by local whites 
who readily accepted land or the proceeds from land sales as payment for the debts incurred by 
the sachems. Hence when Thomas Ninigret returned from Europe accustom to the finery of the 
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English gentry and assumed the sachemship, he began a reign that one historian called “the most 
costly and divisive in the history of the Ninigret family.”
281
 Due in large to the massive debts 
incurred by Thomas and his forbearers, nearly all of the 41,000 acres Ninigret II claimed in 1709 
had been lost by mid-century.  
Chroniclers have tended to judge the Ninigret dynasty harshly. For example, the scholar 
Joseph A. Conforti, observes that when “The Ninigret family . . . gained legal control over 
thousands of acres of tribal land. They used it not on behalf of fellow reservation Natives, but to 
finance a lavish Anglicized way of life.”
282
 Similarly, William S. Simmons writes that “As ‘King 
Tom’ [Thomas Ninigret] matured, his standard of living and his debts became legendary.”
283
 
And while recounting the abuses of Ninigret II, Robert A. Geake referred to the sachem as an 
arrogant and entitled “degenerate.”
284
 However, it is important to remember that many of the 
sources detailing and sometimes deriding the opulence of the Ninigrets were produced and 
preserved by white colonists who were often interested in gaining greater access to the lands held 
by the sachems. Hence, it is not difficult to recognize how these accounts could be used to both 
explain and justify the dispossession of the Narragansetts. The stories of excess bolstered a well-
established maxim that portrayed Indigenous peoples as hopelessly irredeemable. The exploits 
recounted in these sources implied that even when afforded the advantages of wealth, Indians 
were still innately ill-equipped to adapt to emerging social, political, cultural, and economic 
realities.  
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However, it seems that the problem for Thomas Ninigret was not his inability to adapt to 
European lifeways but perhaps that the sachem accommodated and assimilated too much. The 
hunting, farming, and crafting associated with a subsistence lifestyle was still practiced in 
varying degrees by many Narragansetts when Thomas returned from England sometime around 
the middle of the eighteenth-century. But for an individual raised and educated mostly within 
western society, the lifeways of some of his fellow tribesmen must have seemed anachronistic to 
the young sachem, and Thomas drew upon his wealth to maintain the lifestyle to which he had 
grown accustomed. As the tribe’s principal representative and advocate, it might have even been 
appropriate for the sachem to live “after the English mode” in order to prove that the Indians 
could indeed adapt and assimilate into modern society. Whatever it was that informed the 
decisions and lifestyle of Thomas Ninigret, it is clear that under his reign the tribe’s landholdings 
were greatly diminished making the traditional means of subsistence almost impossible.
285
  
No longer able to use the land to meet the bulk of their needs, by the middle of the 
eighteenth-century many Narragansetts became “poor rural folk who struggled to make a living 
around the edges of the white plantation economy.”
286
 While some of the Indians turned to 
selling venison, furs, feathers, baskets, and woven mats, others searched for employment beyond 
the confines of the reservation.
287
 Women tended to find jobs locally working in the homes of 
their white neighbors. However, the employment opportunities available to many men—laborers, 
soldiers, and sailors—required that they leave their families and communities for months or 
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years at a time.
288
  The result was that during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth-centuries 
many Narragansett households were led by women, a reality that contributed to greater instances 
of intermarriage. Still, many of the Narragansetts who remained in southern Rhode Island 
struggled to provide for themselves and their families. “Some Indians signed indenture 
contracts,” writes Silverman, “as the only way to feed and clothe their children.”
289
 Moreover, 
Silverman explains that exorbitant fees, disproportionately high fines, and frivolous lawsuits 
often forced other Narragansetts into bondage. The realities of dispossession, poverty, and 
servitude were seen by non-Indians as evidence of maladjustment and helped not only to 
reinforce the belief that Indian peoples were incapable of integrating into modern society but also 
justified their placement at the bottom region’s social hierarchy. It was, in fact, these hardships 
that finally began “to open the hearts and minds of many Native peoples to Christianity.”
290
 
The sachemship of Thomas Ninigret coincided with a general religious revivalism that 
challenged traditional hierarchies and advocated for the democratization of spiritual authority. 
This Great Awakening—as it has come to be known—held tremendous significance for the 
Narragansetts because it helped to inspire and empower individual tribal members who used the 
rhetoric of equality to openly challenge the sachem’s authority. The animated evangelicals of the 
Great Awakening—known as New Lights—“preached against the corruptions of worldly wealth 
and emphasized the equality of all men and women before God.”
291
 Embracing these doctrinal 
dictates, some tribal members started attending services at a church established in Westerly 
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Rhode Island by Reverend Joseph Park.
292
  By 1744, more than one hundred Narragansetts 
joined Park’s congregation with sixty-four of the Indians becoming full members including 
Samuel Niles—a former Narragansett powwow [traditional spiritual leader] turned New Light 
convert. Niles could not have been more different than Park. While the Reverend received his 
training and credentials from Harvard, the Narragansett leader was illiterate—but had committed 
many verses to memory—and although Park was himself an evangelical, Niles was chastised for 
“exhorting in the congregation” too exuberantly.
293
  
Eventually, Niles led a faction of Narragansetts that detached from Park’s flock and 
established a new church on reservation land. But these Indian separatists did not only reject the 
leadership in the church because the new congregation also formed the foundation from which 
tribal members could contest the authority of the sachem. It was in this way that the Indians 
appropriated the prevailing religious tenets and “converted Christianity to their own needs.”
294
 
The challenge mounted by Niles and his followers ultimately resulted in the revocation of the 
sachem’s authority to unilaterally sell tribal land. However, the struggle had been a protracted 
one, and by the time the legislation establishing a review board passed in 1782, the damage was 
already done because much of territory forever promised to the Indians 1709 was already in the 
possession of local whites.
295
 
Faced with the loss of almost all of their ancestral lands, some of the newly converted 
Narragansetts concluded that “they would be more free from the contaminating influence, and 
evil example . . . of their white brethren” if they left the region an resettled in “a sanctuary far 
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away from whites where they and their offspring could finally live in peace and prosperity.”
296
 In 
what has come to be known as the Brothertown movement, various individuals from Indigenous 
communities throughout southern New England sought not only liturgical autonomy from their 
non-Indian neighbors, but also social, cultural, territorial, and even racial separation. This 
amalgamation of tribes—now known as the Brothertown Indians—first moved to territory 
granted to the group by the Oneida of western New York in 1770s.
297
 Later, due to the continued 
expansion of the non-Indigenous populace, the Brothertown Indians faced renewed territorial, 
social, and economic pressures. Once again the Indians fled west, this time to territory controlled 
by the Winnebago in what is now known as Brothertown, Wisconsin.
298
 Historian Linford Fisher 
explains that at its base the “motivation for migration seems to have been long-term resentment 
and frustration.”
299
 Hence, the Brothertown movement was not just emblematic of the abject 
social, political, and economic conditions that faced the Narragansetts in Rhode Island, but it was 
also indicative of how the process of ethnogenesis was strategic. Archaeologist Craig N. Cipolla 
argues that “reeling from the aftermaths of colonial encroachment . . . once-distinct Indigenous 
groups . . . sometimes reinvented themselves” creating “new identities and modes of social 
classification as they incorporated once-foreign ideas, materials, and practices and responded to 
colonial power structures.”
300
 Indeed, as the Indigenous peoples of southern New England 
searched for ways to navigate the pressures of colonization, the Indians found that they often 
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faced the same challenges as other Native groups throughout the region. As Silverman observes, 
the Brothertown movement emerged out of this shared experience because it was not just the 
Narragansetts—but all Indians—who had been assigned to the lowest caste in New England. 
Still, the frustration and resentment to which Fisher referred must have been especially acute in 
Rhode Island because Narragansetts comprised the majority of those Indians who left for 
Albany. In all, the movement claimed close to twenty percent of the tribe’s overall population.
301
 
In 1855 the Narragansett-Brothertown composer Thomas Commuck gave a sobering account of 
his Brothertown experience: 
Here, then, are the Brothertown Indians on the east side of Winnebago Lake, in 
Calumet County, trying to imitate our white brethren in all things except their vices. Here we 
have taken our last stand, as it were, and are resolved to meet manfully, that overwhelming 
tide of fate, which seems destined, in a few short years, to sweep the Red Man from the face 
of existence. 
 
For Commuck’s tribal brethren who remained in their homeland, the few short years to which the 
author referred were, in fact, twenty-five because in 1880 the state of Rhode Island declared that 
the Narragansetts were extinct.  
Belying its relatively small size as both a colony and a state, Rhode Island played a 
central role in the trade that brought African slaves to American shores. The historian Christy 
Clark-Pujara explains, “During the colonial period, the West Indian and Atlantic slave trades 
were the lifeblood of the colony’s [Rhode Island] economy.”
302
 Local merchants transported 
more than sixty percent of all enslaved persons destined for North America. “And by 1750 
Rhode Islanders held the highest proportion of slaves in New England” with one in ten residents 
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being an enslaved person.
303
 Slavery and all of its economic outgrowths—what Clark-Pujara 
terms the business of slavery—was central to the development and prosperity of Rhode Island as 
both a colony and a state. And as such, the assertion of a racial hierarchy undergirded local 
socioeconomic realities. “To put it bluntly,” writes Clark-Pujara, “the lives and the worth of 
many white Rhode Islanders were predicated on the subordination of black people.”
304
 But, as 
we have seen, individuals of African descent were not the only ones relegated to the lowest rungs 
of society and thus eligible for enslavement because even Roger Williams profited from the sale 
of his former Indigenous benefactors.
305
 As identified earlier, in the years following King 
Philip’s War, dispossession forced many Narragansett into servitude.
306
 By 1703, Rhode 
Islanders codified slavery and limited the practice to include only African and Indigenous 
persons.
307
 But unlike their Native counterparts who could, at times, draw upon existing 
Indigenous networks—however small and fragile—for support, refuge, strength, and sustenance, 
the Africans who labored in homes, mills, distilleries, and on small farms throughout Rhode 
Island did so in almost complete isolation from others of African descent because “most northern 
enslavers held just one or two slaves.”
308
 However, the maintenance and perpetuation of a racial 
hierarchy meant that both Africans and Natives were legally separated from whites as “people of 
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color” and, as such, often segregated into “the same taverns, jobs, and city neighborhoods.”
309
 
Moreover, as enslaved persons, “Africans and Indians in Rhode Island labored side by side.”
310
 
Such social and physical proximity inevitably led to intimacies and intermarriages between 
Africans and Indians. 
Native peoples have long used intermarriage to incorporate nonmembers into existing 
social, political, and cultural frameworks. For the Narragansetts, unions between Indians and 
Africans helped to bolster the tribe’s depleted population and were a means to bring “new skills, 
social and political connections, and other forms of power into the community.”
311
 As noted, the 
demands for Indigenous men to prosecute colonial wars and to serve as crew for far-flung 
excursions meant that even before the outbreak of the American Revolution, Indian women 
outnumbered Indian men in Rhode Island by a ratio of almost two to one.
312
 Faced with this 
demographic reality, Daniel Mandell argues that “Indian women in seaport neighborhoods and 
rural villages often had little choice but to marry someone of African ancestry.”
313
 For some 
Narragansetts, coupling with a Black man was a strategic decision because it was through these 
unions that women gained access to the labor they could use “to improve their lives and better 
provide for their children.”
314
 For example, William Brown recounted that sometime around 
1770 his grandmother purchased and married an enslaved man “in order to change her mode of 
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living” because the union portended to enable her to live “after the manner of white people.”
315
 
For Black men, these unions also connoted an opportunity to improve one’s station in life. By 
marrying into the tribe, peoples of African descent not only gained access to reservation land—
or what remained thereof, but they also ensured that their descendants would be born-free 
persons. But these interracial unions were not always primarily strategic calculations because in 
1761, Thomas Ninigret married Mary Whitfield, a “molatto.”
316
 As sachem, Ningret would have 
had little economic motivation to marry Whitfield and was most likely merely smitten. As 
evidenced by Thomas Ninigret and William Brown’s grandmother, various demographic, social, 
and economic factors influenced intermarriage, and as such, unions between Africans and 
Indians were not unlike previous acts of ethnogenesis.  
The rhetoric of freedom and equality espoused in the years leading up to the American 
Revolution inspired New England communities to enact legislation hastening emancipation 
throughout the region.
317
 In Rhode Island, ideology combined with necessity in 1778 when—in 
an effort to counteract the British, who occupied the town of Newport and offered freedom to 
any slaves held by rebels— legislators passed a law providing that “every able bodied Negro, 
mulatto, or Indian man slave who enlisted for the war’s duration and passed muster, would be 
freed.”
318
 The offer led to the creation of Rhode Island's famous all-black regiment and some 250 
slaves joined the America effort.
319
 Moreover, state officials passed a gradual emancipation act 
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in 1784 that further contributed to the demise of slavery in Rhode Island. But by 1820, as Melish 
argues, the discourse surrounding slavery was “transformed into the discourse of ‘Race” as many 
whites promoted a mythologized view of a “free New England.”
320
 
  Melish explains that for many Euro-Americans, the concept of a free New England 
connoted not just a region absent of slavery but the restoration of an apocryphal “homogeneous 
[all] white society.”
321
 However, the continued presence of the former slaves could not be easily 
explained in the newly sterilized historical narratives which minimized the importance and 
prevalence of slavery. Therefore, while New Englanders sought to reinterpret their past, they also 
endeavored to recast freed people in the region as anomalies. Within this context, peoples of 
African descent were interpreted as “strangers” whose deprived condition was seen as indicative 
of their natural inferiority and not an outgrowth of systemic practices.
322
 This mythologized past, 
coupled with the economic hardships of the postwar era, worked to harden social demarcations 
and “further ‘racialized’ both black and white identity in New England.”
323
 When Euro-
Americans sought to define and explain their position atop the social hierarchy, they turned to 
new “scientific” explanations of difference as innate, permanent, and residing in the body.”
324
 
Thus, Euro-Americans ascribed their imagined superiority and the perceived inferiority of 
African-Americans to nature.  
Unwelcome in the “all-white” society envisioned by Euro-Americans, as more people of 
African descent gained their freedom many “went native,” living in Charlestown on tribal land 
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“after the manner of the Indians.”
325
 Melish observes that although—in time—these migrants 
identified socially as Indian, many in the dominant society continued to see anyone of African 
descent—regardless of admixture—as innately inferior mongrels.
326
 Mandell posits that 
“although the efforts by southern New England Indians to survive by incorporating blacks 
worked, that very success posed new threats.”
327
 Questions about racial authenticity constituted 
the heart of the challenges now faced by those Indians—mixed or not—who continued to claim 
Narragansett lineage. But race was not yet a primary consideration among the Narragansetts as 
they endeavored to reconstitute and redefine their community during the latter part of the 
eighteenth century. Hence, absorbing peoples of African descent into the tribe was not unlike 
incorporating Pequot and Wampanoag refugees a hundred years earlier. But a lot had transpired 
over the past century, and although ethnogenesis had long been a traditional practice, the defeat 
of the Indians at the Great Swamp meant that—at least in the public sphere—the Narragansetts 
no longer solely determined and defined the parameters of their community. Many Rhode 
Islanders—motivated by a desire to collapse social differences into a binary of black and white—
began to challenge the indigeneity of the Narragansetts.
328
 Although it is impossible to know to 
what extent the intermixing with Africans reshaped tribal practices and customs, the ability of 
the Indians to transform and evolve to meet new social, political, demographic, and economic 
challenges was undoubtedly consistent with Indigenous traditions. By intermixing with 
newcomers—both black and white—the Indians certainly changed their appearance, but appeals 
to the way tribal members looked—as a way to question their Indianness—had more to do with 
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erasing the rights and claims of Rhode Island’s Indigenous population than the particular hues 
found among the Narragansetts. 
The perception—held by many—that Rhode Island’s Indigenous population had simply 
vanished was no accident. Instead, it was the intended outcome of an effort that endured for more 
than two centuries as colonial and later state officials attempted to erase all vestiges of the 
region’s once-vibrant Indian population. Ruth Wallis Herndon and Ella Wilcox Sekatau 
(Narragansett) argue that between 1750 and 1800, town clerks throughout Rhode Island stopped 
referring to Indigenous persons as “Indian” and instead substituted the term “mustee” and later 
“Negro” or “black” in a deliberate effort to commit what the authors called “documentary 
genocide.”
329
 According to Herndon and Sekatau, “By writing Indians out of the record, local 
leaders helped ensure that Native people would not regain land in their towns.”
330
 Thus, many 
local whites held a vested interest in abetting the disappearance of Rhode Island’s Indigenous 
population, if not in reality, then at least on paper where it appeared to matter most. 
For more than a century, the “ghosting” of the Narragansetts seemed to be a complete 
success.
331
 In fact, even other Indigenous peoples came to believe that the tribe had just 
disappeared. In 1811, just before going to war against American authorities, the Shawnee leader 
Tecumseh queried his followers, “Where today are the Pequot? Where are the Narragansett . . . 
and many other once powerful tribes of our people? They have vanished before the avarice and 
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the oppression of the White Man, as snow before a summer sun.”
332
 But the Narragansetts had 
not vanished because even as Tecumseh spoke, tribal members were locked in a bitter land 
dispute with state and local authorities.
333
 However, "Given the prevailing attitudes about race 
and class in the dominant society," writes Rubertone, “diluted blood meant that Narragansetts 
were” simply classified as Negroes.
334
  
As early as 1819, a Gazetteer of the States of Connecticut and Rhode-Island, which 
professed to be “written with care and impartiality,” claimed that the Narragansetts had “passed 
away like a dream” and that the “remains of the tribe” were “intermixed” members of an “abject 
race.”
335
 Similarly, a report delivered to the Rhode Island General Assembly in 1831 stated, “The 
once powerful nation of the Narragansett is found to be rapidly verging toward that state of 
extinction,” and “only five or six are genuine untainted Narragansett; all the rest are either clear 
or nearly Negroes.”
336
 Moreover, in 1852, 1855, 1858, and 1866, the Rhode Island General 
Assembly established committees to explore the detribalization of the Narragansetts. And in his 
report to the General Assembly in 1858, the Rhode Island Indian commissioner told lawmakers 
that the Narragansetts no longer “looked Indian.”
337
  
It is clear then that many non-Indians sought to equate Indigeneity and authenticity with 
the highly subjective gage of appearance. But as Melish observes, conceptualizations about race 
and identity are “not imposed by one group upon another,” but are instead the products “of an 
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ongoing dialogue between dominated and subordinated peoples.”
338
 Similarly, the scholar Harald 
E. Prins observes that “Ethnicity involves self-ascription,” and that at times Indigenous peoples 
“intentionally distinguish themselves from others—especially non-Indians.”
339
 Thus, in Rhode 
Island, redefinitions of indigeneity by the white majority did not go unchallenged. For example, 
in 1831, a group writing as “Members of the Narragansett Tribe of Indians” acknowledged that 
“Mixture of African and European Blood with that of the native Indians” had taken place and 
that this reality could “not be undone by any Legislative Act.”
340
 The Indians appeared to be 
arguing that their indigeneity could not be revoked because of mixed ancestry or by legal 
measures. Likewise, in 1866, the Narragansetts made explicit their objections to the way non-
Indians characterized and perceived their community. 
We are not Negroes: we are the heirs of Ninigret, and of the great chiefs and 
warriors of the Narragansetts. Because, when your ancestors stole the Negro from 
Africa, and brought him amongst us, and made a slave of him, we extended to 
him the hand of friendship, and permitted his blood to be mingled with ours, are 
we to be called Negroes, and to be told that we may be made Negro citizens? We 
claim that while one drop of Indian blood remains in our veins, we are entitled to 
the rights and privileges guaranteed by your ancestors to ours by solemn treaty, 
which without a breach of faith, you cannot violate . . . We deny your right to take 




It seems then that both the Narragansetts and their non-Indian neighbors sought to define 
Indianness according to a proportionality of blood quantum. The Narragansetts asserted that one 
drop of Native blood affirmed their indigeneity and conferred all the rights, privileges, and 
guarantees due to Native peoples, while their white neighbors contended that one drop of African 
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blood rendered the Indians illegitimate and undeserving mongrels. In 1879, on the eve of 
detribalization, Councilman Daniel Sekater challenged the way many Rhode Islanders attempted 
to define the racial identity of the Narragansetts when he stated “some argue that they 
[Narragasnetts] ought to come out as citizens because they are mixed up with others . . . But 
other classes are mixed up with other nations as well. There is hardly one who can say I am a 
clear-blooded Yankee.”
342
 However, as Lepore noted, in the aftermath of King Phillip’s War, it 
was the non-Indians who had won dominion over the public discourse, and as such, it was their 
interpretations of indigeneity that predominated social and political constructs throughout 
southern New England.  
 
In 1880, and in accordance with the prevailing interpretation that Rhode Island's 
Indigenous community no longer existed, state administrators moved to formally detribalize the 
Narragansetts. Because contemporaries understood "the gravity of the subject under 
consideration, and the interest at stake," governmental leaders decided to include a brief account 
of the history of the Narragansetts. The narrative was intended to explain and justify the 
termination of the tribe's legal identity. Patricia Rubertone explains, “In preparing the historical 
sketch, the committee made ‘copious extractions’ from a number of nineteenth-century 
histories.”
343
 But, as the author astutely observes, all of the accounts “were unanimous in 
expressing the opinion that the Narragansetts were an expiring tribe.”
344
 The historical narratives 
employed by the state were not only universally ethnocentric, but their treatment of Indigenous 
history was at best cursory and at worst fraudulent. Such accounts, along with other dubious 
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pieces of evidence, informed the opinions of Rhode Island lawmakers when they claimed that 
there was “not a person of pure Indian blood in the tribe,” and that “extinction as a tribe has been 
accomplished as effectively by nature as an Act of the General Assembly will put an end to it in 
name.”
345
 Hence, the rhetoric Rhode Island officials chose to embrace was unequivocal in the 
supposition that the Narragansetts were a dying tribe. 
The move to disband the Narragansetts coincided with a nationwide shift in policy 
toward Indigenous peoples. Historian Frederick Hoxie explains that although Americans once 
envisioned that Indians and whites could exist in perpetual seclusion, “the political and economic 
expansion of the postwar [Civil War] era undermined America’s ‘island communities.’ ”
346
 In 
the small settlements of southern Rhode Island, where finite space and limited resources often 
pitted the state’s white and Indigenous communities against one another, the postwar fervor of 
expansion and modernization only exacerbated longstanding territorial conflicts. For example, in 
1879, at a public hearing held by the Rhode Island State Assembly, Gideon Ammons—head of 
the Narragansett tribal council—stated the following: 
Now it appears the State wants to dispose of our public lands, we don’t wish to 
stop the wheels of any business . . . [T]he state has accused us of making an 
enormous expense for them, and here is this tract of land. The railroad passes 




Gideon’s concern was held by many Narragansetts who believed they had not been adequately 
compensated when whites encroached on their lands in the name of economic progress.  
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As was evident in southern Rhode Island, American expansion brought Indigenous and 
white communities into closer contact and hastened calls for the total assimilation of Native 
peoples. Hoxie observes that this effort toward inclusion was indicative of the nation’s “final 
promise” to its Indigenous charges that they could become full and equal members of American 
society. Although such sentiments no doubt helped to influence many people, few Rhode 
Islanders sought the meaningful inclusion of the Narragansetts. Many people throughout the 
region viewed the more than two hundred years of cross-cultural contact between the region’s 
white and Indigenous populations as mostly adversarial. This history, and the negative attitudes 
it engendered inspired a few local whites to question the wisdom of granting citizenship to the 
Narragansett.  “Some were concerned,” writes Ethel Boissevain, “about the prospect of having 
Indian ‘paupers’ to support by town taxes, and adding to the taxpayer's burden by having Indian 
children attend the district schools.”
348
 These suspicions were well placed, given that access to 
district schools was one of the primary motivators for those Narragansetts who supported 
detribalization during the late nineteenth century.  
Although some local whites maintained their misgivings, for most Rhode Islanders, the 
potential benefits of Indian inclusion far outweighed any drawbacks because, as Rubertone 
explains, “Local citizens held a vested interest in the Narragansett’s detribalization, and 
especially in ancestral land that would then be made available to them.”
349
 Indeed, Rhode 
Islanders seemed to have been less concerned with ensuring the equitable inclusion of Native 
peoples than with the practical costs and benefits of assimilation. Within this context, the 
acquisition of Narragansett land and the nullification of tribal territorial claims overshadowed the 
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fulfillment of any promises of inclusion made to the Indians. As a result, detribalization saw 
Rhode Island's Indigenous population pushed further to the periphery, where it was expected—
perhaps even hoped—that the Indians would just disappear. Accordingly, the last entry in a 
report issued by the commission established to oversee the process of detribalization appeared 
almost regretful as it simply stated, "The name of the Narragansett tribe now passes from the 
statute books.”
350
 Considering that many Rhode Island leaders actively sought the erasure of 
Native distinctiveness as a means to forestall legal claims, such statements might be read as a 
positive advance toward assimilation and modernity—not a mournful cessation of claims 
engendered by regional Indigenous groups. Moreover, the Rhode Island commission's 
conclusion appears contrived and perhaps even sinister, given that the state's effort to detribalize 
the Narragansetts was most likely illegal and usurped the role of the U.S. Congress, which 
retained sole authority to regulate tribes. 
Consequently, in 1898, almost two decades after officially detribalizing the 
Narragansetts, state leaders continued to struggle with lingering questions about the legality of 
their actions. In a lengthy eighty-five-page decision, the State Supreme Court aggressively 
affirmed the authority of Rhode Island lawmakers to disband the Indians. The court explained, 
"The so-called tribe existed in little more than name, and had for years been in a practically 
moribund condition, being but a slender band of negroes with a slight infusion of Indian 
blood.”
351
 And while addressing the vexing issue of jurisdiction, the court concluded, “The 
United States had never by any act recognized their [Narragansetts’] existence as Indians” and 
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“The United States are not obliged to recognize the so-called Narragansett as Indians, any more 
than they are any other cluster of negroes or dusky complexioned persons, and they have never 
done so.”
352
 The court's inimical decision was intended to validate the claim that Rhode Island's 
Indigenous population had vanished and an amalgamated band with questionable ties to a once 
great people stood in its place. Such sentiment echoed throughout the region and encouraged 
those lawmakers who endeavored to dismantle the tribe. 
But Rhode Island’s top justices did not merely appeal to popular perceptions by invoking 
the same apocryphal narratives utilized by lawmakers a generation earlier. Instead, the court 
fixed its decision on a technicality. The United States had never formally recognized the 
Narragansetts because the Indians crafted their agreements and treaties with now defunct 
colonial and local authorities.
353
 However, more than a century and a half of war, relocation, 
subjugation, exploitation, and marginalization had rendered the tribe militarily, economically, 
and politically impotent. As a result, the Narragansetts possessed little practical recourse with 
which to demand redress, reprieve, or even acknowledgment from the newly formed American 
government. This postcolonial reality provided Rhode Island’s eager court with the perfect tool 
to exploit to advance its agenda. Still, it is astonishing that Rhode Island authorities decided to 
invoke the supremacy of the national government to justify their legislative overreach and 
subversion of federal law. Moreover, the fact that state leaders neither consulted nor sought 
guidance from Washington during the process of detribalization—and given what one historian 
called Rhode Island’s “maverick reputation” and long-standing aversion to federal authority—
the opinion of the court looks as if it was born more out of pragmatism than deference to the 




 One of the most consequential agreements came in 1709 when Narragansett leaders supposedly agreed to forfeit 




 Moreover, the justices’ proclamation that the Narragansetts had never 
been formally recognized seems disingenuous given the region’s long history of cross-cultural 
interactions dating back to 1524, when upon meeting a group of Natives in Narragansett Bay, 
Giovanni de Verrazzano described the Indians as friendly and the “most beautiful” he had 
seen.
355
 At any rate, the court's decision enabled Rhode Island leaders to purge the Narragansetts 
from state records. In fact, it would be almost forty years before state officials rendered a 
judgment or enacted legislation pertaining to the tribe. However, tribal members continued to 
hold their annual celebration in August and to attend services at their church in Charlestown. In 
fact, the Narragansett Indian Church was more than just a house of worship because it also 
served as a meeting place where the supposedly disbanded Narragansetts continued to discuss 
and decide community-wide matters. The tribal elder and former chief Walter (Kenny) Babcock 
explains why the church was built with two front doors and no door in the back: "They used it 
[the church] as a meeting house. If they saw anyone from the state coming down the road, they 
would pick up the bibles and pretend as though they were praising the Lord. You see there was 
no door in the back, so no one could seek up on them."
356
  
When facing the heat of a summer sun, snow does not simply disappear. It might melt 
and seep back into the earth or evaporate into the air. But in either case, the snow does not 
entirely vanish but is transformed. Similarly, the periods of ethnogenesis precipitated by the 
pressures of colonization and detribalization transformed the Narragansetts. But much like 
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evaporated water when it rains or the moisture drawn from the earth by roots, the Indians would 






Chapter 4 - The Hill 
Ellison “Tarzan” Brown’s effort to this point in the Boston Marathon appeared almost 
superhuman as he bounded past checkpoints in world-record fashion.
357
 In fact, Brown pulled 
away from the pack of other runners so quickly that when members of the press crew arrived at 
the first checkpoint, they were shocked to learn that they had mistakenly spent the last five miles 
following the second group of runners.
358
 Brown’s lead in the famed race remained unchallenged 
for the first two-thirds of the contest but by the seventeenth mile the runner was exhausted and 
the furious pace he had set began to exact its toll. But while the runner’s muscles stiffened so did 
his determination. When Brown entered the Woodland Park section of the race, he received some 
much needed emotional encouragement from a delegation of Narragansett Indians—some 
dressed in full ceremonial regalia and playing drums.
359
 Brown’s resolve was strengthened by the 
entourage when they ran along his side blowing kisses and shouting encouragements.
360
 It is no 
wonder then, that when he exited the park, Brown was on pace to shatter the course record.
361
   
However, three miles further along in the race, fatigue once again slowed Brown’s pace.  
But, another burst of emotion—this time derived from an unlikely source–would once again fill 
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the runner’s heart and help to propel him forward.  As John Kelly—the runner who had won the 
race the year before and remained a perennial favorite—caught up to the tiring Brown he patted 
the runner on the back, as if to “say nice try,” and then proceeded to pass him.
362
  What happened 
next has become part of race folklore and may have resulted in the naming of the marathon’s 
most famous stretch.
363
  Brown, refusing to bow out, battled Kelly over the hilly expanse from 
Woodland Park to Lake Street.  Brown retook the lead—for good this time—as he charged down 
the hills leaving Kelly behind.
364
  This section of the course thereafter became known as the 
“heartbreak hills,” the place where Brown broke Kelly’s heart.
365
  Brown went on to win the 
Boston Marathon in 1936, and in doing so, he became the only Native American to earn a spot 
on the U.S. Olympic team for the games that were to be held in Berlin later that same year. 
In 1939, Brown once again won the Boston Marathon setting a new world record in the 
process.
366
 Although Brown’s physical feats remain impressive, this chapter is not about the 
runner’s athletic accomplishments. Instead, this work focuses on what these victories meant to 
and did for a small and “forgotten” Indigenous community living in the secluded marshlands of 
southern Rhode Island. More specifically, it is about how Brown and some of his Narragansett 
brethren parlayed the runner’s physical accomplishments into meaningful, community-wide 
social, economic, and political advancements. Victory helped to make Brown—and the 
community from which he hailed—visible to a populace that had for years both lamented and 
professed the tribe’s supposed demise. The Narragansetts made use of this brief moment of 
                                                 
362
 Tom Derderian, Boston Marathon: The History of the World’s Premier Running Event (Champaign, IL: Human 
Kinetics, 1994), 153.  
363
 Hopkins, “The Legend of Tarzan.” 
364
 Martin and Gynn, Marathon, 123. 
365
 Derderian, Boston Marathon, 153.  
366
 Ibid., 167. 
124 
celebration and inclusion to prod the state of Rhode Island to officially recognize the continued 
existence of their community. The Native Americans who cheered “Tarzan” on in his sprint 
through Woodland Park did not attend the spectacle simply to revel in Brown’s fleeting fame and 
participate in the celebration customarily bestowed upon the winner of the race.
367
 Instead, the 
Indians made their way from Rhode Island to Boston in the midst of a spirit-crushing economic 
depression so that they could publicly play their drums, don their Western-style headdresses, and 
let the world know—or at least the three-quarters of a million spectators in attendance—that, in 
the words of the tribe’s chief sachem Phillip H. Peckham, “The Indian still lives.”
368
   
 Just eight years before Brown’s initial victory in Boston, another Narragansett runner—
Horatius “Bunk” Stanton—traveled to Maine and attempted to register for a race. Upon hearing 
the athlete declare that he was a Narragansett Indian, an official asked Stanton to sit and wait to 
be registered. After all of the other contestants were certified, the official held out his hand and 
said, “Well Chief you’re the first Narragansett I’ve heard of since King Philip’s War. Any more 
where you come from?” The registrar continued to explain that he “thought they [the 
Narragansetts] were all wiped out.”
369
  It is not surprising that a race official in Maine had been 
unaware of the continued existence of two hundred Natives living in the secluded forest and 
swamps of southern Rhode Island. As discussed, in the aftermath of King Phillip’s War, the 
prevailing social narrative led many to erroneously believe that the Narragansetts no longer 
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existed. This misconception was not only perpetuated in folklore, but it was also corroborated by 
scholars who relied too heavily upon dubious accounts and partial records. For example, just one 
year prior to Stanton’s trip to Maine and ten years before Brown’s adventure in Berlin, Alice 
Collins Gleeson wrote in Colonial Rhode Island that “after this defeat [King Philip’s War], the 
Rhode Island Indians had no independent life…their strength had gone and they passed away.”
370
 
The author’s assertion simply reiterated and affirmed what many people in Rhode Island and 
others throughout New England believed, “that the Narragansett had vanished.”
371
 
However, this construct of the “vanishing-Indian” was not limited to the Narragansetts. 
Instead, it was used to explain what appeared to be the general disappearance of Indigenous 
communities throughout North America. For centuries colonists and later Americans sought to 
subjugate, marginalize, and segregate, Native peoples. And the belief systems they created not 
only reflected these desires but over time, helped to affirm them. Historian Philip J. Deloria 
explains that ideologies are not necessarily true “but, as things that structure real belief and 
action in a real world, they might as well be.”
372
 By the early twentieth-century, the fact that few 
Americans interacted with—or recognized when they did interact with—Indigenous peoples 
seemed to confirm the ideal of the vanishing-Indian. Ideology “is a lived experience,” writes 
Deloria, “something we see and perform on a daily basis.”
373
  The registrar’s sincere amazement 
at meeting Stanton attested to both the efficacy and pervasiveness of an ideal that purported the 
demise of Indigenous communities. 
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Postulations about the death of the Narragansetts were not solely derived from—and 
perpetuated by—the misinformed. In linking the tribe’s expiration to the aftermath of King 
Phillip’s War, European colonists and their descendants intentionally reframed what was a 
complex struggle into a binary of winners and losers. Such narratives obscure the high level of 
tightly interwoven and intercultural alliances forged between Natives and colonizers. Rather the 
story was reduced to a confrontation between a supposedly antiquated group of Indians and the 
more modern European settlers. Or, as Lepore makes clear, in the contest for meaning “the 
colonists won.”
374
 Indeed, the European victory made possible a historical interpretation in 
which the triumph of the colonists and the supposed degeneration of the Indians appeared 
benign, natural, or even providential.   
Erroneous accounts of the tribe’s demise were also reinforced and propagated by the 
popular media. For example, between 1900 and 1920, The Providence Journal—Rhode Island’s 
leading newspaper—printed a total of eight articles about the Narragansetts. Six of these stories 
discussed the waning of the tribe or the passing of individual members, including a story 
published in April 1907 about the death of Abigail R. Smith whom the paper labeled “A true 
Narragansett.”
375
 Likewise, another article printed in June 1908 covered the passing of Benjamin 
Noka whom the Journal declared to be the “last of [the] Narragansett Indians.”
376
 Deloria argues 
that this common trope of the vanishing-Indian helped to erase “white acts of dispossession and 
generously mourned the fact that Indians were disappearing naturally.”
377
 Similarly, the scholar 
Siobhan Senier observes that this myth “exercises special force east of the Mississippi” and 
                                                 
374
 Jill Lepore, The Name of War: King Philip’s War and the Origins of American Identity (New York: Vintage 
Books, 1998), xvi.    
375
 Providence Journal, April 14, 1907, S4, 8. 
376
 “Benjamin Noka Last of Narragansett Indians, died,” Providence Journal, March 4, 1908, 1.  
377
 Deloria, Indians in Unexpected Places, 50. 
127 
“takes particular shape in New England” where “Yankees like to believe that Native people ‘died 
off’ (or ‘lost’) early on and that those who didn’t die were ‘assimilated’ or have ‘very little real 
Indian blood.”
378
 Moreover, the historian Jean M. O’Brien demonstrates that throughout the 
nineteenth-century, writers in New England produced "replacement narratives" to negate 
"previous Indian history as a ‘dead end’ (literally).”
379
 Writers who endeavored to erase or 
diminish the historical significance and continued presence of the Narragansetts chose instead to 
celebrate what they deemed to be a “glorious New England history of just relations and property 
transactions…that legitimated their claims to the land.”
380
 O’Brien explains that such narratives 
enabled writers and their readers to “rationalize their history of settler colonialism” and claim 
“New England as their own.”
381
 These “histories” not only perpetuated and bolstered the trope of 
the vanishing Indian but they—along with the Journal’s lamentations of the tribe’s supposed 
passing—also informed cross-cultural interactions in Rhode Island. Thus, accounts of the tribe's 
demise worked to further marginalize the Narragansetts because these narratives allowed writers, 
readers, and leaders to claim that—through no fault of their own—the Narragansetts no longer 
existed and thus it was the Puritans and their posterity who could claim rightful ownership of the 
region.  
Against this backdrop, the establishment of new land claims advanced by tribal members 
beginning in 1921 led to confrontations with local white populations. Some Rhode Islanders 
turned away from lamentations about the death of Native populations to openly challenging the 
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validity of those who claimed Narragansett heritage. In an article titled “Narragansett Indians 
Again Seek Return of Lands,” the Journal cited a nineteenth-century report that claimed, 
"extinction by nature of the diluted Narragansett blood was imminent."
382
 Also quoted in the 
story was one Rhode Island town clerk who explained that the Indians “have not, so far as I can 
judge, anything tangible upon which to base their [land] claim.”
383
 Through the course of 
publicly mourning the imagined demise of the Indians and challenging the authenticity of their 
remaining descendants, many Rhode Islanders propagated an enduring narrative that proclaimed 
nothing less than the extinction of the Narragansett tribe. 
In the decades that followed state-sanctioned detribalization, some Narragansett leaders 
attempted to restore the tribe’s public identity and implored local and federal authorities for 
redress. For example, in 1921, tribal members sought the return of ancestral land that the Indians 
claimed was taken illegally. However, the case was quickly dismissed because—according to the 
state—the Narragansetts did not exist.
384
 Stymied by the courts in Rhode Island, the Narragansett 
leader Chief William I. Bent appealed to Washington and inquired how the Federal Government 
might recognize the tribe. In its response to Bent, the Department of the Interior explained that 
“the Narragansett tribe of Indians long ago became extinct” and that the Federal Government had 
no jurisdiction or control over their descendants.
385
 Unwilling to acquiesce in the erasure of their 
collective identity, beginning in the early 1920s the Narragansetts introduced a powwow as a 
component of their Annual August Meeting.
386
 The well-advertised spectacle was intended to 
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help elevate the tribe’s public profile through cultural exhibition and social exchange. However, 
despite the continued advocacy of tribal members, a decade later, little had changed. This reality 
is evidenced by another territorial dispute raised in 1931 by the Narragansett elder and 
Councilman Rev. Daniel Sekater. Sekater’s claim suffered a fate that was both similar to the 
result of the challenge posed by tribal leaders ten years earlier, and reminiscent of the 
dismissiveness that had frustrated Bent’s inquiry. This was because Sekater’s appeal—and in 
essence the Narragansetts themselves—were again dismissed as illegitimate.
387
   
It is likely Sekater understood that his challenge would be summarily dismissed but his 
seemingly futile effort was indicative of the desperation experienced by many living in the 
region during the 1930s. Even before the stock market crashed in 1929, Rhode Island’s economy 
was in rapid decline because the state’s aging textile mills could not compete with the low wages 
and cheap fabrics of the industrialized New South.
388
  The Depression only intensified a collapse 
that by 1932 placed more than 115,000 able body Rhode Islanders on financial relief.
389
 The 
Narragansetts suffered disproportionately in the region’s hardships because—like many African 
Americans—they were relegated to the bottom of a racialized social, political, and economic 
hierarchy. The marathon chronicler Tom Derderian communicated the unique social and 
economic conditions faced by many Narragansetts when he wrote that: 
The economy in these depression times provided little for most Americans and 
nothing for Indians.  They were a conquered people living on the margin, living 
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Although the Narragansetts were hardly a conquered people, throughout the 1930s many tribal 
members certainly lived on the margin and Brown was no exception. Growing up in what one 
writer described as “intense poverty,” Brown may have, as Derderian claimed, seen running as 
his only escape.
391
  The Indian runner would often walk up to forty miles to compete in races 
with the hope of winning some type of monetary reward.
392
  In fact, because Brown sometimes 
found that the wristwatch awarded to the second place finisher was of greater value than the 
trophy presented to whoever came in first, the runner could at times be seen looking over the 
slate of prizes awarded to the top competitors and planning his performance accordingly.
393
 
Although Brown saw running as a means to better his own economic condition, it is 
likely that the runner and his Native brethren also viewed these popular competitions as a way to 
elevate the public profile of their entire community. In fact, Brown was often joined by varying 
tribal members on his long walks to the starting line. For example, in anticipation of Brown’s 
arrival at a race in 1935, the Boston Globe stated that the runner would be accompanied “by 
seven sturdy braves and three haughty chiefs.”
394
 Those Indians who escorted Brown did not 
simply intend to profit from the proceeds of a timepiece or a trophy. Instead, they traveled with 
the hope that the deeds of their countryman could be exchanged for something that was—in their 
eyes—much more valuable: public acknowledgement and the economic opportunities and 
relevancy that it portended.  
The strategy proved effective because after decades of disregard, and just five years 
following Sekater’s defeat, the Narragansett suddenly reemerge in state records. The tribe was 
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officially reinstated when Rhode Islanders began to marvel at the exploits of Ellison Brown 
whom they hoped to claim as one of their own. Indeed, as Brown raced along the pathways of 
New England, he ran down more than just his athletic rivals, and on April 24, 1936, just four 
days after the Narragansett’s victory in Boston, the Rhode Island General Assembly approved an 
act “providing for the observance of a special holiday, known as Indian day.”
395
 The Journal left 
little ambiguity about what had spurred lawmakers when it declared, “R.I. Indian Day Set Aside 
in Honor to Marathon Victor.”
396
  The action of the General Assembly constituted the state’s first 
official reference to the Narragansetts since the justices handed down their seemingly definitive 
decision in 1898. Hence, Brown’s athleticism and the acclaim it accrued provided the 
Narragansetts with a new opportunity to profess the continuance of their community. And while 
Rhode Islanders reveled in Brown’s victories, the Narragansetts seized upon the adulation of 
their neighbors to challenge more than a half-century of systematic neglect. It was in this way 
that Brown’s celebrity became the tribe’s success.  
After having shown the Indians nothing but disregard for so long, it might seem 
inconceivable that Rhode Island’s leaders would celebrate Brown’s athleticism and openly 
acknowledge the runner’s indigeneity. However, if one recalls how Americans marveled at and 
championed the physical achievements of earlier Indigenous athletes such as James Francis 
Thorpe and Andrew Sockalexis, or if we consider how whites contemporaneously embraced the 
athletic successes of other traditionally marginalized persons such as Jesse Owens and Joe Louis, 
it is easier to comprehend Rhode Island’s remarkable reversal.   
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When James "Jim" Thorpe (Sac and Fox), Andrew Sockalexis (Penobscot), and Louis 
Tewanima (Hopi) represented the United States in 1912, at the V Olympiad in Stockholm, they 
did so to cheers of support that, according to one historian, “resonated among people across the 
nation.”
397
  Matthew Sakiestewa Gilbert explains that because national pride permeated athletics 
in the United States, white Americans could root unreservedly for a Native American when he 
competed against athletes from around the world.  Therefore, as the author observes, “When 
Native runners stepped on to the track field and took their mark at the starting line, their brown 
skin and ‘uncivilized’ heritage momentarily held little significance for white spectators and those 
in the media.”
398
 A similar sentiment was held by many Rhode Islanders who desired to 
appropriate the athletic successes of Brown. However, the Narragansetts intentionally turned the 
runner’s indigeneity into a spectacle making it impossible to separate Brown from his heritage. 
Like they had been in 1912, international tensions were heightened in the years before 
Brown’s win in Boston and by 1936, with Berlin holding what promised to be the most 
politically charged Olympic Games in modern history, Americans searched far and wide for their 
athletic redeemers. National sentiment was aptly captured by a Rhode Island newspaper when—
in anticipation of the upcoming Olympic qualifier in Boston—it concluded that, “It’s a miracle 
man the Olympic committee is looking for, not a runner.”
399
  The nation would find some of its 
miracle men in those persons who had previously been relegated to the fringes of American 
society. 
                                                 
397





 Westerly Sun, January 22, 1936, 1. 
133 
Brown was just one of the many athletes plucked from the ranks of the disenfranchised 
and charged with delivering international prestige to the United States in the 1930s.  Indeed, 
white Americans would ardently celebrate the pre-war success of both the runner Jesse Owens 
(1913-1980) and the boxer Joe Louis (1914-1981).  Like Brown, these African American athletes 
carried a double burden because they not only represented the desires of white Americans who 
hoped to affirm the ascendancy of their political, social, and economic systems, but Owens and 
Louis also carried with them the desires of many African Americans who hoped that the 
successes of their black brethren would lay bare the inequities harbored within these same 
systems championed by many whites.   
With Adolf Hitler taking the reins in Germany in 1933, the Berlin games were set as a 
showcase for international supremacy with each event holding the potential for national 
aggrandizement. And, although Germany would win the medal count, the XI Olympic Games 
would not be remembered as a tribute to that nation's hegemony because Jesse Owens 
convincingly and singlehandedly dismantled the myth of Aryan supremacy when he won an 
unprecedented four gold medals and set three world records in the span of forty-five minutes.
400
  
Americans—overjoyed with the successes of their black thoroughbred—celebrated Owens as the 
physical embodiment of their nation’s superiority. But for many African Americans, the runner’s 
success connoted more than national pride because it “gave Black America hope,” writes Dave 
Zirin, “when there appeared to be nothing but despair, discrimination, degradation and defeat.”
401
 
Indeed, some African Americans interpreted Owens’ victory not only as a rebuke of Aryan 
dogma, but also as a challenge to the racist ideologies that buttressed American society because, 
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in their eyes, the runner had revealed to the world what a Black man could accomplish given an 
equal playing field—or perhaps more appropriately—the same starting line.   
Just as some African Americas had affixed their dreams of a more inclusive nation upon 
Owens, so too did many see the possibility of communal redemption in the athletic achievements 
of the boxer Joe Louis. The economic downturn that plagued America throughout the 1930s was 
especially difficult for African Americans who were, according to one historian, “traditionally 
the last hired and the first fired.”
402
 David M. Kennedy shows that although the national 
unemployment rate hovered at nearly-twenty five percent, in black communities the numbers 
skewed much higher.
403
 Thus, the Depression added yet another burden upon a people who had 
struggled for many years under the stifling weight of systematic racism. The African American 
poet Langston Hughes (1902-1967) aptly described the situation faced by many blacks when he 
wrote, “The depression brought everybody down a peg or two….And the Negros had but a few 
pegs to fall.”
404
 These were the social and economic realities heartening the promise many 
African Americas located in Joe Louis. However, the boxer was more than just a black 
heavyweight champion. He was an American champion because many whites also held high 
expectations for their black gladiator. In 1938, white and black Americans alike cheered 
fervently when Louis defeated the German boxer Max Schmeling—whom Hitler had promoted 
as the embodiment of Aryan supremacy.
405
 However, like Owens’s successes, Louis’s victory 
held a deeper meaning for many African Americans because they believed in the possibility that 
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the Brown Bomber’s punches pummeled more than just the body of Schmeling and the fallacy of 
Aryan supremacy. They also hoped the blows of their champion could be felt by those American 
Schmelings who had upheld the myth of white supremacy and kept an unrelenting foot pressed 
upon the neck of Black America. Still, the greatest hardships of the Depression era did not fall 
solely upon the shoulders of African Americas. Nor were blacks the only marginalized group 
hoping with trepidation that the athletic successes of one of their own could be transformed into 
communal redemption, because the privations borne by Brown and his Indian supporters inspired 
similar hopes among the Narragansetts. 
When Brown won the Boston Marathon in 1936—defeating a field of athletes that 
included some of the greatest distance runners in American history—he became the nation’s top 
competitor in the event. Some Narragansetts envisioned in Brown an ambassador who could 
dispel the fallacy of the tribe’s demise and prove the continued relevance of the Narragansett 
people. Therefore—like Owens and Louis—Brown carried with him not only the pride and 
adulation of his country but also the hopes and aspirations of his fellow tribal members. Hence, 
by virtue of his impressive showing in Boston, the twenty-two-year-old Brown became not only 
his nation’s greatest opportunity for victory in Berlin but also his people’s best hope for 
redemption in Rhode Island. In a speech delivered at the tribe’s Annual August Meeting and 
powwow just three months after Brown’s victory, Chief Peckham articulated the optimism held 
by many. The sachem declared to all in attendance that “The Narragansett have been in the 
background heretofore but as the last shall be first, so we are now at the dawn of great 
recognition.”
406
 Peckham was referring anxiously to Brown’s upcoming effort in Berlin. The 
Chief continued, “What could be more fitting than to have one of our very own tribesmen win 
                                                 
406
 Cited in Redwing and Hazard, “Narragansett Dawn,” Vol. 2, No. 4. 
136 
this race?” Peckham told his listeners that Brown deserved “all of the honor and praise he will 
receive” but that the fruits of this acclaim would accrue to the entire tribe. Because as others 




Brown’s success did bring greater exposure to a community that had been largely 
forgotten and dismissed by the outside world. For example, between 1851 and 1940, the New 
York Times printed a total of twenty-six articles that related to the Narragansett Indians. Of these 
stories, five covered the deaths of individual members or the waning of the tribe as a whole, 
whereas sixteen of the stories recounted Brown’s athletic exploits. This pattern also held true for 
regional dailies because a more concise and localized analysis reveals that in the four years 
between 1930 and 1934 the Westerly Sun—the principal newspaper of southern Rhode Island—
ran a total of fifteen stories concerning the Narragansetts. However, during the next four years—
a period of time over which Brown’s athletic prowess was proven—the Sun printed forty-six 
articles about the Narragansetts including fourteen that pertained exclusively to the Indian 
runner. It is clear that—just as Peckham promised—Brown’s celebrity led to greater publicity. 
And as newspapermen recounted the athletic accomplishments of the Indian runner, they also 
increased the general public’s awareness about the survival and continuation of the Narragansett 
Indian community. 
Brown and his Indian supporters were keenly aware that high profile competition held the 
promise of greater recognition. In fact, as Brown raced his way into Woodland Park in 1936, it 
was Stanton who sprinted to his side blowing kisses and encouraging the runner along.
408
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Stanton, himself a veteran athlete, understood that the publicity and pageantry associated with a 
victory in the world’s premier running event would elevate not only Brown’s personal profile, 
but also that of the entire Narragansett Indian community. Thus, Stanton made the trip to Boston 
not just to encourage his protégé, but also to support his people. The Indian’s appearance drove 
home the point because as he matched Brown stride for stride through Woodland Park, Stanton 
did so in full regalia complete with a headdress. Although the press corps snickered and derided 
the Indians as they cheered Brown through the park, there was no denying that he was their man.  
The runner about to win the venerated marathon was a Narragansett.  Brown’s victory and the 
Indians who publicly celebrated their champion made it abundantly clear to all observers that the 
tribe did not simply pass away as the state of Rhode Island had claimed. Instead, by piecing 
together the remnants of their people, culture, and traditions, the Narragansetts maintained a 
distinct—and now because of Brown’s success—undeniable presence in southern Rhode Island.  
In an address at the state’s very first Indian Day celebration in 1936, Princess Red 
Wing—a social, political, and cultural leader among the Narragansetts—reminded her listeners 
that the Indians had “cheered Ellison Brown on his upward path to victory in the marathon races 
when the world knew him not.”
409
 However, some of Brown’s Indigenous brethren did more 
than applaud the runner, they also actively supported Brown and helped contribute to his success. 
For example, despite the fact that many of the Indians were impoverished, tribal members were 
able to establish a fund to help pay for Brown’s racing expenses.
410
 Similarly, the Narragansett 
elder Evangeline Babcock Hankinson recalled the stories her father—Thomas Babcock—told her 
about his experiences in assisting Brown to better prepare his body for the physical grind of a 
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marathon. According to Hankinson, her father attached buckets filled with water to the ends of a 
railroad tie so that Brown—who had no access to more traditional exercise equipment—could 
use these “weights” to build up his strength and endurance.
411
 The maintenance of the race fund 
and Hankinson’s recollection extends our understanding of how the Narragansett community 
became invested in Brown’s athleticism “when the world knew him not.”   
Redwing’s speech, the fund, and Hankinson’s recollection suggest, the Narragansett 
were, for the most part, a tightly knit community.
412
 The realities of discrimination, isolation, and 
economic hardship only abetted the tribe’s coming together because the Indians often derived 
strength, acceptance, and even sustenance from each other.
413
 For example, when Charles 
Babcock—a prominent member of the tribe—was hospitalized in 1936, close to one hundred 
Narragansett attended a “supper” and fundraiser held for his benefit. The event was indicative of 
the tribe’s communal nature because there were scarcely more than one hundred Narragansetts 
still residing in the area.
414
 Moreover, when Sekater introduced his claim in 1931, the Journal 
avowed that it was “only with the thought of justice for the remaining 118 Narragansett that he 
[Sekater] plans to ask for redress.”
415
  At the age of seventy-eight, Sekater held little hope that 
this case might result in his own material betterment or that of his kin because the Reverend had 
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no direct descendants. It is clear, then, that the Narragansett elder was more concerned with 
communal advancement than with personal gain. As an elderly man with no successors, Sekater 
may not have feared reprisals from the white majority as much as some of his Indigenous 
brethren and it is possible that the elder was simply the named litigant representing a larger 
contingent of Narragansetts.    
Regardless of what the particular circumstances of Sekater’s claim might have been, the 
elder openly embraced and espoused a communal identity that proved incessant. Invoking such 
ethnic homogeneity not only helped to shelter the Narragansetts from the most extreme 
privations of subjugation and disregard, but it also enabled tribal members to mitigate the 
psychological liabilities of their current misfortunes by summoning recollections of a proud past 
and envisioning a future when the Indians could reclaim former glories or at least public 
relevance.  In the essay “If You Have Narragansett Blood—Join Us” penned by Ernest “Eagle 
Eye” Hazard in 1935, the Indian writer sought to encourage his Indigenous brethren when he 
explained that although others “stand back and make all manner of fun of us, because we declare 
we are Narragansett,” the tribe was in good company because Robert Fulton, Abraham Lincoln, 
Franklin Roosevelt, and even Jesus were all ridiculed by others but these individuals had 
remained firm in their convictions.
416
 “These men were all laughed at,” wrote Hazard, “and 
considered queer, so let us older ones stick to our convictions, that the young may take heart.”
417
  
Even in the face of public ridicule, Hazard and other Narragansetts recognized the importance of 
invoking, preserving, and strengthening their collective identity and passing on to their 
descendants an appreciation for the tribal community.   
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Similarly, in its very first issue, the Narragansett Dawn—a monthly newsletter produced 
by tribal members and disseminated to audiences around the globe—proclaimed “We 
Narragansett of today must advance through our young.”
418
  The Dawn, along with Hazard’s 
appeal and Sekater’s claim, revealed that various tribal members desired to bequeath more 
favorable social, political, and economic conditions to their posterity. But as the Dawn and 
Hazard had explained, to realize these ambitions the tribe needed to focus its efforts, and Brown 
provided the Indians with an ideal opportunity to do so. For example, in 1935, just days after the 
death of his mother and escorted by close to twenty Narragansetts, a grieving Brown arrived in 
Boston to compete in the marathon. The Dawn reported that it was Grace Babcock Brown’s 
dying wish that her son runs the race.
419
 It is possible that, like Sekater, Grace Brown may have 
thought of the greater Narragansett community and the prospects associated with victory when 
she encouraged her son to compete.  But even if this was not the case, those who accompanied 
Brown were certainly concerned with professing the tribe’s continued existence because the 
Indians arrived in full regalia for all to see. The runner even competed in an outfit stitched 
together from his late mother’s ceremonial dress.
420
 In Brown, then, the Narragansetts had finally 
found a potential pathway out of obscurity.   
Moreover, Brown understood his triumph in 1936 to be more than just a personal victory 
because as he broke the tape at the end of the Boston Marathon the exhausted runner cried out 
“we done it.”
421
 Maybe Brown thought of Stanton and the other Narragansetts who had helped 
stiffen his determination as he sprinted through Woodland Park. Or the runner might have 
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recalled his training sessions with Babcock and the assistance he received from untold others 
within the tribal community. Perhaps Brown was thinking of his Indigenous brethren who had 
accompanied him on his long walks to the starting line. Still, it may have been his mother or all 
of the Narragansetts that the runner had in mind when he exclaimed “we done it.” Whoever it 
was that Brown had thought of when he crossed the finish line, it was clear that he believed his 
success was shared. It can be proposed that the next day when Brown told reporters that “maybe 
now the white man will take me seriously,” he was including the same “we” who had helped him 
win the race.
422
 Because of his victory in Boston the white man did indeed take notice of Brown 
and the Indigenous community from which he hailed. Just as it had done for African Americans, 
athletic success provided the Narragansetts with a modicum of social relevancy and the Indians 
seized this opportunity to reassert publicly their presence and proclaim their heritage.   
Although Brown’s athleticism and the acclaim it garnered were essential in capturing the 
attention of the general public, what white Rhode Islanders saw when they finally did gaze upon 
the Indians, was in many ways, just as important. In order to be accepted by the white majority, 
after having had their ethnic and racial authenticity challenged for so long, the Narragansetts 
needed to portray what their Caucasian observers believed to be the genuine traits of Indigenous 
peoples. That is why tribal members attended Brown’s races in regalia fashioned in the Western-
style, donned headdresses, and played their drums. However, this is not to suggest that the 
Narragansetts sought validation from the majority, but instead conformity on the part of the 
Indians was strategic because, if the past half-century had taught them anything, it was that 
perception mattered. Brown certainly looked the part because the Narragansett champion 
appeared to be the very embodiment of a Hollywood stereotype, save the long braided hair, an 
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omission the public probably accepted because Brown was a runner. Indeed, with his bronze 
colored skin, straight black hair, high cheekbones, and thin lips, Brown resembled what many 
whites had envisioned a Indian to look like. It was his appearance that rivaled the runner’s 
athleticism for coverage in the press as reporters sought to describe the Indian, or what one 
writer called “the ethnological mystery man,” to their readers.
423
 For example, Jack Barnwell of 
The Boston Post referred to Brown as a “full-blooded Indian” and a “mahogany-hued…dark-
skinned warrior.” Ruth C. Bodwell also writing for the Post described the Indian as “brown-
skinned and as smooth-cheeked as a girl.” Will Cloney of The Boston Herald called Brown a 
“penniless redskin.”
424
 In essence, what the reporters were telling their audiences was that this 
man looked Native. Albeit offensive in many respects, the descriptions employed by the 
newspapermen helped to certify the Indian’s authenticity because it was these reporters who first 
described Brown as "full-blooded" when the last of the Narragansetts had supposedly died off 
decades earlier. For a people trying to publicly assert their ethnic and racial authenticity, 
Brown’s appearance and the ink it generated looked to be a godsend.  
Because the runner delivered both athletically and aesthetically on the promise that some 
tribal members had vested in him, by the time of Redwing’s address in 1936, the world had come 
to know Brown. In fact, even as the Narragansett leader spoke, Brown was in Berlin and 
anticipation of the Indian runner’s world debut was high. The excitement was especially palpable 
in Rhode Island because the Olympic Games coincided with the state’s tercentennial celebration.  
In a region where whites were originally only allowed to settle because of the generosity of the 
Narragansetts, it appeared serendipitous that a descendant of this tribe would bring international 
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glory and honor to the progeny of the Puritan’s as they celebrated their three hundredth year. It 
was the Providence Tercentennial Committee that sponsored Brown’s trip to Boston and funded 
the latter part of his training. But, as Americans—and in particular Rhode Islanders—prepared to 
celebrate the athleticism of their native son, they were also forced to acknowledge that this son 
was indeed Native. It is revealing that the arguments and assumptions made by state officials 
during the era of detribalization and reiterated by detractors for more than fifty years, were 
forgotten or dismissed once Brown’s athletic prowess was proven. For example, the day after the 
runner’s victory in Boston, a headline in the Sun stated “Tarzan Brown, Full Blooded 
Narragansett Indian Wins BAA Marathon.” The questions about authenticity and blood quantum 
that had long dogged the Narragansetts suddenly disappeared as Rhode Islanders eagerly 
accepted the Indian runner as one of their own. 
Upon his return to Rhode Island, Brown was hailed as nothing less than a conquering 
hero. There were at least three official state and locally sponsored receptions in his honor. At the 
festivities held in Providence—Rhode Island’s capital—Mayor James Dunne and a host of other 
city officials lined up to congratulate the Indian. While shaking Brown’s hand, Dunne revealed 
what had precipitated all of the pomp and excitement when he remarked “I hope that there is 
absolutely no question of your participation in the Olympics.”
425
 The Mayor and many other 
Rhode Islanders were aware that by virtue of his victory in Boston, the Indian’s Olympic 
aspirations had increased exponentially.  Dunne had made it clear that Rhode Islanders were 
eager to ride the runner’s coattails all the way to Berlin. Similarly, as Lieutenant Governor 
Robert Quinn congratulated Brown, he stated: “I’m going to shake again and wish you the best 
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of luck in Berlin.”
426
 Before exiting the Governor’s office, Brown donned a headdress and sat for 
pictures with local dignitaries. But the move might have been a strategic one because the event 
not only allowed the champion to affirm his Indian identity, but it also provided Brown the 
opportunity to symbolically, dramatically, and publicly embrace the Indigenous community from 
which he hailed. Upon leaving the office, Brown was whisked to the state assembly where he 
witnessed the oration of a joint resolution that read in part:  
Whereas, this strong-hearted son of enduring spirit, the very embodiment of all 
those qualities which have made these Indian runners of the trails and hills an 
heroic part of our glamorous history, deserves the friendliest of greetings from 
this general assembly for thus bringing to Rhode Island…this high honor, with its 




With the conclusion of the reading, lawmakers stood and—according to one reporter—“paid the 
new Marathon champion one of the finest ovations ever tendered a visitor.”
428
 
The extent to which Rhode Islanders celebrated their Olympic hopeful perplexed some 
observers as an astonished writer for the Boston Traveler exclaimed, “The state of Rhode Island 
has gone completely daffy over its new…champion, Ellison “Tarzan’ Brown, the Narragansett 
Indian.”
429
 For their part, the Narragansetts were certainly pleased that the same officials they 
had spent the last fifty years haranguing for recognition, inclusion, and the return of sacred land, 
were suddenly “daffy” about one of their own. Just days after Brown’s reception, the Rhode 
Island General Assembly passed the “Indian Day” legislation and allowed the date for the 
ceremony to be determined by the Narragansett. This dramatic reversal in official policy 
appeared to validate the promise that some tribal members had located in Brown, and as Chief 
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Peckham explained, the tribe decided to hold the celebration on the third Monday in April 
because “Tarzan had won the marathon on that day.”
430
 Hence, it appeared—for the moment at 
least—that although it was Brown who had endured to win the twenty-six-mile grind, it was the 
Narragansetts who had truly persevered because the tribe finally won public recognition.  
However, the holiday was not the only redresses earned by way of the athleticism of the 
Indian runner and the obstinacy of his Indigenous supporters because Rhode Island lawmakers 
contemporaneously debated a bill granting the Narragansetts clear title to a two-acre plot 
whereupon laid a historic Indian church and tribal burial ground. Similarly, just two months after 
Brown’s victory, a replica of a traditional “Indian Village” was opened in Rhode Island’s 
Goddard Park to much acclaim. Governor Theodore Francis Green declared that the village 
“would represent a bond between the red man and the white man as long as it stands, and I think 
it will stand for a long time.”
431
 The exhibit, along with the church bill and state holiday, helped 
to relocate the Narragansetts—however briefly—from obscurity to a place of social, political, 
and economic relevance.   
This advancement was only possible because the celebration of Brown by white citizens 
did not upset well-established social and racial ideologies because, as Deloria explains, the 
success of Indigenous athletes could be understood as the byproduct of a primitive physicality 
and evidence of Indian difference.
432
 Observations made by Roger Williams almost three-
hundred years earlier appeared to affirm the seemingly natural ability of Narragansett runners. 
“They are generally quick on foot,” wrote Williams, “brought up from the breasts to running . . . 
I have knowne [sic] many of them run betweene [sic] fourscore and a hundred miles in a 
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 The joint resolution issued by the state assembly in 1936 referenced the 
assumed historic qualities of “Indian runners.” But, while Rhode Islanders celebrated Brown’s 
supposed natural ability, they also negated all of the toil, sweat, and determination that had 
helped to make him victorious.  
O’Brien argues that in the minds of many New Englanders, “Indian peoples became 
forever ancient—mired in the static past” and  “deemed inauthentic if they did not comply with 
the expectation that they be persistently ancient.”
434
 Many white spectators merely embraced 
Brown as a caricature of an Indigenous past, a Wildman who emerged from the woods with a 
natural and raw talent, or as Derderian observes, “It was expected that he [Brown] could run—he 
was an Indian…if he succeeded it was because he did what his handlers prepared him to do, like 
a thoroughbred stallion.”
435
 By defining Brown’s success as wild, natural, and savage Euro-
Americans affirmed their place atop New England’s social hierarchy. “The superiority of the 
‘civilized,’ explains the anthropologist Pauline Turner Strong, “as well as their claim to 
legitimate power rests on dominating the natural, controlling the wild, subjugating the 
savage.”
436
 Therefore, while Brown’s athletic feats were something to be marveled at, many 
white Rhode Islanders ultimately construed that the runner’s success was indicative of innate 
racial, social, and physical difference. Instead of challenging existing ideologies, Brown’s 
success served as evidence of the natural inferiority of Indigenous peoples. Hence, the runner’s 
accomplishments could be framed as natural and primitive, and in no way emblematic of the 
industriousness or continued relevance of Indigenous persons, or a challenge to the privileged 
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and seemingly natural superiority of white Rhode Islander’s and their “verifiable” claims to the 
region.  
Moreover, public acknowledgment of the tribe appeared to be of little consequence to 
many non-Indians because the Narragansetts, who were relatively small in number, did not 
receive any monetary recompense. In fact, the Indians seemed to gain nothing tangible from 
recognition, save a two-acre plot that was already under the control of the tribe. Therefore, when 
Arthur Duffy, the state’s commissioner of the Amateur Athletic Union, advocated that “the City 
of Providence and the State of Rhode Island get behind this boy” because, “when he wins the 
marathon it will mean not only a great victory for Uncle Sam, but for Rhode Island,” he 
expressed the promise that many of the state’s white citizens had envisioned in Brown as they 
exhorted the Indian runner without questioning the veracity of their own exclusionary social, 
racial, and economic policies.
437
   
However, because Brown did not return from Germany an Olympic champion as so many 
had hoped, the enthusiasm that had carried the Indian runner across the ocean quickly dissipated.  
Although there are many explanations—some quite spectacular—for Brown’s failure to secure a 
victory in Berlin, the fact is, that for the first time in his career, Brown failed to finish a race.
438
 
 The parallels between the experience of the Indian and that of Sohn Kee Chung—the 
man who won the Olympic marathon in 1936—were quite remarkable because, like Brown, 
Chung represented two nations because the Korean runner was compelled to compete using the 
Japanese alias Kitei Son and under the auspices of the Japanese flag. Like Brown, Chung had 
hoped that his participation would lead to greater awareness about the plight of his people and, 
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while on the podium, the Korean victor lowered his head in defiance when officials raised the 
Japanese flag and played that country’s national anthem.
439
 We can only speculate what Brown 
might have done had he won the race. Would he have cried out “we done it” as he did in Boston?  
Would he have donned a headdress as he had at the Governor’s office? Or would he have hung 
his head in shame like Chung? Irrespective of what the runner might have done, it is likely that 
had he won, Brown would have returned home a champion on paper but to the same social, 
political, and economic realities that greeted him as an also-ran. In fact, Brown’s post-Olympic 
experience resembled that of Owens because, like the black champion, the Indian also struggled 
to find employment and relevancy in a society still clinging to antiquated social and racial ideals. 
Indeed, even before Brown’s second win in Boston, Rhode Island’s leaders had already 
returned to the pre-tercentennial practice of ignoring and marginalizing the state’s Indigenous 
population. For example, the resolution passed by the state assembly in 1939 recognizing 
Brown’s latest victory constituted the first and final time lawmakers officially acknowledged 
anyone from the Narragansett community since the runner returned home from Berlin and until 
tribal members were granted suffrage by the state in 1950. The neglect experienced by Brown 
during the years bookended by his two wins in Boston was emblematic of the challenges faced 
by a people deemed to be of little or no consequence by state leaders. For example, when Brown 
won the marathon in 1939, his top priority was to seek opportunities for employment. While 
discussing his latest world record-setting victory with an interviewer, the runner chided, “I get 
nothing but medals, and you can’t eat those.”
440
  Similarly, when observing all the pageantry 
associated with his win, Brown stated: “Really fellows [sic], I like all this, but a job would be so 
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 The fact that someone Rhode Islanders ardently celebrated just a few years 
earlier had such difficulty securing employment was not only emblematic of the ephemeral 
nature of celebrity, but also of the systemic challenges faced by those at the bottom of the social 
hierarchy. Those people from traditionally marginalized groups who hoped that athletic success 
might transcend and possibly challenge enduring racial and social ideologies were mostly 
disappointed because the recognition and praise won by Owens, Louis, and Brown did not result 
in the redemption of their communities. In fact, the public admiration tendered to these athletes 
did little to improve their plights because not only did their fame fail to elicit fortune but it also 
did not afford the former athletes with greater opportunities for employment once their celebrity 
waned. 
Hence, after the spectacle of the tercentennial and the excitement of the Olympics faded, 
Rhode Islanders quickly returned to the standard policy of neglecting and marginalizing the 
state’s Indigenous population. However, a precedent had been set and the recognition and 
property exacted by tribal members between 1935 and 1936, would figure prominently in the 
forceful demands made by future generations of Narragansett leaders.
442
 In what would prove to 
be the paper’s final issue, the editors of the Dawn reflected on what the past year had meant to 
the Narragansetts:  
In the many programs of the year, only a pleasant, bright and cheerful side of the 
Narragansett have been portrayed.  Always the Indian is giving up to the paleface 
. . . We have given what we had to give in the past. In the present we gave of our 
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members for entertainment . . . Our reward is—Rhode Island knows now—The 




Indeed, by publicly celebrating Brown’s success and participating in the pageantry of the 
tercentennial, tribal members not only affirmed the persistence of their community, but these 
efforts also helped to fashion a future in which the Indians and their posterity could demand 
redress as the regions original and rightful inhabitants.      
The Narragansett journalist John Christian Hopkins eloquently recounted Brown’s 
achievements in a poem when he stated, “a man climbed Heartbreak Hill, a legend descended the 
other side.”
444
 However, modern interpretations of that legend merit some revision because the 
runner not only contributed to Narragansett lore, but Brown’s accomplishments also helped to 
make public acknowledgment of the tribe's communal identity a reality. Therefore, while it was a 
man who climbed Heartbreak Hill, it was an Indian nation that descended the other side.  
The headline for a short two paragraph story found in the New York Times on 24 August 
1975 read: Ellison (Tarzan) Brown, 61, Marathon Runner, Is Dead.
445
 Although the caption 
appeared to communicate all of the pertinent information, it was the article’s first line that 
revealed Ellison Brown’s real legacy. Because, after communicating the name and hometown of 
the deceased and before listing the runner’s athletic accomplishments, the paper identified 
Brown—foremost—as a “Narragansett Indian.” During the same year that Brown passed away, 
the community his athleticism helped to preserve once again sued the state of Rhode Island for 
the return of ancestral lands. But now—primarily due to the recognition afforded to Brown and 
the Narragansetts in 1936—lawmakers could no longer claim that the Indians had been 
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disbanded in 1880. In fact, although the Narragansetts officially obtained the land upon which 
the now federally recognized tribe has built its community longhouse, administration offices, 
health center, police and environmental enforcement offices, Church, and powwow grounds in a 
settlement with state officials in 1978, this land and the recognition it portended was really won 
in 1936, on a hill in Boston.  
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Chapter 5 – The Dawn  
In 1935, just months before Ellison “Tarzan” Brown’s dash up heartbreak hill, James F. 
Rockett –Rhode Island’s director of education—penned a terse reply to an inquiry he received 
about the inclusion of Native Americans in the state’s official curriculum. The director wrote, 
“We have made no recommendation of study of the American Indians . . . we believe . . . Indians 
. . . contributed very little indeed to American civilization . . . we would wish in Rhode Island to 
relegate the Indian interest to a matter of a passing episode.”
446
 Rockett’s response was 
emblematic of an enduring narrative—discussed in previous chapters—that professed an early 
demise of the region’s indigenous population and defined succeeding generations of Indians as 
illegitimate. Hence, the director interpreted Native peoples, both past and present, as 
inconsequential.  
However, the pomp and pageantry associated with the celebration of Rhode Island’s 
tercentenary in 1936 created opportunities for tribal leaders to challenge the narrative of demise 
and to proclaim the continuance of their community. Philip J. Deloria observes that by the 
twentieth century some Indian peoples recognized “that political and legal struggles are tightly 
linked to the ideologies and images—the expectations—that non-Indians have built around 
Native people.”
447
 The experience of detribalization left many Narragansetts with a unique 
appreciation for the sway and utility of public perception. Thus, by the 1930s, some 
Narragansetts sought to express their indigeneity according to the social and racial constructs 
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established and professed by non-Indians.
448
 However, in the process of reimagining and 
reasserting their indigeneity, many Narragansetts not only considered and utilized the parameters 
of authenticity enshrined within the larger society, but certain tribal members also internalized 
and perpetuated these themes. For example, in response to Rockett’s assertions, Princess 
Redwing wrote, “To-day the brown skinned, blackeyed, straight haired tall and fiery spirited 
man, whom R.I. has done her best to extinguish, still lives, and the blood of his forefathers, in 
many places, has not been tainted with either white or black bloods.”
449
 In attempting to certify 
the indigeneity of the Narragansetts, Redwing appealed to the same tropes—blood quantum and 
appearance—previously used to invalidate the tribal community. It appears then that race—a 
characteristic seldom employed by previous generations of Narragansetts—was now a 
paramount identifier and communicator of authenticity even among the Indians. This chapter 
examines the Narragansett Dawn—a monthly newsletter published by tribal members and 
distributed to audiences around the world between 1935 and 1936—to assess how the 
Narragansetts used the language of authenticity established by local, state, and federal officials to 
reassert a public identity.  
The Narragansett Dawn was intended, as its editors explained, to “open for our public of 
all races, the great unwritten book of the Narragansett, sent down from father to son, portraying 
from time to time, many folk laws, ideals, principles, and traditions which we hold as sacred 
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 By opening for public display, the great book passed on through generations the 
creators of the Dawn appealed to a social and cultural tradition that remained unbroken by the 
exigencies of official detribalization. Although seemingly innocuous, the Dawn was nothing less 
than the emphatic reclamation of an Indigenous identity by a people who were not just written 
off, but also quite literally, written out of history. Moreover, in the paper’s inaugural issue the 
editors observed that “for nearly sixty years the Narragansett Spirit has laid dormant,” while state 
and federal officials “recorded the tribe as extinguished,” but “all the recording in the country 
could not change the blood or wipe it out.”
451
  It is clear that from its conception the Dawn was a 
medium through which the Narragansetts would challenge longstanding misconceptions.    
In 1936, more than fifty years after state officials emphatically determined that the 
Narragansetts were extinct, Rhode Islanders prepared to commemorate their three-hundredth 
year. But while they planned their celebrations the state’s white citizenry was forced to contend 
with the fact that Native Americans were a central and immutable part of Rhode Island’s history. 
Chapter 3 describes how Rhode Islanders were eager to appropriate the athleticism of Ellison 
Brown in hopes of bringing fame to the state in its banner year. Similarly, the spectacle 
associated with the tercentenary provided opportunities for tribal members to participate in the 
pageantry as organizers looked to authenticate their events with the participation of real—or at 
least real-looking—Indians. But the inclusion of Narragansetts in the parades, plays, 
reenactments, and dedications of 1936 was—for the most part—a perfunctory exercise and by no 
means a certification of the authenticity of the Indians or their community. But while tribal 
members donned their regalia, secured bows to their backs, and grabbed their drums to play 
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Indian, they necessarily subverted the prevailing historical narrative because they exposed all 
who viewed these exhibitions to the plain fact that all of Rhode Island’s Indians were not extinct. 
Indeed, the Narragansetts who marched down Main Street and recited soliloquies intended to 
communicate to their audiences that they were not merely playing Indian.  
In preparation for a major parade staged during the tercentenary celebration, Narragansett 
leaders designed and constructed an extravagant seventy-two-foot long parade float. According 
to the Dawn, the float was an artistic and technical marvel intended to re-create the arrival of 
Roger Williams in Narragansett territory: 
It [the float] carried the sign "Netop," meaning "Friend" in the Narragansett 
tongue…. Upon the hood, protruded a platform on which was built an Indian 
village, where reclined the aged Narragansetts and small children . . . On the 
shoreline stood Canonicus and Miantonomi, with outstretched hands towards 
Roger Williams rocking in the morning breeze on the water . . . The Indians were 
of the same blood of those who did live on these shores in 1636. Twenty-nine of 
the present Narragansett Tribe were there in the garb of their ancestors, and 




Moreover, the Dawn described the parade as “one like Providence had never seen before” and 
recalled that the Indians strutted to “a loud applause all along the line of march, through the 
streets of Providence.”
453
 The utility of such as spectacle for a people deemed non-existent was 
evident because—although the recreation constituted an ode to the past—it was peopled by those 
living in the present. The obvious message that the Indians literarily paraded through the streets 
was that the Narragansetts still existed. Hence, a notable percentage of the tribe’s overall 
population marched alongside the float. However, the underlying message associated with the 
spectacle was much more convoluted. While the Indians paraded through the streets of 
                                                 
452
 Redwing and Hazard, “Narragansett Dawn,” Vol.1, No. 9. 
453
 Redwing and Hazard, “Narragansett Dawn,” Vol.1, No. 9. 
156 
Providence in their ceremonial garb, they recalled a time when the region’s white and Indigenous 
populations communed peacefully as coequals. The participants almost certainly hoped to 
communicate to their white audience that this mutually beneficial relationship did not have to be 
relegated to the past. But the expression and agency of the Narragansetts was curtailed by the 
expectations of their non-Indigenous audience because for tribal members to participate in the 
parade they needed to look and act in accordance with well-established stereotypes. The 
caricature of the buckskin-wearing and tomahawk carrying redskin was delimiting and obscured 
the fact that those who marched in the parade were the same people who proclaimed the 
perseverance of the Narragansetts as a tribe. Deloria posits that many non-Indians harbored the 
common expectation “that Indian people would remain back with Columbus, locked in history, 
memory, and representation, and excluded from a new social and political world.”
454
 Hence, the 
regalia, bows, and drums donned by the Indians hid more than just their identities because these 
accouterments of a bygone era also helped to dehumanize the performers. But such was the price 
of inclusion, and the Narragansetts who participated in the spectacle made a strategic decision. 
“In these great celebrations by white Rhode Island,” explained the Dawn’s editors, 
“Narragansetts have been called upon to do their part from the days of Canonicus…In the long 
run—‘giving’ brings a reward.”
455
 Indeed, no matter their expectations, some in the audience 
saw beyond the costumes, and although the Indians they observed might have looked like they 
were from a different era they most certainly were not. And this fact was undeniable no matter 
what the audience believed about the current condition of the Narragansetts.  
                                                 
454
 Deloria, Indians in Unexpected, 103. 
455
 Redwing and Hazard, “Narragansett Dawn,” Vol.1, No. 9. 
157 
The opportunities for inclusion afforded to the Narragansetts during the celebration of the 
tercentenary accompanied a general shift in federal policy exemplified by the appointment of 
John Collier as Commissioner of Indian Affairs in 1933 and the passage of the Wheeler-Howard 
bill—also known as the Indian Reorganization Act or IRA—in 1934. Leaders among the 
Narragansetts where well aware of the opportunity portended in these developments publishing 
in the Dawn that “We have a real friend of our race in Commissioner Collier,” and that “Many 
features of the Act [IRA] are good…Wisely administered…it may result in much good to the 
Indians who may elect to come under its provisions.”
456
 According to Donald L. Parman, Collier 
rejected the philosophy of forced assimilation and instead emphasized the importance of 
preserving and renewing Indigenous heritage whenever possible. The new director “demanded 
that Indians be allowed to reorganize their tribal governments,” writes Parman, “and...take an 
active role in the administration of reservation affairs.”
457
 Although many criticized Collier’s 
approach as retrogressive charging the commissioner with “turning the clock back on Indian 
advancement,” scholars such as D’Arcy McNickle show that Collier viewed Indian societies not 
as fossilized and frozen in the past but as “assimilative, while yet faithful to…ancient values.”
458
 
Regardless of how others interpreted Collier’s policies, the utility of this philosophical shift and 
the legislation it helped to inspire was quickly embraced by many within the Narragansett 
community who had long petitioned Washington for recognition and redress. Collier and the IRA 
breathed new life into Narragansetts’ hopes for a new deal. The optimism that accompanied this 
shift in federal policy was expressed in the first issue of the Dawn when editors explained that 
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“We have called this monthly booklet “the Narragansett Dawn” because we are watching for the 
“sunrise of better times” in the “New Deal” with our fellow countrymen.”
459
 Indeed, after what 
the Dawn called a long night, the Narragansetts were among the first Indigenous peoples to seek 
reorganization under the new legislation holding their inaugural meeting on December 4, 1934, 
less than five months after the passage of the IRA.   
Those within the Narragansett community who looked to Washington for the sunrise of 
better times understood that the new commissioner, as Parman observes, “believed very strongly 
that whatever remained of Indian heritage must be preserved and renewed if at all possible.”
460
  
It is no coincidence then that the majority of the articles published in the Dawn focused on the 
preservation and continuance of Narragansett folkways. But the stories about traditional recipes 
and medicines and the lessons about the tribe’s history and language were not solely or even 
primarily designed for an Indian audience. In fact, a preponderance of the newsletters were 
delivered to non-Indian peoples and institutions including the many copies provided to individual 
libraries and universities free of charge. Indeed, the wide distribution of the Dawn was in 
keeping with the editors’ stated objective to open to the public the great book of the 
Narragansetts. Therefore, the newsletter was not only intended to teach local Indians but also, 
and perhaps more purposefully, the Dawn constituted an attempt to reclaim and reassert the 
indigeneity of the Narragansetts publically. 
But, as stated earlier, while the Narragansetts worked to reestablish and legitimize their 
public identity, they were compelled to operate within the confines of the general public’s 
common expectations. Hence the Dawn’s contributors often appropriated the language of 
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authenticity established and certified by those outside of their community. For example, in its 
December issue of 1935, the Dawn published a story written by Chief Pine Tree titled “A Feast 
For An Indian Scout.”  In the story, the author advises readers that “If you are on an all-day 
fishing trip be sure to carry along some potatoes and Indian corn meal.”
461
 Such preparations will 
allow the “scout,” after he has “caught a good mess of trout,” to “build a campfire on a sunny 
side hill.” Prepare his corn cakes on birch bark and place his potatoes and fish—which were to 
be wrapped in green leaves—under the coals. While his meal is cooking the scout can “lie down 
and rest for an hour.” Although seemingly innocuous and perhaps even practical, this story must 
be placed into context. The editors of the Dawn knew that the great majority of their readers 
would never use the techniques outlined in the article. The story’s informative value rested not in 
what it instructed but in what it implied. By suggesting that—in the midst of a crushing 
depression—certain Narragansett scouts could blissfully spend all day on a fishing trip 
punctuated with a long nap, the Dawn made use of widely accepted stereotypes that claimed 
Native peoples were wild, carefree, and non-industrious. Furthermore, the instructions about how 
to prepare the meal using just the implements provided by nature communicated an 
understanding of traditional ways that could have only been gained from a strong connection to 
the past. Thus, the story intended to certify not only the scout’s Indigenous authenticity but also 
that of the greater Narragansett community. As Fredrick E. Hoxie explains, “Most Americans 
instinctively view Indians as people of the past.”
462
  The editors of the Dawn were also keen to 
exploit this social expectation however antiquated. 
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Although it may seem counterintuitive that members of an Indigenous community would 
employ stereotypes that many people regarded as degrading and restrictive to communicate their 
Indianness,  one must only examine the rancor that permeated interactions between the state of 
Rhode Island the Narragansetts over the preceding sixty years to truly appreciate that tribe’s 
unique disposition. When state administrators moved to detribalize the Narragansetts they did so 
by aggressively arguing that the so called descendants of this once prominent  tribe—whose 
centrality in Rhode Island’s establishment was unquestionable—were in fact inauthentic 
imitators who, as the state claimed, “simply took the name of this once great tribe.”
463
 As 
discussed in previous chapters, Rhode Islanders based their analysis and dismissal of the 
remaining Narragansetts almost exclusively upon the appearance of the Natives. Many non-
Indians argued that all of the real Indians must have died out because all that remained of the 
tribe was a “cluster of negroes or dusky complexioned persons.” Moreover, some of the state’s 
white citizens questioned the authenticity of the Narragansetts because the Natives did not 
resemble the “real Indians” Rhode Islanders saw when attended William Cody’s Wild West 
shows which visited the state no less than eighteen times between 1874 and detribalization in 
1881.  It was true that many Narragansetts did not resemble the Lakota heavily featured in 
Cody’s shows. But aside from the fact that they were not Lakota, two and a half centuries of 
close cross-cultural interactions meant that the Narragansetts maintained a long history of 
intermarriage, a reality seldom experienced by tribes living among the isolating vastness of the 
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 But, as explained in chapter 2, the idea that intermarriage rendered the 
descendants of these unions as less authentic was originally proposed by non-Indians. However, 
in an effort to reclaim their identity, many within the Narragansett community appropriated and 
internalized the measures of Indigenous authenticity fabricated and propagated by their white 
neighbors. For example, the Narragansett historian Ella Wilcox Sekatau explains that some 
Narragansetts came to see the children resulting from cross-cultural relationships as less 
authentic, especially those resulting from an admixture with African blood because such unions 
were interpreted as contributing to a “loss of Indianness.”
465
  
  An article published by the Dawn in April of 1936 clearly illustrates how some 
Narragansetts attempted to communicate the authenticity of their community by appealing to 
popular conceptualizations about race. “The world has forgotten,” wrote a Narragansett historian, 
“that we could marry and run out it time, strange bloods that once invaded our tribe.”
466
 The 
claim constituted a stark departure from earlier appraisals because—as discussed in Chapter 2—
Narragansett leaders asserted previously that one drop of Indigenous blood certified them as 
Indians.
467
 However, the intervening decades—ones that included detribalization and 
marginalization—taught many within the Narragansett community that they were not—at least in 
the public sphere—the only arbitrators of their community’s parameters. In describing how the 
Narragansetts were able to “run out…strange bloods,” the historian invoked social and racial 
modalities readily understood by the great majority of the Dawn’s readers. It was by such means 
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that some Narragansetts appropriated the language of authenticity established by non-Indians. 
Moreover, to further certify the Indigeneity of the tribal members, the author suggested that any 
observer who looked at “our very faces, features, eyes, hair and physics [sic]” will conclude that 
the Narragansetts were Indians. The historian’s appeal to appearance was also in keeping with 
mainstream ideals because, as explained earlier, many white Rhode Islanders held certain 
expectations about the way Indians should look.
468
 The importance the Indians assigned to 
appearance was further communicated in another issue of the Dawn that celebrated the arrival of 
twenty-nine “golden brown, black-eyed, straight haired Indian babies born into our tribe.” 
Although the births, which marked the resurgence of a community that had previously teetered 
on the brink of numerical extinction, certainly gave cause for merriment, the editors of the Dawn 
intended to communicate more than just a surge in population. They also hoped to convey their 
authenticity as Indian peoples who produced “golden brown and straight haired” children. 
By choosing to define their community per widely accepted social and racial ideals, 
Narragansett leaders invoked what the scholar Greta Snyder Fowler termed a monovalent form 
of recognition. Fowler explains that monovalent recognition movements were delimiting because 
they produced “fixed conceptions of collective identities” in which certain—often 
stereotypical—characteristics “are conceived of as essential or authentic.”
469
 Scholars have long 
lamented this type of essentialism not only because of its tendency to repress or exclude certain 
members of the community who failed to possess or display whatever characteristics were 
deemed essential or authentic, but also because it reinforced constraining stereotypes and 
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allowed individuals from outside the community to act as arbitrators. However, the Narragansetts 
did not just simply placate white audiences with their dress, drums, and appeals to racial purity. 
On the contrary—many tribal members also viewed these acts as symbols of authenticity. 
Christine N. Reiser explains that during the early twentieth-century white audiences throughout 
New England expected widely accepted symbols of indigeneity to figure “prominently in 
historical pageants.”
470
 Hence, Native communities were encouraged to supplement traditional 
practices and iconography with that “of other Native groups, particularly those groups of the 
Plains whose traits had come to symbolize Indian-ness in the non-native public.”
471
  
A recollection printed in the Dawn illustrates the change experienced by many within the 
Narragansett community once certain tribal members adopted pan-Indian symbols of 
Indigeneity. In an article published in September of 1935, Cassuis A. Champlin—president of 
the Narragansett tribal council—recalled attending an annual August Meeting as a youth. 
Champlin remembered that “Indian costumes and war bonnets were not in vogue then, for 
everybody was doing his best to apt the white race in style and dress…but the August Meeting of 
to-day seems somewhat different, as though the cycle of time had lifted us up and dropped us in 
new surroundings.”
472
 Champlin was born in 1894, and the meeting he described most likely 
took place sometime around the turn of the century. But as Reiser shows, by 1925 the annual 
August Meeting had transformed. Through the inclusion of pan-Indian style dress and 
performances, “the Narragansetts’ annual August Meeting, was expanded even further into a 
dramatic display of indigeneity” in which tribal members intended to make clear their 
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“continuing links to heritage and community.”
473
 Two images Boissevain included in her work 
on the Narragansetts attested to the change described by Champlin. A picture of Mary A. Secatur 
Perry taken sometime in the late nineteenth-century showed the Narragansett woman fashioned 
in the clothing and wearing her hair in a style similar to that of Euro-American women. The 
image is a stark contrast to another picture included in the book of Philip Peckham. The 
photograph of the chief taken in 1934 showed Peckham adorned in ceremonial regalia complete 
with a Western-style headdress. The two images were emblematic of a change that saw certain 
members of the Narragansett community appropriate pan-Indian imagery and symbolism to 
communicate their identity as Indigenous peoples.      
Sometime before the printing of its May issue in 1936, the editors of the Dawn received a 
letter from “a modern lady . . . critizing [sic] the use of ceremonial clothes by the descendants of 
Indians.”
474
 The response printed by the editors revealed not only why some Narragansetts 
sought to employ the symbols of Indigeneity accepted by Euro-Americans, but also how the 
expectations of non-Indians were appropriated and authenticated by the Indians themselves. 
Aside from the fact that the editors found the beadwork that adorned ceremonial clothes a 
“pleasant sight,” the authors explained that, “The American public still lores [sic] Indian 
ceremonial clothes and ask that we shall wear them to their ceremonies.”
475
 By donning their 
buckskins and war bonnets, leaders within the Narragansett community were quite simply 
playing Indian for their white audiences. But the regalia worn by tribal members did more than 
just entertain because it also helped to authenticate a population many had long thought to be 
extinct. For many Rhode Islanders, the Narragansetts were a people of the past, and as such, 
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modern incarnations of the Indians were deemed to be imitative. The letter written by the 
“modern lady” was indicative of these conceptualizations because the author referred to the 
people asserting Narragansett ancestry as “descendants of Indians” and not Indians in their own 
right. The ceremonial dress worn by tribal members helped non-Indians clear this ideological 
hurdle and the Narragansetts were keen to exploit this reality. However, some factions within the 
Narragansett community objected to the appropriation of popular Indigenous iconography.  In 
fact, the tribal elder Evangeline Hankinson recalled that her father Thomas Babcock once 
explained why their family did not dress like some of the other Indians or participate in certain 
ceremonial dances at the August Meeting. Babcock told his daughter, “That is not part of our 
history . . . that is not who we are.”
476
 Babcock was referencing the western inspired costumes 
that by the middle of the twentieth-century remained a mainstay at local powwows.    
As stated, certain Narragansetts did not just co-opt the identifiers of Indigeneity espoused 
by Euro-Americans, because—in time—some tribal leaders internalized these symbols as 
authentic harbingers of Indigeneity. For example, in their response to the modern lady, the 
editors of the Dawn explained that their regalia was more than just decorative because “all of the 
symbols upon our clothes have a meaning.”
477
 The editors continued to explain the importance of 
teaching their children the significances of the ceremonial dress: “Each true Indian mother gives 
her son or daughter the Indian signs of life. She teaches him the things hidden in her heart, which 
time cannot wipe out, or civilization change.”
478
 However, as revealed by Champlin’s early 
recollection of the August Meeting and Babcock’s disinterest in the practice, dressing in regalia 
was a more modern ritual. Therefore, all of the lessons and meaning that emblazoned ceremonial 
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outfits were somehow passed through the generations even when many Narragansetts had 
forgone their “Indian costumes” for the dress and style of the “white race.” The fact that in their 
response, the editors of the Dawn equated ceremonial dress with tradition and Identity reveals 
how some Indians began to internalize and certify common symbols of Indigeneity.                         
When the Narragansetts began to incorporate the general pan-Indian iconography they 
also help to legitimate these symbols as identifiers of authenticity. Hence, certain tribal members 
were complicit in defining and perpetuating restrictive interpretations of Indigeneity. But in the 
1930s Narragansett leaders were forced to operate within the confines of what Fowler terms 
“structural prerequisites” because Rhode Islanders—who had spent decades professing the 
extinction of the state’s Indigenous population—only accepted a narrow monovalent form of 
indigeneity as authentic. Thus, the Narragansetts needed to don their war bonnets, bang on their 
tom-toms, and play Indian for the white mainstream to recognize them as Indians. But even as 
tribal members performed in the roles of a bygone era, they hoped to communicate to their non-
Indigenous audiences that the Narragansetts were far from gone. 
But the Narragansetts did not only change their attire when they adapted to and employed 
more general conceptualizations about the identifiers of authenticity because— in an attempt to 
both certify their Indigeneity and prove the continued relevance of their community—tribal 
members also appealed to historic and popular constructions about the bellicosity of Indigenous 
peoples. The reenacted struggles Rhode Islanders witnessed at Cody’s shows as well as the 
fictional contest they saw on movie screens throughout the opening decades of the twentieth-
century helped to frame Indian peoples as “war-whooping” savages in the eyes of the general 
public.
479
 Although the Narragansetts had been militarily subdued long ago, the massacre of 
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Lakota at Wounded Knee, which Deloria called “cross-tribal and cross-cultural milepost,” was 
not yet fifty years past.
480
 “For non-Indian Americans,” writes Deloria, “the possibility of 
nineteenth-century Indian violence existed before Wounded Knee; afterward, it became a thing 
of representation, perfect for twentieth-century movies and books.”
481
 As Euro-Americans 
became more accustom to seeing Indians depicted as violent and warlike, the symbols of war—
hatchets, bows and arrows—came to be identifiers of authenticity. This was not because non-
Indians feared the bellicosity of Indigenous peoples in the twentieth-century, but that those 
Indians who rode bareback and took scalps in fictionalized resistance seemed more authentic 
than the Natives who filed lawsuits in actual acts of resistance. Deloria observes that while “most 
Americans expected that Indian people had been pacified, they also came to expect images of 
nineteenth-century Indian violence on the silver screen.”
482
 Because modern acts of resistance by 
Indigenous peoples did not match what Euro-Americans saw in theaters, to many non-Natives 
“contemporary Indian people seemed like pathetic anachronisms.”
483
 Thus, when certain 
Narragansetts took their bows, clubs, and hatchets in hand they clutched more than just these 
instruments of war, because they also affirmed their connections to a violent, warlike, and 
supposedly more authentic past. An editorial published in the Dawn explicitly recalled these ties 
to bellicosity. “We would rather . . . draw a picture, than draw a trigger . . . ‘truck’ than dance a 
war dance . . . gather around a cozy fireplace, rather than a council fire of death.”
484
 Although 
they were ultimately avowing violence, the editors still drew upon the widely accepted and 
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apocryphal paradigm proclaiming the violent nature Indigenous peoples to assert their 
authenticity as people who could still perform war dances and build council fires of death. 
Some Narragansett leaders also employed this ideal of Indigenous bellicosity to affirm 
both the contributions and continued relevance of their community. “Narragansetts love their 
state and the ideals for which it stands,” wrote the Dawn’s editors, “when her [Rhode Island] 
liberty was at stake, Narragansetts fought.”
485
 The editors proceeded to list the names and ranks 
of Narragansetts who had served in all of the wars fought by colonial and Euro-Americans 
beginning with what has come to be known as the French and Indian War in 1754. The authors 
even noted those who had “made the supreme sacrifice for liberty and honor of their 
homeland.”
486
 By recounting the martial contributions made by tribal members, Narragansett 
leaders made use of delimiting serotypes to advocate not only for the public recognition of the 
sacrifices made by tribal members, but also for the acknowledgement that the Indians—and their 
supposed innate bellicosity—remained relevant in modern American society. For example, the 
editors claimed that the twenty-five names they listed were “just a few, just enough to show, we 
can give for war.” During a time of heightened international tensions, knowing that their 
neighbors—no matter how small their community—were willing to give for war must have been 
reassuring to some Euro-Americans. In reminding readers of their contributions, the 
Narragansetts appealed to the same hyper-patriotic milieu that had allowed for the inclusion and 
celebration of athletes drawn from traditionally marginalized communities. And as was true for 
those who believed that athletic achievements might lead to greater inclusion, so did some 




 Redwing and Hazard, “Narragansett Dawn,” Vol.1, No. 10. 
169 
Narragansetts hope that the recognition of their “supreme sacrifice” would inspire Rhode 
Islanders to rethink how they interacted with their Indigenous neighbors.      
For the Narragansetts’, participation in the pageantry of the tercentenary compelled tribal 
members to interpret limited roles that—because they were exclusively rooted in the past—often 
portrayed the Native performers as anachronistic. However, tribal leaders were also able to use 
the unique opportunities associated with 1936 to communicate the continued perseverance and 
relevance of their community. For example, on the fourth of July the Narragansetts staged an 
elaborate pageant that recalled “the Coming of Roger Williams to the Lodge of Canonicus.”
487
 
Close to 140 Narragansetts participated in the performance. In adhering to the expectations of the 
general non-Indian public, tribal members reenacted scenes such as the purchase of Aquidneck 
Island, the defeat of King Phillip, and of course, Canonicus’ acceptance and support of Roger 
Williams. In fact, only two of the sixteen pages in the program dealt with events beyond 1880. 
But in these last pages the Narragansetts revealed the utility—and perhaps real intent—of their 
endeavor. It was here at the end of the program that the Indians may have hoped to leave their 
most important and lasting impression because the final pages of the program called for a parade. 
But unlike the time the Narragansetts marched through the streets of Providence, on this day 
when the Indians paraded past their audience they did so while playing themselves. The part of 
“Our College Lassie” was interpreted by Margret Carter a member of the Phi Betta Kappa and 
Sigma Ki national academic honorary societies and student at Brown University in Providence. 
The part of “Our College Lad” was depicted by Harry Peckham who was then enrolled at Eastern 
Nazarene College in Wollaston Massachusetts. The part of “Our Dentist” was portrayed by Dr. 
U.T. Carter. The parts of “Our Business Man,” “Our Business Women,” “Our School Teacher,” 
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“Our Stone Masons,” along with a multitude of other “Ours” also made their way through the 
procession. And of course, “Our Runner” was played by the marathon champion Ellison Brown. 
Because these Narragansetts essentially portrayed themselves they were really not playing 
anything. They were not dressing up. They were not pretending to be someone who lived 
hundreds of years ago. They were instead dramatically and emphatically asserting themselves as 
authentic and modern incarnations of Indigeneity. Thus the parade was nothing less than a direct 
assault on the apocryphal narrative—believed by many in attendance—that real Indians were 
forever ancient. 
1936 proved to be a banner year not just for Rhode Island but also for the Narragansetts 
because the celebration of the state’s tercentenary not only allowed for, but authenticity also 
demanded, the inclusion of the area’s Native population. But whereas non-Indians mostly 
dictated the parameters of Indian inclusion, tribal members worked within prescribed structural 
prerequisites to not only subvert but to also openly challenge familiar expectations. The final line 
in the Fourth of July program revealed what the Narragansetts hoped to accomplish as they 
helped their white neighbors recall the days of Canonicus. The tribe’s elaborate pageant ended 
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Conclusion – The Punchline  
A story published in the Dawn in 1935 recalled the tale of a white man who wished “to 
buy the land of an old chief.” The man—no doubt aware of stereotypical depictions of Indians as 
drunkards—invited the sachem to his house to eat, drink, and discuss business.  The “dinner was 
served in several courses and” with “drink each time.” The chief ate and drank so much that he 
was unable to certify the deal and “went home and said nothing.” The following day “the white 
man came by the Indian’s abode to talk business. The Indian ordered his squaw to serve dinner 
first.  She served six courses but each was succotash.  The white man wishing to be polite in 
order to keep the Indian in good humor, ate so many beans that he could not talk, so he went 
away. The Indian saved his land.”
489
    
The story was allegoric and indicative of the transformative events that bookend this 
work. When the white man arrived at the Indians abode, he was compelled to sit through 
multiple courses of succotash because he no longer determined the protocols of exchange. 
Because he was in an unfamiliar place, the white man was forced to abide by the customs of his 
Indigenous host. Like the man in the story, when European colonists first arrived in North 
America, they were compelled to observe local practices. In this analogy, the succotash the white 
man was obliged to eat was akin to the agreements the settlers made with their Indigenous host. 
As explained in chapter one, the Narragansetts were the preeminent power in southern New 
England, and as such, they helped to shape and define cross-cultural exchanges. In fact, many of 
the early agreements forged between Indians and non-Indians throughout the region were a 
reaction to or outgrowth from the predominance of the Narragansetts, or what Miantinomi 
referred to as the “great tree.” Tracing the demographic, economic, political, and social 
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transformations that abetted both the rise and the downfall of the Narragansetts, as well as, 
delineating the consequences of these changes forms the foundation from which this 
investigation examines evolutions in the ways the Narragansetts understood and expressed their 
Indigeneity.  
Moreover, the story of the white man and the old chief was indicative of the difficulties 
faced by many within the Narragansett community when tribal members attempted to publically 
reclaim and reassert their indigeneity in the early twentieth century. For example, while dining at 
the home of the white man, the actions of the old chief were restricted by the expectations of his 
host. The Indian drank with every course because that was precisely what his host assumed he 
would do. However, even though the white man determined the parameters under which the two 
men supped, he was unable to fully control the actions of his guest or entirely realize the 
outcome he had intended. Similarly, by the twentieth-century, cross-cultural exchanges between 
the Narragansetts and their white neighbors were prescribed mainly by the latter. Still, like the 
white man who hosted the Indian, Rhode Islanders were unable to unilaterally determine the 
consequences of their interactions with the region’s Indigenous population, a reality evidenced 
when the Narragansetts paraded their modern interpretations of Indigeneity past an audience who 
had come to see Indians in their buckskins. Like the old chief when he ate and drank too much, 
the Narragansetts also operated within the traditional framework to realize their aims. However, 
whereas the old chief was able to save his land, by incorporating and utilizing many of the social 
dictums espoused by non-Indians the Narragansetts saved their community.
490
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 I do not mean to suggest that the Narragansett sought or needed public recognition to ensure the continuance of 
their community and identity as Indigenous people.  In fact, many tribal members remained in close association 
living on or around the former reservation land. However, the population was undoubtedly dwindling with tribal 
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In his 1999 HBO special titled Bigger and Blacker, comedian Chris Rock quipped, 
“When was the last time you met two Indians? You ain’t never met two Indians. I have seen a 
polar bear ride a tricycle in my lifetime. I have never seen an Indian family just chillin’ out at 
Red Lobster.” The joke worked because the audience—not just the close to two thousand who 
filled Harlem’s Apollo theater but also the millions who viewed the special on HBO—could 
identify with its premise. The people heard laughing and clapping in agreement attested to the 
fact that for many, Native Americans did seem to be comically—or tragically—absent from 
contemporary American society. 
Rock’s query speaks to the broader issues of identity, indigeneity, and authenticity that 
inform this investigation. How do we—in the twenty-first century—determine who is Native 
American?  Natives themselves employ a variety of criterion to decide tribal affiliation. Some 
American Indians use measures of blood quantum to certify membership. Other Indigenous 
groups might use community involvement or an individual’s proximity to reservation or 
ancestral land as gages for qualification. Still, some Indians determine association through lines 
of heredity. The Narragansetts use the list of individuals who the Indians agreed were entitled to 
recompense from the sale of reservation land in 1880. Another reality that further complicates 
the identification of Native Americans is the fact that—according to data taken from the 2010 
census—almost half of all respondents who reported being American Indian and Alaska Native 
also reported being one or more other races. Hence, Identifying and authenticating the 
indigeneity of persons and groups remains a complicated endeavor.  
                                                                                                                                                             
members leaving in pursuit of other opportunities. Today, the federally recognized tribe boasts more than 2300 
members up from the 200 or so who remained in the area by 1934.      
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This study examined how the Narragansetts attempted to communicate and affirm their 
unique identity as Indigenous persons amid shifting political, social, economic, and militarily 
realities. The work traced how these changes wrought evolution in both the composition and 
conceptualization of Narragansett tribal boundaries with the Indians at times rejecting or 
confirming the expectations and dictates of others. Chapter one explored how the 
Narragansetts—in their role as the area’s hegemonic Indigenous power—worked to define both 
the parameters and meaning of early cross-cultural exchanges throughout southern New England. 
The chapter also shows how other groups—both Indigenous and non-Indigenous—sought to 
uproot the “great tree” as they worked to circumvent and challenge the authority of the 
Narragansetts. Chapter two finds the Narragansetts struggling to deal with the ramifications of a 
military defeat that precipitated a dramatic decline in not only the tribe’s population but also 
consequently its economic and political power. The chapter shows that when the Indians 
attempted to meet these challenges in a traditional way, by incorporating other peoples—both 
Indigenous and non-Indigenous—into the tribe, some from outside the tribal community began 
to question the Indigeneity and authenticity of the Narragansetts ultimately resulting in the 
Indian’s detribalization. How the Olympian Ellison “Tarzan” Brown and some of his 
Narragansett brethren turned the runner’s physical accomplishments into meaningful, 
community-wide social, economic, and political advancements constituted the interpretive focus 
of chapter three. The chapter explained that it was the eagerness of Rhode Islanders to 
appropriate the Brown’s successes that inspired a public recognition of the Narragansetts’ 
continued existence. Finally, chapter four explained how some Narragansetts made use of the 
visibility afforded tribal members by the tercentenary to proclaim not only the survival but also 
the continued relevance of their community. The chapter also shows how certain tribal members 
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both incorporated and rejected widely accepted identifiers of Indigeneity as they sought to 
communicate the authenticity of their community. Scholars have shown that even before 
colonization North America was a dynamic place with Indigenous groups sometimes 
transforming, collapsing, and disappearing. Ultimately, then, this study illuminated how the ways 
in which the Narragansetts understood and communicated their Identity as Indian peoples has 
changed over time. 
Within this context of evolving conceptualizations of Indigeneity, how did Rock expect 
that he could identify a Native American from across a room? The answer to this question—
which the comedian eludes to further along in his set—helps to explain why, despite the fact that 
the Rock and the vast majority of those in the audience would not know if they had indeed met 
two Indians or observed an Indian family eating in a restaurant, the joke is effective. Most people 
assume that the others with whom they regularly intact are not Native America. The common 
perception that Indian peoples are generally absent in American society is not only due in part to 
demographic realities—in 2015 Native Americans made up two percent of the overall 
population—but also because the traits invoked by most Americans to identify peoples of Native 
American ancestry derive from antiquated stereotypes. For example, a little further along in his 
routine Rock complains that the organizers of the Macy’s Thanksgiving Day Parade tried to 
sneak some actors pretending to be Indians past him by placing feathers in their hair. The hilarity 
of the situation is that the wearing of feathers is so intrinsically tied to Native Americans that it 
was only the comedian’s discerning eye that had uncovered the rouse. However, the joke 
ultimately hinged on the universal expectation that Indians could be identified by the feathers in 
their hair. Because, as they went along in their daily lives, audience members did not regularly 
see people with feathers in their hair they assumed they had not interacted with or seen any 
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Native Americans. However, statistical analysis of the Apollo theater’s capacity suggests that 
their might have been as many as sixteen Indians in the audience. But it is most likely that these 
Native spectators did not have feathers in their hair. 
After hundreds of years of various cross-cultural contacts, identifying who and who is not 
considered to be Native American is fraught with complications. However, when Americans 
reduce Indigeneity to a narrow set of stereotyped identifiers and qualifiers, they obscure the fact 
that—whatever their percentage of the overall population—Native Americans remain a 
continued presence in society. This reality was not only dismissed by Rock and his audience but 
also by a general public that continues to only see Indians as people of the past who remain 
readily identifiable by the feathers the put in their hair. This investigation argues for a 
reexamination of those delimiting identifiers of Indigeneity.   
This work opened with a discussion of the divide that existed in 2003 between the 
Narragansetts and the authorities charged with enforcing Rhode Island’s laws. And as explained, 
what separated the two sides was much more than differing interpretations of state, federal, and 
tribal authority. Indeed, what was violently mediated in the parking lot of the smoke shop on July 
14
th
 was the legitimacy of Narragansett Indigeneity. As shown throughout this work, Rhode 
Islanders had long decried those who claimed to be descendants of the Narragansetts as 
inauthentic usurpers. Hence, the assertions made by the Indians especially their claims of 
sovereignty were—in the views of many—both unfounded and untenable. Within this context, 
the state’s overwhelming use of force can be understood as an unambiguous declaration of its 
authority and an invalidation of the Narragansetts. For, it was not that Rhode Islanders were 
unaware or unsympathetic to the plights of the nation’s Indigenous population. It was that many 
people in the state viewed the Narragansetts through the lens of a long historical narrative that 
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rendered those who stood and proclaimed their rights as Indian peoples on that day in mid-July 
as undeserving.
491
      
Hence, for those Narragansetts who stood locked arm to arm ready to oppose the advance 
of the officers, there was much more at stake than the revenue earned from cigarette sales. Since 
at least the late eighteenth century, white Rhode Islanders continually challenged the authenticity 
of the Narragansetts. However, tribal members often opposed attempts to invalidate their 
indigeneity as they endured the “sneers” and “unjust criticism” of their white neighbors while 
emphatically asserting that “we are the heirs of Ninigert and Miantinomi.”
492
 Thus, when the 
Narragansetts gathered at the smoke shop, they carried with them the animosities engendered by 
centuries of degradation, disregard, and marginalization. And as tribal members aligned 
themselves along the road on that hot morning in mid-July, they did so not in opposition of 
Rhode Island state law but in defiance of the historical fallacies that not only shaped how others 
perceived their community but also influenced the decisions and policies that continue to affect 
the Narragansetts negatively. In short, the Narragansetts stood in 2003 for the same reasons that 
they championed Ellison Brown and participated in pageants some seventy years earlier, to let 
the world know—as the Dawn proclaimed in its final issue—“The NARRAGANSETT TRIBE 
STILL EXISTS!"
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